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This dissertation investigates the efficacy of shamanistic healing by exploring the 
self-transformation process as mediated through ritual practices and symbolic narratives. 
It has long been observed that self-transformation is a common occurrence in shamanistic 
healing, but the mechanisms contributing to this transformation are not well understood. 
By integrating findings from contemporary scientific research on self and adapting earlier 
frameworks to reconsider both theoretical formulations of and empirical data on self-
transformation, this dissertation constructs a computational model capable of identifying 
these mechanisms, which are articulated and tested using simulation.  
Studying shamanistic healing within a broader evolutionary, informational, and 
physical context and by means of computer modeling, the gap between the contemporary 
science of self and the understanding of self in religious studies has been partially bridged. 
As simulation results show, self-transformation consists of two stages, disruption and 
reintegration. High-arousal shamanistic healing rituals exhaust cognitive resources and 
weaken the self-organizing integration tendency of the self-system, leaving self 
	
	 vii 
vulnerable to external influence and therefore providing a window of opportunity for 
symbolic narratives to exert their guiding influence on the reintegration process. As such, 
the self-transformation achieves optimal results when ritual practices and symbolic 
narratives are both involved in the healing process. By employing computational 
modeling, this dissertation demonstrates the potential and relevance of simulation for 
exploring the mechanisms that underlie shamanistic healing and constitutes a case study 
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CHAPTER ONE  
INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation seeks to specify how patients’ selves are transformed in 
shamanistic healing. Both shamanistic healing and self are debated concepts. There is no 
single agreed-upon content for either category, and both are used unsystematically across 
anthropological and sociopsychological literature (for “shamanistic healing”, cf. Eliade, 
1951/2004; Clottes & Lewis-Williams, 1998; for “self”, cf. Hallowell, 1955; Csordas, 
1994; Metzinger, 2004, 2010; A. Seligman, 2003; R. Seligman, 2010). Nevertheless, it is 
possible to compare phenomena identified with these healing practices by identifying 
features common to many of them and employing cross-cultural data analysis (cf. 
Winkelman, 2000, 2010; Dubois, 2009). Similarly, concepts of the “self,” while deeply 
embedded within cultural, conceptual, and historical frameworks, can also be studied by 
drawing from the rapid development in the study of self by cognitive scientists and 
philosophers in recent decades (cf. Damasio, 2010; Metzinger, 2004). For the purpose of 
this dissertation, shamanistic healing refers to the healing traditions that (1) adopt 
techniques that induce altered-states and (2) involve the elicitation or manipulation of 
“cultural conceptions of supernatural beings/powers” (Pandian, 1991, p. xi)  such as 
guardian spirits, animal spirits, etc. (cf. Winkelman, 2010); and self is defined not as an 
ontological entity but as “a set of motivational processes with a variety of assimilatory 
and regulatory functions”(Deci & Ryan, 1991, p. 238); these processes are self-organized 
processes (Damasio, 2010; Freeman, 2001; Deacon, 2011; Thagard, 2014) the dynamics 




Nowak et al., 2000, 2005; Wrong, 1961).  
Earlier scholarship has noticed that patients often display changes in self when 
undergoing healing: parameters of personality such as self-esteem and self-certainty shift; 
somatic aspects of self such as attention or the phenomenal experience of personhood 
undergo change; and aspects of social self are transformed (cf. Csordas, 1994; R. 
Seligman, 2010; Pandian, 1991). Shamanistic healing also leads to changes within self, 
and the reintegration of self has been highlighted as one of the important causal 
mechanisms underlying the therapeutic effects of such healings (cf. Pandian, 1991; R. 
Seligman, 2010; Walsh, 1990; Winkelman, 2010). As Pandian (1999) has argued, 
shamans often address the symbolic or cultural laws contributing to the disintegration and 
integration of self (p. 515); further research, he suggests, should focus on how the 
formulations of sacred beings provide coherence for the formulations of self (p. 506). 
Csordas’s (1994) ethnographical work has also demonstrated that religious healing acts 
regularly involve the transformation of self; theories of religious healing therefore invite 
a theory of self that can explain how this self can be transformed by religious healing 
practices.   
Nevertheless, many models of self-transformation have neglected the important 
role of cultural and contextual factors when examining healing phenomena, focusing 
instead on the isolation of a universal psychophysiological mechanism. A better model of 
self-transformation is required if we are to understand how various, culturally specific 
selves can be transformed in shamanistic healing. Such a model should account for 




contextual factors play an important role in influencing the direction of self-
transformation; such a model should also make it possible to examine how the cultural-
contextual and biopsychophysiological aspects interact, working together to trigger and 
guide self-transformation (an example can be seen in R. Seligman, 2014). By adopting an 
integrated methodology1 comprising multi-disciplinary theoretical integration and 
computer simulation to examine self-transformation in shamanistic healing processes, 
this study will provide a more rigorous model of self-transformation that can address 
some of the shortcomings of previous models and deepen the understanding of 
shamanistic healing.  
Contexts of the Study 
In 1951, Eliade argued that shamanism is a cross-cultural healing practice 
involving spirit beliefs and various practices that manipulate perception, sensation, or 
attention to induce altered states (Shamanism: Archaic Techniques of Ecstasy). Following 
Eliade’s initial work, experts have debated whether shamanism as a category possesses a 
robust empirical basis; nevertheless, cross-cultural research indicates shamanism is 
indeed an identifiable etic phenomenon (Winkelman, 1990; Dubois, 2009). The symbolic 
or interpretative approach to shamanism, which focused on the symbolic and expressive 
functions of rituals, dominated early studies of healing (cf. Ong, 1987; Lambek, 1981). 
According to this approach, since shamanistic healing ritual participation is mainly 
spectatorship, interpreters should focus on the forms or meanings of ritual symbols in 
                                                
1 Examples of this integrated approach in religious studies can be seen in R. Seligman (2011) and 
Luhrmann (2013), both of which integrate qualitative and quantitative methods, as well as 





order to understand their psychological effects— “it should be possible to extrapolate 
what went on in people’s heads from what went on in the show” (Whitehead, 1987, p. 
283). Once the meaning of symbols is adequately understood, certain emotional 
discharges would be elicited in response to the message conveyed by the symbols. 
Moreover, ritual practices are culturalized: they are rendered as conventionalized 
expressions of cultural values. Trance and other altered states of consciousness are also 
regarded as expressions of culturally sanctioned beliefs, such as the belief that souls can 
escape the body (cf. Lewis, 1971). 
Although these explanations rightly note that shamanistic ritual practices are not 
merely instrumental in function, regarding all shamanistic actions as stylized expressive 
forms reflecting social and cultural values oversimplifies the complex nuanced 
relationship between meaning and practice. As Whitehead (1987) says, “While no 
anthropologist would go so far as to claim that when people eat the ‘flesh of the gods’ in 
the form of hallucinogenic mushrooms, it is only the symbolic value of the mushroom 
that gets them high, such a statement would be an appropriate parody of the position I am 
criticizing” (p. 284).  
This approach does not mean that the underlying psychological mechanisms were 
neglected. In fact, there has been widespread interest in the mechanisms of shamanistic 
healing and important scholars have drawn heavily from psychoanalytic theories to 
understand the healing efficacy (cf. Levi-Strauss, 1949/2000). However, one rarely sees 
an examination of whether these mechanisms really account for the healing efficacy. As 




really heals people is the placebo effect / catharsis / altered states of consciousness’, but 
what actually get ‘catharted’, or the manner by which an alteration of our state of 
consciousness brings about healing or change, remains unexplained” (p. 288). 
Recognizing this lacuna, many religion scholars have embraced the paradigm of 
embodiment in recent decades. This paradigm was first adopted by Csordas (1990), 
aiming to overcome the limitations of the symbolic and interpretative approach by giving 
due credit to corporeal and sensorial engagement. The major contribution of this 
paradigm lies in its argument that the locus of the therapeutic effect lies in self. The focus 
on self in the study of shamanistic healing and other forms of religious healing is not new; 
indeed, the importance of self in understanding healing experiences has been noticed 
since the beginning of the scholarly interest in miraculous and faith healing in the 
nineteenth century (cf. James, 1902/2003; Peters, 1989). However, these previous 
approaches are impeded by partial conceptualization of self: self is examined merely on 
the discursive, objectified, abstract level, with its embodied level overlooked (cf. James, 
1902/2003; Mead, 1934). This disproportionate focus on the discursive aspects of self 
made it hard to understand a critical puzzle – how changes in meaning can cause 
physiological effects (Winkelman, 2010, p. 8). 
As a counterweight to the predominant focus on the discursive aspect of self, the 
embodiment approach emphasizes the pre-reflective and embodied aspect of experience 
(cf. R. Seligman, 2010; Itzhak, 2015). Seligman (2010) argues that healing practices 
simultaneously engaging both dimensions—the cognitive-discursive and embodied 




importantly, this embodied paradigm also emphasizes the multi-leveled nature of self as 
well as the feedback loops between its hierarchical dimensions. This is in agreement with 
recent developments in the study of self within complexity theory (Damasio, 2010; 
Metzinger, 2004; Thagard, 2014). However, due to the disciplinary gap, few religion 
scholars have adopted tools used in complexity sciences to explicate the mechanisms and 
principles underlying self. 
Self and Shamanistic Healing in a New Framework 
Current trends in psychology and cognitive neuroscience suggest that principles 
of thermodynamics and information theory might be particularly important for gaining 
insights into psychological processes, especially their organizational principles; the 
underlying premise is that complex systems—physical, biological, or psychological—
have similar generic features, since what matters in complex systems is the organizational 
patterns of the systems rather than the nature of the units comprising those systems (cf. 
Friston, Kilner, & Harrison, 2006; Edelman & Tononi, 2000; Clark, 2015; Bob, 2011; 
Gelo & Salvatore, 2016). This integrative theoretical framework has been applied to the 
understanding of the transformational processes in psychotherapy (Gelo & Salvatore, 
2016), perception (Clark, 2015), self-recognition (Apps & Tsakiris, 2014), anxiety (Hirsh 
et al., 2012), and dissociation (Bob, 2011); and has positioned psychological research 
within a broader physical, informational, and evolutionary context. 
With increasing realization that the brain is a complex information-processing 
system, major theoretical formulations have appeared that derive organizational rules 




Friston’s Free Energy Principle (FEP) (Friston et al., 2006; Friston, 2010), which 
describes how complex adaptive systems (e.g., organisms in an environment) resist the 
tendency to disorder (e.g., disintegration and death) – this is related to the second law of 
thermodynamics2. Biological systems sample environmental information selectively to 
avoid irreversible change of structure and thus minimize free energy. This principle 
might be a unifying principle for mental processes at different levels (Friston et al., 2006) 
and thus enables a compelling understanding of the dynamic change of self. Closely 
related to the FEP is the “entropy model of uncertainty” (EMU) (Hirsh et al., 2012), also 
deriving from thermodynamics and information theory. EMU emphasizes the concept of 
entropy, which describes the amount of uncertainty or disorder in a system. One 
important tenet of this theory is that a clearer belief structure or goal can help constrain 
the subjective uncertainty experience through decreasing competing affordances (ibid).  
FEP and EMU illustrate the adaptive value of developing an integrated or 
coherent self. A coherent self, as an efficient predictive and interpretive frame of 
reference (Metzinger, 2004; Freeman, 2001), enables the generation of clear goals and 
belief structures that serve as solid frames of reference for decision making. It also 
enables better self-regulation not only of interactions with the outside world but also of 
internal cognitive and affective processes. Contemporary study of self suggests that self 
arises from the necessity of organisms to regulate their bodily states and maintain 
homeostasis (Damasio, 2010). An integrated self can regulate the body in a more efficient 
way, which facilitates information processing and the organization of complex and 
                                                
2 The Second Law of Thermodynamics states that for any isolated system there is a natural 




ambiguous experiences better than a disintegrated/disrupted self, and thus plays an 
essential role in managing mental and physical health (Metzinger, 2004). 
This dissertation argues that the same physical principle of minimizing 
informational entropy also applies to the self-system. The need for minimizing entropy 
requires a press for integration in the self-structure (Nowak et al., 2000, 2005). From an 
evolutionary perspective, the self-organizing tendency towards integration is also a 
necessary complement to the increasing modularity of the brain shaped by the increasing 
need for information processing (cf. Laughlin et al., 1992; McNamara, 2014; Damasio, 
2010). To regulate inner states and to respond to the environment efficiently requires 
clear goals and unconflicted motives, which a disrupted self-structure fails to provide. 
Laughlin et al. (1992) refer to this tendency towards integration as the “holistic 
imperative”—a drive toward more integrated levels of self—and regard this as an 
important principle of shamanistic healing practices. Empirical evidence in agreement 
with this postulate consists in the findings that deficits in neural connectivity are related 
to disintegration of the mind and ‘intrapsychic’ conflict (Edelman & Tononi, 2000; Bob, 
2011).  
However, the ability of self to organize itself toward coherent states might not be 
constant. There are reasons to believe that intrinsic and situational factors affect this 
capability. Maintaining internal coherence requires energy and resources (Treisman & 
Schmidt, 1982), and cognitive, emotional, or physical overloading limits the energy and 
resources that can be used (cf. Schjoedt, 2013; Gilbert, 1993). The cognitive resource 




high-arousal rituals exhausts cognitive resources without which one cannot check for 
incongruence within information.  
Besides the assumption of the self-organizing tendency toward integration, this 
theory of self also assumes the influence of external information on the development and 
transformation of self. In particular, based on the findings from the role theory / play 
theory framework (Perner, 1991; Rakoczy, 2008; Leslie, 1994; Nichols & Stich, 2000) 
and the observations from religion scholars on the role of self-model scripts or self-
narrative on the transformation of self (R. Seligman, 2010; Winkelman, 2010), this theory 
emphasizes the special effect on the transformation of self of “cultural conceptions of 
supernatural beings/powers” (Pandian, 1991, p. xi) as models for self-development. 
According to the role theory and play theory, as well as theories on possible selves and 
self-schemas, the capacity for imagining possible selves plays important roles in guiding 
the reintegration of self. Many shamanistic healing rituals engage spirit beliefs and 
manipulate cultural symbols representing spirits, which may guide the direction for self-
transformation.  
Many religion scholars have also noticed the therapeutic potential present in role 
taking, and suggested it may activate the mechanism for self-transformation (Taves, 2011; 
McNamara, 2009; Winkelman, 2000; R. Seligman, 2014). This approach argues that the 
development of self requires the integration of other roles by adopting the scripts for self 
present in those other roles. Laughlin et al. (1992) postulate the concept of "shamanic 
projection,” positively projecting into sufferers an ideal image that is a more advanced 




(2010, 2014), by providing an alternative model of selfhood, healing rituals enable the 
rescripting of self-narrative for the patients, and can fix their biographical disruption 
(Hunt, 2000; Bury, 1982).  
In summary, the theory presented in this dissertation aims to provide a new 
framework for understanding self-transformation in shamanistic healing within a broader 
evolutionary, physical, and informational context by synthesizing (1) recent 
developments from the study of complex psychological and cultural systems, equipped 
with the theoretical and technical tools for complex system study derived from the 
physical sciences since the 1950s, and (2) research on self in cognitive science, 
neuroscience and psychology. The aim is to examine the important roles played by 
cultural/contextual factors and their interaction with psychophysiological factors, and to 
provide a well-articulated and testable causal understanding of shamanistic healing rather 
than merely a descriptive or suggestive correlational analysis of the kinds already 
prevalent within the existing literatures on religion and healing. 
Different from many theories of mechanisms that neglect the essential roles of 
cultural-contextual aspects of selfhood and healing, this dissertation, on the contrary, 
aims to demonstrate how cultural/contextual aspects actually play a significant role in the 
self-transformation process underlying shamanistic healing. A viable model of self-
transformation cannot afford to ignore either the cultural/contextual aspects or the 
psychophysiological aspects.  
Methodology 




transformation in shamanistic healing. The first component of this approach is a 
multidisciplinary theoretical integration of the contemporary science of self, upon which 
to form a new framework of self, which construes self as a set of both discursive and 
embodied dynamical processes that help humans better control their internal states and 
interaction with the environment (cf. Deci & Ryan, 1991; Damasio, 2010; Carver & 
Scheier, 2001; R. Seligman, 2010). This framework draws its basic principles from the 
physical sciences, especially complexity science and information theory, the plausibility 
of which is reflected in the increasing influence of these principles in various fields of 
psychology and cognitive science (Gelo & Salvatore, 2016; Clark, 2015; Apps & Tsakiris, 
2014, Hirsh et al., 2012; Bob, 2011). This theory also draws on role theory and possible 
selves theory, which explain how the imagination of possible selves and role playing 
function significantly in self-development (Taves, 2011; Perner, 1991; Rakoczy, 2008; 
Leslie, 1994; Nichols & Stich, 2000). This theory predicts that shamanistic healing 
practices involving both (1) the techniques that can trigger altered states and (2) the 
elicitation or manipulation of cultural conceptions of supernatural beings as self-scripts 
simultaneously can be particularly effective in transforming self due to that it reflects the 
coupled effect from the interaction between the intrinsic dynamics and the external 
contextual factors.  
The second component of this approach is computer modeling and simulation; the 
simulation results can be compared against the predictions of the theory. On one hand, 
implementing a formal model of a theory pushes one to formulate precise and explicitly 




the theory strictly guide the construction of the simulation model, the simulation results 
can be compared against the predictions of the theory to reveal any inconsistencies of the 
theory. Using simulation modelling to test theories of self is a well-established approach 
in social psychology. One of the most important achievements of simulation modelling, 
the “Society of Self model,” was created by social psychologist Andrzej Nowak, one of 
the founders of computational social psychology (Nowak et al. 2000, 2005). His 
simulation modelling has focused on the understanding of self in social psychology. The 
model built in this dissertation will be a modification and extension of his computational 
model as a formal platform to study self-transformation in shamanistic healing. 
Since self is a set of processes generated from the interaction of self-relevant 
information as well as external contextual information, in this cellular automaton model, 
each cell represents a specific item of information relevant to self. Because the focus is 
on the generic features of the integration process, the model assumes that the elements 
correspond to the lowest-level features of self-understanding (Nowak et al. 2000). Each 
item differs in evaluation and weight (ibid). Each cellular automaton is composed of 400 
self-relevant information items, and each item’s interaction with others and with the 
external contextual information reflects the dynamics of the self-processes of a single 
person. The basic idea is that each self-information item is influenced by its neighboring 
self-relevant elements and also by relevant external information.  
There is reasonable distrust of simulation models when they are used – “They are 
themselves complex, created by people, and have no necessary relationship to the real 




fantasies?” (O’Reilly et al., 2012, Kindle Locations p. 370-373). This concern has been 
addressed carefully in social psychology and personality studies, in which computer 
simulation has been used frequently, and the most important way to avoid arbitrariness in 
the simulation model is to constrain it with data at as many levels as possible (cf. Nowak 
et al., 2000, 2005). The simulation model in this dissertation fulfills this requirement, as 
every parameter and its value setting is based on empirical research and theory. For 
example, the two major parameters of the model correspond to the two factors co-present 
in shamanistic healings in accord with many ethnographic studies—cultural conceptions 
of supernatural beings, and altered-states inducement techniques. The platform 
construction actively incorporates constraints from as many disciplines as are relevant to 
maximize the model’s physical, neuro-psychological, and phenomenological plausibility.  
Although the simulation model is created based on the assumptions of the theory, 
the simulation results are not built into the simulation model, but are generated by the 
self-organization of the self-dynamics and its interaction with the external factors; thus 
the simulation results are independent of the theoretical predictions. In other words, the 
simulation results may not be what the theory has predicted. If a simulation model strictly 
follows the theory’s assumptions but does not generate the same results as the theory 
predicts, then this indicates a necessity to modify the theory before conducting any 
follow-up empirical research to further test the theory. However, if the simulation results 
conform to the theoretical predictions, it can greatly strengthen its plausibility. The 
strengthened plausibility could then motivate future empirical research where data can be 




model, and permitting direct testing. With future interdisciplinary cooperation, data can 
be collected by ethnographers who intentionally observe and record changes in self in 
shamanistic healing rituals and how these self changes relate to other comparative 
categories, such as cultural-contextual models of personhood, supernatural beings, 
efficacy, and ultimate human possibility (Barnes, 2011); by empirical psychologists who 
design experiments to collect self-related data as dependent variables influenced by ritual 
elements; and by neuroscientists who use EEGs to collect data about brain coherence and 
complexity level before, during, and after shamanistic rituals.  
Even without sufficient existing data to test or falsify the theoretical predictions, 
we can still discuss the plausibility of the theory. As Kuhn (1977) says, in order to 
evaluate the adequacy of a theory, determining whether it matches existing experiments’ 
results is only one of the five standards (accuracy, consistency, breadth of scope, 
simplicity, and fruitfulness). (1) The unavailability of sufficient data to test the model 
only relates to the first of Kuhn’s five standards. The theory proposed here works well in 
relation to the other four standards. (2) It is consistent with important physical and 
information theories, in agreement with the trend in cognitive science to regard self as 
hierarchical, complex, and evolutionarily adaptive (fulfilling “consistency”); (3) it applies 
well to the subjective process implicated in shamanistic healing rituals but is also a 
general self theory that may apply outside religious contexts, which serves as a solid 
foundation for comparison between shamanistic healing and other forms of healing 
(“breadth of scope”); (4) it is also simple in that there is a limited set of basic 




(5) it indicates promising new directions and discloses previous unnoted relations such as 
the relation between practice and meaning, and between intrinsic features and situational 
factors (“fruitfulness”). 
This dissertation has theoretical and methodological biases. I share a similar 
theoretical orientation with Csordas, represented by his remark on his book Sacred Self 
(1994):  
…it would be only partly correct to say that this book is about ritual healing 
among Catholic Charismatics in the United States. Such a book would consist of a 
description of healing practices in their social and cultural context, detailing the 
kinds of problems these healing practices address and speculating about how they 
achieve whatever beneficial effect they appear to have. I must admit from the 
outset that I find this formula unsatisfying, as it has produced a voluminous 
literature on healing that, despite its empirical diversity, is in large part 
theoretically redundant, reaching the same conclusions over and again. Thus, 
while I have addressed the standard issues in the chapters that follow, my strategy 
has been not to write about Charismatic healing, but to ask what Charismatic 
healing is about and write about that. (p. viii) 
 
My theoretical bias is that to ask what shamanic healing is about and to write 
about that is more important than writing about shamanistic healing. This is not only to 
avoid producing literature that only reaches redundant conclusions, but also to catch the 




may help build an integrated framework that appreciates the complexities intrinsic to the 
healing efficacy issue. This dissertation thus focuses on the potential causal mechanisms 
of shamanic healing within a new framework rather than producing another detailed 
description of these practices in a specific cultural context. This does not mean, however, 
that cultural contexts and detailed descriptions are not important; to the contrary, this 




















CHAPTER TWO  
RELIGIOUS HEALING: HOW DOES IT WORK? 
This chapter reviews the multidisciplinary literature that helps explore the topic of 
the mechanisms underlying the efficacy of shamanistic healing. This review includes the 
more general literature accounting for religious healing efficacy instead of solely the 
literature specifically on shamanistic healing. The rationale for this broader inclusion 
criterion is that some important theories of religious healing contain shamanistic healing 
in consideration, and a more inclusive criterion would help situate shamanistic healing in 
a broader context and bring opportunities to shed more light on this important puzzle. 
Indeed, the conceptualizations of other forms of religious healing, such as 
charismatic healing, adopt notions of the placebo effect, dissociation, and 
symbolic efficacy that are also widely used as possible explanatory models for 
shamanistic healing, suggesting that different forms of religious healing might share 
some similar underlying mechanisms. When Csordas (1994) talks about charismatic 
healing, he argues that it is more important to ask what it is about than to describe what it 
is (p. viii). The same goes for shamanistic healing— a dissertation about shamanistic 
healing in a certain region or culture is undoubtedly important, as it would provide 
detailed descriptions of the healing practices in a concrete cultural context, but the 
problem of this approach might be that “it has produced a voluminous literature on 
healing that, despite its empirical diversity, is in large part theoretically redundant, 
reaching the same conclusions over and again” (p. viii).   




(Barnes, 2005; Csordas, 1994; Dole, 2004; Greenfield, 2008; Grim, 1987), “ritual” 
(McClenon, 2002; McGuire, 1988), “indigenous” (Kleinman, 1980a), or “spiritual” 
(Watts, 2011). This is a broader category than shamanistic healing, but the latter is 
subsumed under the former. I will begin by reviewing the discipline in which religious 
healing study has traditionally dwelled: anthropology. Later, I shall examine 
contributions from psychology, which may not directly tackle religious healing, yet 
whose insights into the human psyche have been drawn upon frequently by religion 
scholars to understand religious healing phenomena. The discipline I shall subsequently 
review is biomedicine, where scientific research on religion and health has emerged fast 
over the past decades, and in which psychosomatic mechanisms have been elaborated to 
account for the complex connections between religion and health.   
Anthropology 
Csordas (1994), in his review of the theories about religious healing, has 
summarized four major hypotheses: the Structural Hypothesis, the Clinical Hypothesis, 
the Social Support Hypothesis, and the Persuasive Hypothesis.  
Csordas notes that the Structural Hypothesis was initially developed in Levi-
Strauss’s (1949/2000) seminal work “The effectiveness of symbols,” in which he argues 
for an inherent power of correspondence between a healer’s symbolic acts and a patient’s 
disease. However, Csordas and Kleinman (1996) argue that the explanatory power of 
using “homology” to account for efficacy is no stronger than indigenous explanations. 
Csordas also notes that the Clinical Hypothesis focuses on the analogy between religious 




psychiatry as a paradigmatic example. Csordas argues that the problem with this 
approach is its tendency to downplay the specific quality of such healings that makes it 
“religious.” Csordas observes that the Social Support Hypothesis suggests that religious 
healing rituals are effective through enhancing social solidarity and resolving 
interpersonal tensions, among other effects, and Victor Turner (1964)’s discussion of 
Ndembu healing is paradigmatic. However, as Csordas criticizes, those studies have 
provided only a functional understanding of rituals and haven’t touched the underlying 
biological or psychosomatic mechanisms. The last hypothesis, Csordas notes, is the 
Persuasive Hypothesis, which is represented by Frank’s argument that religious healing 
works by making a shift in patients’ assumptive world under healers’ influence (Frank & 
Frank, 1993).  
Each of these theories has exposed some possibly important elements involved in 
religious healing. However, Csordas (1994) argues that these theories depend on a shared 
understanding of how efficacy is constituted by certain psychosomatic mechanisms, such 
as suggestion, the placebo effect, catharsis, trance, etc. These mechanisms are “a limited 
repertoire of global mechanisms” and “a kind of biocultural ‘black-box’” (Csordas, 1994, 
p. 3). Although anthropologists may be quite right in saying the healing rituals must work 
by eliciting psychosomatic effects through one or more of these mechanisms, they 
haven’t gone further to show why these mechanisms are therapeutic or to explain what 
they are. The question is not answered but transferred: the gravity of the question 
migrates from how religious healing heals to how trance or hypnosis heals. The problem, 




mechanisms actually work. 
Realizing this lacuna, some anthropologists explore new theoretical directions. 
Two major directions have emerged: the first is an integrative interdisciplinary approach, 
such as incorporating findings from evolutionary psychology and neuroscience into the 
understanding of religious healing; the second is innovating ethnographical 
methodologies within anthropology itself, which emphasizes experiential details of 
subjects’ first-person views and draws attention to the integration of the representational 
and symbolic levels of analysis with the experiential and embodied level. These two 
directions are closely related. The following will review these trends, with Winkelman’s 
(2000) biopsychophysiological model of shamanistic healing, McClenon’s (2002) ritual 
healing theory, Csordas’s (1994, 2002) sacred self theory and Seligman’s (2014) self 
model of ritual healing as examples. 
Winkelman’s research on shamanistic healing (2000) adopts a 
biopsychophysiological approach. It is based on an important concept: underlying 
religious experience is the integrative mode of consciousness, which contributes to brain 
integration and is thus therapeutic. This integration is manifested in the entrainment of 
the frontal cortex by highly synchronized waves from lower brain structures. Religious 
healing heals by eliciting these brain wave patterns through ritual procedures or 
psychedelics. According to Winkelman, there are three major types of religious 
experience that involve the integrative mode of consciousness: shamanic states, 
meditative states, and possession states. Religious healing rituals are therapeutic because 




brain, particularly the limbic system and the cerebral cortex. Now the question becomes 
why is integration of information therapeutic? Winkelman’s hypothesis is twofold: first, 
this may correspond to a collapse into a parasympathetic-dominant state, whose link with 
therapeutic effects is well-established; second, people in the integrative mode of 
consciousness have an enhanced ability to access information that normally remains 
unconscious. By bringing the body-level awareness of the preverbal mind into 
consciousness, a better mind-body integration ensues.  
Winkelman (2000) summarizes shamanistic studies and concludes that a complete 
understanding of shamanistic healing efficacy requires a reconceptualization of causation: 
how the mental influences the physiological. He says that this question has been noticed 
in neuroscience, with Freeman’s (2001) study of perception as an example. Unfortunately, 
Winkelman doesn’t incorporate much of Freeman’s research, or that of other 
neuroscientists who adopt a complexity and information framework (Sporns, 2002; 
Edelman & Tononi, 2000), which deals with the relations between disposition/value and 
body and which might be an important piece for understanding religious healing. 
Another example of interdisciplinary synthesis is McClenon’s (2002) ritual 
healing theory, arguing that the central mechanism underlying ritual healings is the 
hypnosis-related placebo effect. McClenon groups various phenomena such as shamanic 
healing, hypnosis, and other anomalous experiences together and argues that they are part 
of an evolved psycho-physiological potential – the placebo response. Healing rituals 
induce hypnotic states with positive physiological consequences. He believes the cross-




biological mechanism. McClenon (2002) argues that hypnosis interrupts the normal 
cycles of neurotransmitters, causing the neural system to collapse into parasympathetic-
dominant states and inducing interhemispheric synchronized brain wave patterns. This 
enhances the human capability to recover from disease. This synchronization also causes 
enhanced flow of information from the unconscious to the conscious, enhancing the 
ability to discover more creative strategies. He also argues that the mechanism underlying 
religious healing effect on those psychosomatic ailments might involve 
psychoneuroimmunological (PNI) responses. In summary, McClenon adopts the 
psychosomatic mechanisms of hypnosis, the placebo effect, PNI, and neural system 
synchronization to account for the biological underpinning of religious healing efficacy. 
But without specific explanations of how these mechanisms can heal, this still amounts to 
a transferring of our leading question to why the psychosomatic mechanisms are 
therapeutically effective, and amounts to answering the question of how shamanistic 
healing works by saying it works through hypnosis, the placebo effect, and PNI.  
Csordas’s cultural phenomenology of embodiment (1994, 2002) greatly 
influenced research on religious healing. He conducts a synthesis of Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology of embodied perception (1945/2013) and Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of 
habitual bodily practice (1977). His approach focuses on participants’ lived experiential 
specificity of the religious healing process rather than the clinical, ritual, or social aspects 
of the healing. The central organizing theme in his analysis is the making of selfhood and 
self-transformation. Based on his ethnographic work (1994) on charismatic churches in 




of self towards a sacred self. He argues that self is not an entity but a projective and 
indeterminate complex of perceptual and imaginative processes. Religious healings use 
techniques to alter supplicants’ indeterminate dispositions and thus transform selfhood. 
Therefore, religious healing is about the transformation of self.  
Csordas’s argument for a more specific, non-black-box understanding of the 
mechanisms of religious healing is very influential. Through his first-rate ethnography he 
also redirects the focus of religious healing research from social and cultural factors to 
the self-process within which all other factors are located. He convincingly locates the 
efficacy of religious healing in self, and thus builds a bridge between anthropologists’ 
cultural analysis of selfhood and the psychological and neuroscientific studies of 
subjectivity. Although he himself does not go deep into neuroscientific study of selfhood, 
he successfully shows the necessity of redirecting the focus of religious healing study 
onto it. 
Sharing Csordas’s focus on self and the interaction between meaning and body, 
Rebecca Seligman (2014) also frames her understanding of Candomblé trance healing in 
terms of the transformation of self processes. Her central premise is that self-
transformation in Candomblé mediumship is a process that can potentially heal mind and 
body, and she borrows Ian Hacking’s concept of bio-looping (1995), the feedback loop 
among practice, experience, learning and body as the mechanism underlying the health 
effect of spiritual healing rituals. Her major argument is as follows: first, self resides at 
the intersection of mind and body; second, afflictions can cause incoherence or disruption 




practices that simultaneously work on both levels can be particularly effective.   
These new orientations constitute great progress in religious healing studies and 
are essential steps towards a more thorough understanding of this topic. They help guide 
future research by showing the importance of interdisciplinary study of the underlying 
mechanisms and the importance of the concept of self integration in understanding 
religious healing. In particular, important research has drawn attention to self as the 
potential locus not only for religious healing but for a fruitful integration of the biological 
and cultural approaches to religious healing. 
Psychology 
Religious healing literature is often subsumed under the broader “religion and 
health” literature, and the psychological literature on religion and health has increased 
rapidly in recent decades (see Koenig, McCullough, & Carson, 2001; Paloutzian & Park, 
2014). Many review articles have shown the general significant correlation between 
religion and health (Bergin et al., 1988; Larson, Swyers, & McCullough, 1997). In the 
authoritative handbook of religion and health, Koenig, McCullough, and Larson (2001) 
conclude that there is ample evidence to demonstrate the association of religious belief 
and practices with positive health. To be more specific, it has been shown that 
religiousness or spirituality “have a consistent relationship with low levels of substance 
abuse and dependence; a weaker, although reliable, salutary association with affective 
disorders, suicide, and well-being; and a less consistent pattern of associations for 
schizophrenia, anxiety, and reactions to trauma (PTSD, PTSS, and perceived growth)” 




However, two problems occur when one attempts to understand the mechanisms 
of religious healing by resorting to the religion and health literature. The first problem 
concerns the quality and nature of the literature itself: the relationship demonstrated 
between religion and health is ambiguous because many studies are cross-sectional with 
various confounding variables (Paloutzian & Park, 2014). This ambiguity is most evident 
when it comes to causal mechanisms, as association is not causation. Most researchers 
resort to social support, lifestyle choices, coping strategies, etc. to account for the 
correlation between religion and health. However, it is difficult to identify any causal 
relationship: whether individuals with higher well-being turn out to be more religious, or 
whether those religious people tend to have higher well-being, or whether religiosity and 
wellbeing simply co-develop with other unknown factors mediating their relationship 
(Fontana, 2003). Fontana summarizes that, although most studies point to a significant 
association between religiosity and well-being-related factors, a clearer explanation for 
these associations is still lacking. Realizing these limitations, scholars like McCullough 
(McCullough et al., 2007) and Pargament (2004) have designed longitudinal studies to 
explore the underlying causal processes, and attachment theorists have developed studies 
of research showing the effects of variability in attachment styles on health-related 
factors (Jankowski & Sandage, 2011; Granqvist & Kirkpatrick, 2004). 
Moreover, most religion-health psychology literature focuses on the gradual 
process by which religious participation or beliefs influence health states, rather than the 
effects of specific religious rituals and techniques on the human mental and bodily 




not equivalent to whether and how religious healing techniques achieve therapeutic 
effects. Fraser Watts’s research on spiritual healing (2011) distinguishes between the 
long-term background factors and specific actions/events that occur at specific times to 
trigger the healing effect. He believes that cognitive and social processes likely contribute 
to healing, for example through providing cognitive frameworks that enable patients to 
find meaning, but a different question is how these psychosocial processes might be 
mediated at the somatic level and how specific healing practices such as laying on of 
hands can trigger healing. Most religion-health literature focuses on the long-term 
background factors rather than the specific actions triggering therapeutic effects. 
Therefore, the psychological literature most relevant for understanding 
shamanistic healing efficacy is perhaps not that of religion-health correlations, but of how 
specific techniques trigger healing. In particular, the literature surrounding dissociation, 
hypnosis, and suggestion has been frequently drawn upon by religion scholars seeking a 
biological basis for healing. The same set of experiences designated as dissociation in 
psychiatry corresponds to visions, inspiration, mysticism, and ecstasy in religious studies 
(Taves, 1999, p. 127).  
The study of dissociation began 150 years ago, and the pioneer theorists can be 
formed into two groups: French (Puysegur, Moreau de Tours, Gros Jean, Taine, Charcot, 
Janet, Binet) and Anglo-American (F. Mayers, James, Sidis, Prince) (Ross, 1997). 
Among these great thinkers the most influential one is Janet, who first proposed the 
concept of dissociation to account for those phenomena often occurring in automatism, 




chains of memory, and memories belonging to different chains are independent from 
each other; hypnosis can engage the chains of memory that are dissociated from the chain 
of memory constituting the usual self (Taves, 1999). The major alternative to Janet’s 
theory is Myer’s theory of consciousness (Taves, 1999). Opposite to Janet’s pathological 
theory of dissociation that the healthy mind is unified while sick minds are divided, Myer 
believes that the human mind is naturally multiplex, and he argues that every individual 
has the potential to achieve different arrangements of self by combining the personality 
elements in fresh ways (Taves, 1999). Later research findings support Myer’s theory of 
the multiplex nature of self (see Dennett, 1989; Klein & Gangi, 2010). However, the 
mechanism for this multiplicity was highly speculative in Myer’s case. 
These studies aroused great interest in William James (1902/2003). Long 
interested in the transformative value of conversion experience, James found that Janet’s 
and Myers’ theories of dissociation and integration might help him identify a generic 
psychological mechanism underlying religious experiences. James believed that religious 
experiences might be caused by the incursion of the subliminal self into consciousness 
(1902/2003). He adopts the dynamics of the subconscious self to replace trance, 
suggestion, and magnetism as the genuine causal mechanisms (Taves, 1999, p. 280). For 
him, dissociation is the process of re-aggregation of personality. James’s theory of 
religious experience (1902/2003) can be taken as a theory of religious healing since one 
essential feature of religious experience is the therapeutic states it produces. In particular, 
his theory of the divided self and its unification emphasizes the effect of religious 




health (James, 1902/2003). This understanding of religious healing and its transformative 
effects led James to argue that the function of religion is the transformation of self. In his 
classic book on religious experience (1902/2003), he discusses the transformative effect 
of religion in many chapters. In particular, in the chapter “the divided self, and the 
process of its unification”, James talks about the effect of religious experience in unifying 
the inner self: some people are born with a relatively harmonious inner constitution (“the 
healthy-minded”), while others are oppositely constituted (“sick-soul”). The normal 
evolution of personality consists in the unifying of inner self. Our inner constitution of 
mind must, as James says, end by forming a stable system. James’s theory of religious 
healing is centered around the integration and unification of mind and self.  Although he 
realizes that the inner integration can come in two ways—sudden and gradual—he is 
more interested in the sudden form. He defines conversion as the process by which a 
divided self becomes unified, and believes that the subconscious might be the source for 
such integration, which hypnotists may manipulate to help achieve integration (James, 
1902/2003).  
The second period of development in dissociation studies was after the Second 
World War, when it was accompanied by a renewed interest in hypnosis (Bob, 2003). 
Major progress occurred in this period. Hilgard developed his neo-dissociative theory 
(1977), arguing that there exists a subconscious part of the human psyche—the “hidden 
observer”. Another important aspect of progress was the self approach to dissociation, 
embraced by Nijenhuis (2012) and Putnam (1994, 1995), among others, arguing that 




pathological dissociation results in disruptions in self (Putnam, 1994, 1995) or is caused 
by self disturbances (Liotti, 1992).  
However, to answer whether dissociation can account for the health effect of 
religious healing, we need a detailed analysis of this mechanism due to the complexity 
surrounding this issue. Not only are there many disagreements on the definition of 
dissociation, but the link between dissociation and health effect is debated. As Sandage 
(2014) points out, “Dissociation ranges across a wide continuum and can be both 
adaptive and maladaptive” (p. 63). Therefore, this topic will be approached in detail in 
next chapter, while this chapter focuses on exploring the bigger multidisciplinary picture 
and sorting out the more plausible theories and mechanisms for later detailed analysis. 
Biomedicine 
Biomedical literature on religious healing can be roughly divided into three 
groups. The first one addresses the health benefits of being religious, mediated by 
cognitive and social processes, and focuses more on religion than spirituality, and more 
on mainstream biomedicine than alternative or spiritual healing modalities. This type of 
research has flourished since the 1990s with the support of the John Templeton 
Foundation. The second group focuses on unmasking the hidden paths along which 
endogenous healing powers move to produce therapeutic effects, normally related to so-
called mind-body medicine or psychosomatics. The third group is interested in finding 
any possible forces or energies entangled in religious healing, and can be sometimes 
overloaded with ontological claims that challenge the current scientific framework. To 




Harrington’s (2005) summary of religion’s health effect is a helpful example. She argues 
that religion’s health effect is not a unified single claim but consists of four separate 
claims:  going to church is good for your health, meditation works, the power of belief, 
and prayer can heal. The first one can be roughly subsumed under the first group of 
literature, the following two claims under the second group, while the last one falls under 
the third group.  
The following will show how these claims fit this categorization. “Going to 
church is good for your health” represents the cluster of research studies arguing for the 
correlation between religiosity and better health, and that this correlation can be 
understood in a scientifically detectable way. Psychiatrist Harold Koenig is one of the 
leading researchers in this area, who models the ways in which religion affects mental 
and physical health (2001a, 2001b). He conceives of religion as a personal coping 
strategy, a prosocial force, and a method of behavioral control. In looking for the 
mechanisms by which religion affects health, he first identifies the major pathways by 
which physical health can be affected: genetic factors, childhood training, psychological 
and social influences, health behaviors, and healthcare practices. Koenig’s basic idea is 
this: if these factors can affect health, and if religion influences those factors (religious 
beliefs improve coping, reduce stress, prevent or help resolve depression, enhance social 
support, promote healthy habits, prevent drug use, etc.), then “a plausible mechanism 
exists by which physical health may be affected [by religion]” (2001b). 
As mentioned before, this type of literature suffers a major problem: correlation is 




explanatory power is limited. Other criticisms include reducing the religious factors to 
social support, for example by saying that attending churches is good for health because 
it provides community support. A more fatal challenge appeared in 1996, when Israeli 
epidemiologist Jeremy Kark (1996) designed his study comparing mortality rates in 
eleven religious kibbutzim and eleven secular ones, and found the mortality rates in the 
latter were twice that of the former. Since the levels of social support between these two 
kinds of groups are not significantly different, this research challenges the plausibility of 
accounting for religion’s health effects by social support (Harrington, 2005). 
If social support could not satisfactorily account for the health benefits of religion, 
the answer has to be found elsewhere. Possible answers have emerged from the second 
group of literature, which incorporates among others the two claims that meditation 
works, and that belief has the power to heal (Harrington, 2005). One of the leading 
researchers studying meditation is cardiologist Herbert Benson (Benson & Klipper, 1992), 
whose transcendental meditation research is quite influential. Since his research started in 
the 1970s, he has framed the healing effect of a secularized form of TM as a stress-buster 
that elicits the body’s relaxation response—a physiological counterpart of the well-
known stress response (Harrington, 2005). Compared with meditation research, the kind 
of research represented by Harrington’s third claim— belief is a healing power—is a 
more typical representation of the second group of literature. This research was 
originated in the late nineteenth century’s mind-cure movement, which was markedly 
influenced by European research on mesmerism, hypnosis, and faith healings. This group 




body medicine, which all sought to uncover the complex body-mind linkage, to 
understand the intrinsic healing powers, and to find power sources that can be tapped in 
order to contribute to human health.   
The fourth claim—prayer can heal—lands in the third group of literature, which 
oftentimes involves unconventional ontological claims. One of the leading researchers on 
prayer, and intercessory prayer in particular, is Internal Medicine specialist Larry Dossey 
(1999), who argues for the spiritual nature of human beings, manifested in their ability to 
use their minds to influence others’ health condition. Dossey argues for a new medical 
science paradigm that allows for this extraordinary source of healing. A central concept 
of his theory is the nonlocal mind, by which he means that the mind is not limited by time 
and space nor is it confined in one’s body; some part within each individual is infinite, 
eternal, and omnipresent. According to him, Individual minds and the Universal Mind are 
connected; since the Universal Mind is in everything, prayer can influence the state of 
others, and he believes this effect can be assessed experimentally. 
Another leading researcher in the third group is epidemiologist Jeff Levin (2001), 
who proposes a “unified field theory”, arguing for the integration of body, mind, and 
spirit. In the last paragraph of his book God, Faith, and Health (2001), he says 
“this perspective will not be grounded principally in genetics and molecular biology, as 
the mainstream medical research establishment presumes. Instead, it will be founded on 
an integrated, body-mind-spirit perspective—a view of all sentient life as part of a 
continuous bioenergetic spectrum” and he argues this will mark a new era of Western 




ontological claims that cannot currently be tested or falsified.  
From the above analysis, one can see how the various literatures on the health 
benefits of religion can be roughly divided into those three groups. But the relevance of 
these literatures to shamanistic healing efficacy varies. As shown above, the first group is 
not particularly relevant for understanding shamanistic healing, and the third group is 
overly unconventional and methodologically problematic. Therefore, the most relevant 
literature is the second group, which not only directly relates to mind-body linkages but 
also forms a continuum with the psychological literature on religious healing. Thus the 
following review will focus on this kind of literature, organized around 
psychoneuroimmunology research, the placebo effect, and Wisneski’s integral 
physiological model of systems integration. 
The term psychoneuroimmunology was coined in 1975 by Robert Ader (1975, 
1995) to describe the interrelationships among the immune, nervous, and endocrine 
systems, which he and his colleagues found when doing research on the conditional 
immune response in rats. They injected the rats with cyclophosphamide (an 
immunosuppressive agent) together with saccharin flavored water. They found that this 
condition caused the rats to show impaired immune response even when later only the 
saccharine water was provided. This research provides the first empirical evidence for the 
Pavlovian conditioning of the immune response. 
The basic instinct behind psychoneuroimmunology research is the bi-directional 
impact between our mental state and bodily state, which has been noticed since ancient 




autonomy of mind and body has become a serious barrier for understanding the mind-
body relationship. Psychoneuroimmunology, by uncovering how social and 
psychological factors affect neuroendocrine and immune systems, helps us understand 
mind-body linkages. The psychoneuroimmunology research shows that the nervous, 
endocrine, and immune systems are not discrete units but share chemicals and are 
mutually modulated (Ader et al., 1995). 
Psychoneuroimmunology as a scientifically acknowledged mechanism underlying 
the mind-body linkage has been adopted by many religious scholars as the possible 
explanation for the therapeutic efficacies of religious healings (Watts, 2011; Wisneski, 
2009). However, the exact understanding of the extent to which psychoneuroimmunology 
explains religious healing still remains unclear. Does it explain religious healing efficacy 
partially, or tell the whole story? As psychoneuroimmunology may also underlie some 
modern biomedical procedures, what distinguishes shamanistic healing and modern 
biomedical healing?  
Another mechanism frequently adopted to account for religious healing efficacy is 
the placebo effect (see Miller & Rosenstein, 2006; Kaptchuk, 1998, 2002). It was initially 
regarded as a cluster of nonspecific factors embedded in healings having no real effect 
but was rehabilitated in the 1970s as a powerful mind-body phenomenon (Harrington, 
2011). One of the most influential researchers is Kaptchuk, who argues that the placebo 
effect, instead of being nonspecific factors, is actually the specific effect of healing 
rituals (Miller & Kaptchuk, 2008). According to him, healing rituals can help create 




symbols full of emotional and affective meanings to fuse the sufferers’ idiosyncratic 
narrative into a universal cultural mythos, thereby providing hope and meaning to their 
suffering. Kaptchuk also refers to the placebo effect as interpersonal healing because it 
occurs due to expectations and hopes embedded in the clinical encounter (ibid). He 
acknowledges that the placebo effect works not only through altering the self-concept of 
suffers, but also through affecting physical conditions by means of neurobiological 
pathways.  However, Kaptchuk remains relatively vague on the mechanism of how 
meaning, symbols, or expectations have effects on the bodily or mental dimension.  
Leonard Wisneski (2009) provides a comprehensive review of the classical 
physiological systems that might be involved in spiritual healing and 
other alternative healing techniques: the nervous systems, the endocrine system, the stress 
system, and the immune system. He also talks about the PNI and refers to it as the 
system's integration mechanism. Wisneski takes a dynamic-systems view of the human 
body, arguing that it has an intricate ability for system integration that enhances the 
body’s primary goal of maintaining homeostasis. Homeostasis promotes self-regulation 
and hence self-healing. He draws attention to system interconnections and the body as a 
complex network. He mentions various factors important for the integration of the body 
network, such as the pineal gland, which he believes is the master gland, 
with its hormonal products affecting all the classic physiological systems. Wisneski also 
introduces a paradigm referred to as “integral physiology” (2009) or “a unified energy 
field theory of physiology and healing” (1997), which he says is quite akin to Levin’s 




body systems, acknowledges the information communication among different systems, 
and argues for a network perspective on the human body, he does not really go deeper 
into the complexity theory or information theory of the human mind or body. Instead, he 
resorts the subtle energy as the cause that underlies spiritual healing, without explicating 
the nature of subtle energy or specifying how to verify its existence experimentally. 
Conclusion 
From the above review and analysis of the multidisciplinary literature relevant for 
understanding potential mechanisms underlying religious healing, we can see that the 
healing efficacy issue has attracted attention from many scholars across disciplines, but 
also that little consensus has been reached in spite of numerous research projects 
launched to examine this puzzle. Currently the placebo effect and dissociation are among 
the most frequently mentioned terms when it comes to this issue (Winkelman, 2010; 
Kaptchuk et al., 2002; Moerman, 2002). Therefore, the next chapter will examine these 
two concepts in detail, examining whether they might clarify the causal processes of 












THE PLACEBO EFFECT AND DISSOCIATION: CAN THEY EXPLAIN 
THE EFFICACY OF SHAMANISTIC HEALING? 
This chapter reviews two representative mechanisms that scholars of religion 
often resort to when conceptualizing the health effects of religious healing rituals—the 
placebo effect and dissociation—with the question of whether they may sufficiently 
account for the therapeutic effect of shamanistic healing and, if not, what might be a 
more promising direction. 
The Placebo Effect 
When religion scholars use the placebo effect in their discourse on religious 
healing rituals, it often leaves the impression that the placebo effect is a clearly defined 
mechanism in biomedicine. However, a deeper examination would show that this is not 
the case: “the placebo effect” is highly debated, and when it is used in biomedicine, its 
meaning might be different from what many religion scholars assume it to be.  
What is the Placebo Effect? 
Since Henry Beecher’s classic “The Powerful Placebo” was published in 
1955, research has greatly promoted the understanding of this elusive phenomenon. 
Numerous clinical research studies have been launched since then to explore how various 
factors (the color and quantity of pills, sham acupuncture and surgery, the patient-
practitioner relationship, the temperaments of practitioners and patients, etc.) affect 
therapeutic results. Numerous phenomena are classified as “the placebo effect,” to the 




studying the placebo effect, even suggests that probably this term should be abandoned, 
since it “is an unfortunate term, used carelessly for such a broad range of phenomena that 
we should probably abandon it; or, if we must keep it, we should use it only to refer to 
the changes observed in the subjects in a control group in an experiment” (p. 4). 
  Originally, people seem to have believed that placebo effects are the therapeutic 
effects caused by placebos, where “placebo” refers to inert medical substances or 
procedures. However, as Benedetti (2009) points out, inert substances such as sugar pills 
or saline injections will never have a therapeutic effect (p. 35). This definition commits 
“the fallacy of post hoc ergo proper hoc (after the fact, therefore because of the fact)” (p. 
222). He suggests that we should define “placebo” as “an inert treatment plus the context 
that tells the patient a therapeutic act is being performed” (p. 35), and “placebo effect” as 
“the effect that follows the administration of a placebo” (p. 34). According to this 
definition, any psychobiological effects following the administration of a placebo should 
be called a placebo effect/response (p. 35). Benedetti also maintains that, for the placebo 
effect, it is the context and verbal suggestion that truly matters (p. 35). His definition is 
questionable because, in some classical experiments believed to reflect the placebo effect, 
such as the experiment comparing two groups of patients receiving open or hidden 
treatment where the former group turns out to have significantly better results, no inert 
treatment is involved.  
  Arthur K. Shapiro, an influential researcher on the placebo effect, defines a 
placebo as “any therapy (or that component of any therapy) that is deliberately used for 




presumed effect on a patient, symptom, or illness, but which, unknown to patient and 
therapist, is without specific activity for the condition being treated” (Shapiro & Morris, 
1978, p. 371). This definition has merit in acknowledging the historical dimension of 
placebo, that is, a “real” medicine today may become a placebo tomorrow. Moreover, a 
placebo today might be discovered by future research to have specific therapeutic effect. 
Thus calling something a “placebo” may indicate the current lack of understanding of it, 
and may not necessarily prove the “placebo” is therapeutically inert.  
  Kaptchuk et al. (2002) suggest that the placebo effect occurs due to the 
expectations or beliefs embedded in the patient-clinician encounter. Miller et al. (2009) 
similarly argue that progress in understanding and utilizing the placebo effect can be 
promoted by regarding it as a certain form of “interpersonal healing”, referring to the 
therapeutic effects produced by the context of clinical encounters and the patient-
clinician relationship. However, the problem is that the placebo effect does not 
necessarily involve interpersonal encounters. Effects resulting from the difference of 
colors or shapes of pills are frequently referred to as placebo effects, but no interpersonal 
encounter is involved. Moreover, understanding the placebo effect as interpersonal 
healing does not pay due attention to the question directly related to the naming of 
“placebo effect”—why do most placebo effects need to be triggered by placebos 
(normally inert substances or fake medical procedures)? Why not just use words to 
comfort?  
  Medical anthropologist Moerman (2002) proposes we tease apart the genuinely 




he refers to those that “engage the biological consequences of experiencing knowledge, 
symbol, and meaning” (2002). Moerman names it “meaning response”: “the 
psychological and physiological effects of meaning in the treatment of illness” (p. 14). 
His proposal helps draw attention to the importance of meaning and mind-body 
connection in the placebo effect. “Meaning response” might be closer to what 
religion scholars actually mean when they refer to the placebo effect. In fact, when 
religion scholars adopt the term of the placebo effect, it is often invoked in discussions of 
phenomena closely related to the classical topic of symbolic efficacy. However, as 
Moerman himself admits, “meaning response” is not restricted to the therapeutic 
processes. It is a universal mechanism penetrating almost every aspect of human life (p. 
4). Importantly, if the mechanism underlying these phenomena that reflect the effect of 
meaning or symbols is not specified, neither “placebo effect,” “meaning response,” 
nor “symbolic efficacy” will lead us to a clear understanding of the therapeutic effects 
brought by religious rituals.   
The above analyses have exposed the complexity and vagueness surrounding the 
definition and nature of the placebo effect. In the final report of the NIH-sponsored 
conference “The Science of the Placebo: Toward an Interdisciplinary Research Agenda,” 
it says, 
The speakers, panelists, and audience participants seemed to lack a common 
conceptual framework … the conceptual difficulties at this conference went 
beyond points of disagreement or areas of specialization. Speakers seemed to be 




“species of elephants.” Because the term placebo was used so loosely, it was 
difficult to draw coherent conclusions from the conference as a whole or to see 
what the next steps forward should be. (Guess et al., 2002) 
Dissecting the Placebo Effect 
From the above we see that heterogeneous phenomena are put under the name 
“placebo effect,” which causes much confusion. Among that mass, how should we define 
and identify genuine placebo effects? An approach to this question might be this: given 
that there is at least a minimal agreement that the placebo effect is a sub-category of 
“healing effect”, we may first list all major sources of healing, and from there we can 
then start to determine which among those sources may properly be counted as placebo 
effects. 
Moerman (2002) classifies three ways that human beings respond to injury or 
physical abnormality (p. 16). The most important ones are autonomous response, or the 
self-limiting of sickness (p. 12) (e.g., a broken finger heals by itself); specific response, 
which means the body’s response to the active agents of medical treatment (e.g., the 
body’s response to the antibiotic ingredient of penicillin); and meaning response, 
which comes from human beings’ interaction with healing contexts (e.g., response to the 
red color of the pill in contrast to blue color when these two colors have distinct cultural 
meanings).  Miller et al. (2009) also list three forms of human healing: spontaneous self-
generated “natural healing,” “technological healing,” and “interpersonal 
healing.” Benedetti (2009) lists possible sources of improved results in clinical trials: 




unidentified co-interventions, a real psychobiological placebo effect that involves 
anticipation (p. 20), and signal detection ambiguity (p. 25), etc. 
Based on these and other observations, it might be safe to classify four sources of 
healing effects (here the term healing effect does not necessarily mean that any genuine 
healing happens: it includes improved results in clinical trials that are due to report bias 
or other errors): 
1 Natural (Spontaneous or Autonomous) healing: This is the human body’s 
autonomous responses to physical abnormalities. 
  2 Conditioning: There are two types of conditioning, classic conditioning and 
unconscious conditioning. Classic conditioning means that the past positive experiences 
of visiting doctors raise patients’ expectation of the current consultation’s result, which in 
turn triggers improved physiological responses (Ernst, 2007). In contrast, 
unconscious conditioning does not involve the awareness of the treatment administration, 
pointing to the fact that placebo responses can be triggered by non-conscious reception of 
signs (Jensen et al., 2012).  
  3 Illusory sources of healing results: factors that affect the data on therapeutic 
results but do not contribute to real healing, such as report bias or flawed measurement. 
  4 Healing from the manipulation of medicines or medical procedures: This type of 
healing is what is most relevant to the medical profession, but the sources of such healing 
need to be further classified into two:  
4.1 Chemically or physically active elements of medicines or medical procedures.  




The symbolic meanings of treatment are perhaps the most relevant for the various 
forms of spiritual healing considered in the academic study of religion. These symbolic 
meanings can also be classified into four types. Due to its relevance, this part will be 
analyzed in more detail. 
4.2.1. The first source of symbolic meaning that may bring about positive results 
is the use of concrete medical substances (whether these substances contain active 
chemical elements is not the concern here, as the focus is on symbolic meaning). The 
power of substances is so real and relevant that human ancestors would even form “the 
belief in the immanence of forces” (Geest et al., 1996, p. 154) in concrete substances, 
which they could “possess, control, and manipulate to their own advantage” (p. 154). 
Miller and Kaptchuk (2008) make a similar point in saying that medicines, compared 
with other forms of healing, have two unique qualities: being substances and containing a 
transformative power to change human conditions (p. 3). Similar to the idea of Geest at al. 
(1996), they acknowledge that drugs have more concreteness than other healing modes, 
which can be applied directly to human body (Miller & Kaptchuk, 2008). They also 
mention the widespread assumption that medical substances contain innate healing 
powers (2008). In short, the first type of symbolic meaning of medicines is the immanent 
power of medicines’ concreteness. At this point lies the reason why “It is easier to satisfy 
patients with drugs than with words” (Geest et al., 1996, p. 159). This also explains why 
normally a placebo effect needs to be triggered by the use of placebos (such 
as inert sugar pills). This immanent power of concrete medicines partly derives from the 




has been established, it is not restricted to real effective medicines. As Geest et al. (1996) 
point out, in patient-doctor communication or patient-environment interaction, medicines 
are more effective in transmitting knowledge and emotion than words even before they 
are used. 
4.2.2 Parallel to the universal faith in the innate power of medicines, human 
beings are also socialized deeply in the power of doctors to heal patients. This conviction 
comprises the second type of symbolic meaning of medicine. As Moerman maintains, 
that one person can be healed by another is an almost universal realization, though the 
therapeutic means might be variable (Moerman et al., 1979).  
4.2.3 The third type of symbolic meaning of medicine lies in the cultural and 
social-specific meanings surrounding the administration of medicines or related 
procedures. Price (1984) maintains that human beings’ distinctiveness lies in that they are 
able to build their social realities through ideation, language, and symbolization (p. 
62). This type of symbolic meaning does not necessarily relate to medicines’ chemical 
substance. As Geest et al. (1996) point out, medicines’ “total drug effect depends also 
on non-chemical attributes of the drug such as its color, name, and provenance; on 
properties of true recipient and prescriber; and on the situations in which the medicine is 
delivered and consumed” (p. 167). Moreover, even the same medicine or procedure can 
have significantly different meanings in different cultural worlds, since diverse cultural 
and social systems infuse them with distinctive qualities and efficacies (Miller & 
Kaptchuk, 2008). Moerman suggests that this system of meaning plays an equally 




(Moerman et al., 1979). This type of meaning, which concerns the biological 
consequences resulting from culturally defined meanings, might be closer to what 
religion scholars intend to mean when they use the placebo effect to understand the 
mechanism of religious healing. However, resorting to the placebo effect in this sense 
does not further our understanding of this issue, as the power of symbolic meanings to 
affect the human body has long been noticed in religious healing studies; what is at issue 
is how the symbolic meaning is able to affect the psychophysiological level, and 
how certain elements of healing rituals may affect this process.  
The placebo effect “represents the point at which mind and body, … science and 
faith come together” (Price, 1984, p. 63), and helps draw attention to the important 
fact that human beings are simultaneously biological, cultural, and social (Taves, 2010, p. 
171), and our bodies can be affected by symbols. This is in line with the 
essential question in the study of various forms of religious healing—the problem of 
symbolic efficacy: how do symbols affect the body? From the above analysis, however, it 
seems that the placebo response, other than emphasizing this important feedback between 
meaning and body, cannot itself expose the underlying details of the physiopsychological 
mechanism for any form of religious healing. Indeed, resorting to the placebo effect may 
not count as much advancement compared to symbolic efficacy, as Csordas and 
Kleinman (1996) further make the point that the symbolic explanation does not have 
more explanatory power than indigenous explanations. As Kirmayer (2004) notes, “the 
unsolved problem in classic accounts of symbolic healing is just how the narrative 




bodily experience or physiology” (p.36). Current understanding of the placebo effect 
does not seem to help much to clarify this process.  
The placebo effect, though an important concept that challenges the outdated 
biomedicine framework in which the mind-body link is neglected, and that brings the 
“embodied mind” (Taves, 2010, p. 173) to the fore, does not overcome the limitations of 
the symbolic and meaning approach of religious ritual healing. It still remains vague as to 
how symbols and meanings can result in changes at the bodily level. If the placebo effect 
cannot help us understand the mechanism of religious healing, could another frequently-
invoked mechanism, dissociation, point us in a better direction?  The next part will 
examine dissociation and see how it might shed light on shamanistic healing.        
Dissociation 
Dissociation has been frequently used by religion scholars to understand spiritual 
healing experiences and other religious experiences. Seligman and Kirmayer 
(2008) argue for understanding spiritual and healing practices that involves trance and 
possession in terms of dissociation, and also argue for an integrative model of 
dissociation that integrates “the neuropsychological notions of underlying mechanism 
with sociocultural processes of the narrative construction and social representation of the 
self” (p. 55). They believe that anthropological studies of healing and trance could greatly 
benefit from dissociation research. Several of Taves’s works (1999, 2010) on religious 
experiences also draw attention to the study of dissociation, emphasizing the impact of 
this research on religious studies of spiritual and healing experiences.       




  Although dissociative experience is not a newly-discovered human phenomenon, 
during most of its history it has been subsumed within the supernatural realm of spirits 
and demons, rather than being regarded as a universal cognitive process. The concept of 
dissociation is often traced back to Pierre Janet and his attempt to build a unified theory 
of consciousness (Schumaker, 1995). 
  Janet first formulated the concept of dissociation in his 1889 dissertation, one of 
the most important works on dissociation (Dell & O’Neil, 2009, p. 7). The basic 
presumption behind this concept is that “the unity of consciousness is illusory” (Hilgard, 
1977, p. 1) and that human consciousness has multiple independent parts. In other words, 
Janet observes that consciousness has a discontinuous nature, and human awareness can 
be divided into multiple sections, or even multiple sub-personalities (Schumaker, 1995). 
According to Janet, information enters into awareness through association of ideas, and 
some information could be prevented from becoming associated, thereby remaining out 
of touch with human awareness, which leads to the concept of dissociation (Schumaker, 
1995). However, these dissociated elements of information or memory are not eliminated 
totally, but exist at another level of consciousness, where they can exert influence 
through dreams and symptoms. Janet believes that this is how the multiple modes of 
consciousness come into existence (ibid). 
  However, there have long been two difficult but fundamental conceptual issues 
about dissociation. First, does dissociation refer to a division in consciousness, as claimed 
by Janet, or merely to a narrowing of the focus of consciousness? Second, are all 




pathological to pathological (Dell & O’Neil, 2009, p. 4)? The understanding of these two 
issues has undergone a development. Initially, dissociation was mainly regarded as 
reflecting the division of consciousness; then it was reinterpreted following the line of the 
psychoanalytic concept of repression; later it was viewed as a process comprising 
dissociative division and the subsequent switching among different dissociated states of 
consciousness; and is now finally realized as consisting of a broad spectrum of 
experiences and lying on a continuum ranging from normal to pathological symptoms 
(Dell & O’Neil, 2009, p. 20).    
  Schumaker proposes that dissociation is the result of human beings’ unique brain 
design that makes human reality highly fluid (Schumaker, 1995). In contrast to animals 
that do not possess the intelligence to selectively take inputs and compartmentalize 
information, hominids developed the critical faculty of cognitive flexibility (McClenon, 
2006). This flexibility has resulted from the fact that certain mental processes can be split 
off from the “main body of conscious with various degrees of autonomy” (Hilgard, 1977, 
p. 69). Thus, individuals can selectively eliminate traumatic experiences from the 
conscious level so as to protect their overall psychological balance. Similarly, people can 
also put not-so-traumatic, unimportant pieces of information below the conscious level to 
save energy. That is perhaps what makes multi-tasking possible, and as McClenon (2006) 
suggests, multitasking is one form of dissociation, and this capability was evolved as 
hominids’ brains became increasingly bilateral (p. 140). The need to multi-task and avoid 
negative emotional repercussions seems to render the capability for dissociation 




a tremendous amount of information with varied affective valences that the increasingly 
enlarged human brain is capable of receiving. What is worth pointing out is that this 
integration process may not be a completely conscious one, but may better be understood 
as an autopilot system, or guided by what Hilgard calls a hidden observer.  
  Some suggest that the core of dissociative process might be the 
compartmentalization of human consciousness. As Kihlstrom and Hoyt (1988) note, there 
are two cognitive states involved in dissociation. The first is the spitting of consciousness 
into multiple streams of mental activity. The second is that some of these streams are put 
outside conscious awareness but can exert influence on our mental and physiological 
process. Through compartmentalization and the consequent shifting and altering of the 
usual associations between information and cognitive responses, human beings can “(a) 
selectively perceive their environment, (b) selectively process information, (c) selectively 
store memories, (d) selectively disengage from already stored memories, and (e) 
selectively replace dissociated data with more ‘user-friendly’ data” (Schumaker, 1995, 
Kindle Location. 167).   
  The review of research on dissociation shows that there might be two major 
conceptualizations of dissociation: narrow and broad (Dell & O’Neil, 2009, p. 20). The 
narrow conceptualization was dominant from the birth of the study of dissociation until 
the later part of the twentieth century. This conceptualization defines dissociation as a 
division of consciousness or the personality. There are two important versions of this 
narrow conceptualization: (1) hypnotically induced division of consciousness, and (2) 




However, as has mentioned above, since the 1980s the narrow conceptualization 
of dissociation has been overshadowed and largely replaced by a broader 
conceptualization of dissociation. The latter is based on a continuum model of 
experiences, and focuses on the broad range of phenomena themselves rather than on 
their etiology (Dell & O’Neil, 2009, p. 21). This view defines dissociation as a 
breakdown of the cognitive integrative function, and the etiology could be due to varied 
reasons such as the narrowing of consciousness or the post-traumatic divided personality 
(ibid). The American Psychiatric Association (2000) defines dissociation and the 
dissociative disorders as “a disruption in the usually integrated functions of 
consciousness, memory, identify, or perception,” and The World Health Organization 
(WHO 1992) gives the definition as “partial or complete loss of the normal integration 
between memories of the past, awareness of memory and immediate sensations, and 
control of bodily movements” (Dell & O’Neil, 2009, p. 225). It is true that dissociation 
certainly includes a long list of psychopathological disorders, which all depend on the 
dissociative process to construct their symptoms, including PTSD, Dissociative 
Personality Disorder (Multiple Personality Disorder), depersonalization, etc., but it 
should not be ignored that there are also many types of normal dissociative experiences 
that share the same fundamental process as the clinical ones. 
  Why do people dissociate? 
  Although dissociation is similar to many other human faculties whose origin is 
hard to explain definitely, there are some theoretical formulations around this interesting 




religion and hypnosis—argues that the ability to dissociate is due to the amplified 
intelligence that human brains evolved in the course of human evolutionary history. 
When hominid brains reached that threshold, they became “conscious to a potentially 
debilitating degree” (Schumaker, 1995, p. 163). Therefore, a certain brain faculty was 
needed to absorb “the collision between amplified consciousness and many emotionally 
terrifying and confusing facets of this-world existence” (ibid). Schumaker (1995) 
believes that the evolutionary strategy of human beings is to develop the dissociative 
ability to help achieve “strategic reality corruption” (Kindle Location. 45) and produce 
“adaptive cognitive errors” (Kindle Location. 151). Schumaker also believes the ability to 
dissociate is an important evolutionary strategy and that “the future viability of nature’s 
experiment with the big brain” (Kindle Location. 163) depends on dissociation that 
“would preserve the many advantages of elevated consciousness, while simultaneously 
reducing the emotional impact of that same adaptation” (ibid).  
McClenon’s ritual healing theory (2002) holds that people with high dissociative 
ability can respond better to a ritual’s therapeutic effects, and that this is a genetic 
capacity that can be passed to the next generation. Thus, during the long run of 
evolutionary history, the dissociative ability would be preserved and even enhanced. 
However, he reduces the question of why highly dissociative people can benefit more 
from rituals’ therapeutic effects to the therapeutic effect of suggestion and hypnosis, 
therefore failing to explicate the underlying mechanisms specific to ritual healing and 
merely transferring the question to why suggestion and hypnosis heal.  




  Some research studies have drawn attention to the dissociative experiences as a 
reflection of certain regulation of attention affected by cultural scripts and 
neurobiological bases. Seligman and Kirmayer (2008) suggest that individuals, guided by 
cultural scripts and meaning systems, can invoke or inhibit certain affective, perceptual, 
and cognitive processes. In particular, situations that cause intense emotional reaction 
may trigger strong self-regulatory processes such as rapid narrowing of attention, which 
might cause intense phenomenal experiences. Under this paradigm, one may understand 
dissociation as basically an attention-modulation process, and dissociative phenomena as 
“a clarifying extreme of human attention process” (Spiegel, 1994, p. 186). Hypnosis, 
which is interpreted by many as reflecting the dissociative process, is “at one end of the 
continuum of attention, involving an enhancement in focal concentration with a relative 
suspension of peripheral awareness” (Spiegel, 1994, p. 186). The dissociative 
compartmentalization is accomplished through a complementary focusing of attention 
(ibid). Spiegel gives a metaphor of hypnotic concentration as “looking through a 
telephoto lens in a camera”: we see a more detailed view, but our field of attention is 
narrowed (ibid). This narrowing process is not necessarily a distorting one. As Hilgard 
(1977) points out, “man does more than one thing at a time—all the time—and the 
conscious representation of these actions is never complete” (p. 1). Human awareness 
constantly shifts from one aspect to another of whatever happens within our body or 
without, or shifts between memory and imagination (ibid). Undoubtedly we cannot have 
a complete picture of all the sensory stimuli around us, and there would certainly be some 




our attention, Hilgard says,  
It may be that attention shifts about, like a spotlight in the dark, permitting one 
facet at a time to be examined and acted on. Or alternatively, the several things 
may be going on in parallel, with sufficient attention giving to listening to register 
what is being said, with enough surplus attentive effort remaining to allow for the 
simultaneous preparation of the intended reply. Even more intriguing and 
puzzling is the possibility that in some instances part of the attentive effort and 
planning may continue without any awareness of it at all. When that appears to be 
the case, the concealed part of the total ongoing thought and action may be 
described as dissociated from the conscious experience of the person. (Hilgard, 
1977, p. 1-2) 
 
The most difficult issue concerning this view is the “brain self-regulation” 
paradox: “what mental ability is responsible for making decisions about the actual 
content of consciousness?” (Schumaker, 1995, Kindle Location. 542) In other words, to 
selectively dissociate certain information out of consciousness and to put it on other 
levels of awareness, there must be a censoring system “capable of attaching positive or 
negative valences to new information, as well as information already stored within the 
brain” (Schumaker, 1995, Kindle Location. 556). Current dissociation theories 
hypothesize that perhaps the human mind is “continuously aware cross the conscious-
unconscious barrier, even though we might be consciously unaware of being aware at the 




out who or what determines what can be consciously conceived and what must remain 
unconscious. This seems to fall into the same “homunculus problem” as in self 
studies. As Schumaker says, our brain is selective about the associations it makes, but 
this selection represents a type of intelligence still eluding our understanding (Schumaker, 
1995, Kindle Location. 378). 
Similar to this attention-modulation view is the perceptual approach to 
dissociation. Based on the Gestalt principle of “the organization of perception into figure 
and ground” (Dell & O’Neil, 2009, p. 210), this theory posits that our ordinary day-to-
day experience includes constant flowing of figure/ground perceptions. Time, body, mind, 
world, and identity normally recede into the background, which, during dissociation, is 
lost or altered (ibid). The integration of figure-ground constitutes ordinary lived 
experience, while in dissociation, the lived-experience is ruptured and thus we feel it as 
weird (ibid). In other words, “dissociation occurs because the figure becomes the 
exclusive focus of attention; when this occurs, the background fades, changes, or is lost” 
(Dell & O’Neil, 2009, p. 211). 
  However, high dissociative capacity is not equal to high ability to pay attention or 
focus. In other words, “blocking out the background is a different psychological process 
than paying attention (i.e., not being distracted)” (Dell & O’Neil, 2009, p. 220). On the 
contrary, research shows that people with superior dissociative ability are more 
unresponsive to changes in their surroundings; they easily get stuck in the prior mode 
(Dell & O’Neil, 2009, p. 220). In this sense we can even say that high dissociators are 




more rigid (ibid). In other words, high dissociators are more easily absorbed in what they 
focus on and less sensitive to changes in surrounding stimuli. 
  The rigidity of paired association between certain cues and responses in highly 
dissociative individuals means that it may be more difficult for them to change when the 
association is a harmful one. However, they are also easily absorbed and so “engrossed 
that he or she loses track of present reality” (Dell & O’Neil, 2009, p. 220) where, 
curiously, they become quite weak at critical and rational thinking, and their ingrained 
attention paths become most malleable and easily altered. Thus, in dissociative states, 
people become amenable to suggestions. As Taves (1999) says, “Dissociation, although 
generally linked with degeneration, may simply prefigure a reaggregation of the 
personality and growth in new and untried directions” (p. 279). Schumaker (1995) 
distinguishes dissociation and suggestion by saying that dissociation is “a blank and 
directionless state” (Kindle Location. 701) and it is suggestion that “informs the senses to 
distort or change the interpretation of the sensed stimuli” (Kindle Location. 687). But as 
one can see, there is inherently a paradox in terms of the rigidity and malleability 
associated with dissociation, and it remains vague whether these refer to the same kind of 
dissociative phenomena or not.  
Dissociation and “Altered States of Consciousness”   
Different from the situations where the changes of attention are mild and the level 
of dissociation stays low, there are occasions when dissociative phenomena approach the 
other end of the continuum. Indeed, highly traumatic experiences or certain induction 




consciousness. There is a close and dialectical relationship between trauma and 
dissociation. As Sandage (2014) points out, dissociative states may help patients cope 
with trauma but “chronic use of highly dissociative practices can limit relational 
development” (p. 63). Intense religious experience, hypnotic experience, and certain 
psychopathological states are typical kinds of altered states of consciousness. Various 
studies report significant positive correlations between dissociativity and frequency of 
anomalous experience (McClenon, 2006, p. 142). A study by the Association for 
Research and Enlightenment shows that dissociation is significantly correlated with 
precognition, apparitions, and volitional telepathy (McClenon, 2006, p.145). 
  Altered states of consciousness can happen automatically, though the most 
common way to trigger these states is through certain forms of induction, such as 
religious rituals or hypnosis techniques. One of the most effective ways is through 
repetitive physical and sensory-perceptual exhaustion. As Schumaker (1995) mentions, 
“through the ages, many indigenous cultures have made use of repetitive drumming, 
chanting, or dancing as a means for people to become absorbed and to enter into trance. 
This then paved the way for the effective use of shamanistic healing techniques or other 
traditional practices employing ‘magic’” (Kindle Location. 828).  
Ludwig associated altered states of consciousness with dissociation, which 
markedly influenced latter studies. He published with others one of the first modern 
controlled experiments on the transfer of information across dissociative barriers in 
Multiple Personality Disorders (Ludwig et al., 1972). His later reflection shows the 




“[I]t is difficult to know the extent to which many other altered states of consciousness … 
should be regarded as examples of dissociation, or whether dissociative states should be 
regarded as a subcategory of altered states of consciousness” (Ross, 1997, p. 94). 
However, their research has drawn attention to the relationship between dissociation and 
anomalous consciousness studies. 
Dissociation, Suggestion and Hypnosis  
The study of dissociation is closely related to the study of hypnosis and 
suggestion. The three concepts have been intimately entangled and in some occasions are 
even used interchangeably. However, it remains unclear whether they refer to the same 
process and, if not, what the differences among them are. Many researchers have 
attempted to distinguish between these processes in varied ways.  
The term “hypnosis” was first introduced by James Braid in 1843, and was later 
developed by Jacques Puysegur, Franz Mesmer, Pierre Janet, and Jean-Martin Charcot 
(Schumaker, 1995). Hilgard (1977) believes that dissociation is a more general and basic 
process than hypnosis, and hypnosis should be regarded as “an expression of dissociation” 
(p. 759). As Dienes et al. (2009) note, dissociation is the basis for the two most popular 
theories of hypnosis: the neo-dissociation theory (Hilgard, 1974) and the dissociated 
control theory (Woody & Bowers, 1994). These two theories are well summarized by 
Dienes et al. (2009): “According to neo-dissociation theory, hypnotic responding consists 
of splitting the central executive so that one part controls hypnotic responding without the 
other part being aware of it. According to dissociated control theory, hypnotic responding 




directly by the hypnotist’s words. Both theories postulate that high hypnotic 
suggestibility results from an ability to produce the relevant fractionation” (p. 838). 
However, despite this postulated association between dissociation and hypnotic 
suggestibility, empirical data is lacking to support this association. For example, multiple 
empirical studies (e.g. Kirsch & Council, 1992; Dienes et al., 2009) demonstrated that the 
tendency to dissociate in daily life is not related to hypnotic suggestibility.  
Schumaker (1995) regards dissociation and suggestion as “separate but tandem 
processes” (Kindle Location. 701), as suggestion is “the specific process whereby 
otherwise contentless dissociative states are filled, or structured” (Kindle Location. 681), 
and dissociation must precede suggestion for suggestion to be successful (Kindle 
Location. 694). In normal states with merely a low level of dissociation, cognitive 
patterns are relatively stable, while in deep dissociative states, previous cognitive patterns 
are softened, which produces a window for suggestion to exert its power. In this sense, a 
certain degree of dissociation is the prerequisite for suggestion to work. As Schumaker 
(1995) argues, “suggestive behavior is possible only when someone has been successfully 
removed from his or her capacity to process information in a reality-based manner” 
(Kindle Location. 694); when dissociative states are not sufficiently strong, the 
suggestion might not work. Moreover, he argues that hypnosis is the Western and modern 
form of the dissociation-suggestion mechanism. Schumaker argues that “what is often 
celebrated as the ‘discovery’ of hypnosis is actually a very belated Western discovery of 
dissociation” and “the end result is a culture-specific expression of dissociative trance” 




famous 19th-century medium Mrs. Piper’s case, believes that hypnosis is different from 
dissociation and is more relevant than dissociation for understanding spirit possession. 
The self approach to dissociation 
A recent important shift in research on dissociation is the self approach to 
dissociation. Putnam (1994, 1995) and Nijenhuis (2011), among others, have argued that 
dissociative experiences are integrally related to the development and integration of self, 
and pathological dissociation results in disruptions in self (Putnam, 1994, 1995) or are 
caused by self disturbances (Liotti, 1992). As Carlson at el. (2009) summarizes, 
“dissociative processes both affect and are affected by organization of the self” (p. 39).   
Nijenhuis (2011) argue that dissociation associated with trauma entails a division 
of personality. Such a division is reflected in the lack of capacity to integrate experiences. 
Here the personality is defined as a dynamic biopsychosocial system, and the division of 
personality produces two or more insufficiently integrated self-organized subsystems of 
psychobiological states. According to Nijenhuis, a dissociative part can be called a 
dissociated self only when the dissociative part includes at least a rudimentary first-
person perspective. There are psychobiological boundaries between these dissociative 
parts, but they can be dissolved. The division might be manifested as either positive or 
negative. Integrative capacities of individuals play important roles in whether and to what 
degree an individual may dissociate in certain circumstances. This ability might be 
affected by genetic factors but is also effected by contextual factors. The lack of 
integration might be adaptive but may also be costly when situations change: dissociation 




can be costly in normal social interactions. Moreover, dissociative parts of the personality 
might be overly stable and thus lack systematic complexity. Adopting Edelman and 
Tononi’s theory of consciousness (2000) that claims that adaptation to the environment 
requires systematic complexity of consciousness, which refers to the ability to react 
properly and creatively to the changing environment, Nijenhuis (2011) argue that the 
dissociative subsystems lack such complexity and thus lack the ability to react properly 
and creatively to the changing environment.  
After a detailed review of the literature on dissociative experience, Seligman and 
Kirmayer (2008) also draw attention to the self-process underlying dissociative 
experiences. They point out that there are two main theoretical paradigms in the literature 
on dissociation: the psychiatric-adaptive approach and the anthropological-discursive 
approach. The former approach focuses purely on the psychophysiological mechanisms 
underlying dissociative experiences and ignores the social and contextual factors, while 
the latter approach regards dissociative experiences as socially constructed and neglects 
their dependency on the underlying mechanisms. Noticeably, the anthropological 
discursive approach has long noticed the connection between dissociative experience and 
human selfhood. The contemporary anthropological analyses emphasize the function of 
dissociation to articulate certain self states that conform to cultural notions of self (Hollan, 
2000 a, b). For example, some indigenous cultures have understandings of self different 
from Euro-American conceptions, in which latter case the unitary, and autonomous self is 
highly esteemed while other forms of self, such as fragmented ones, are regarded as 




spiritual gifts and thus might encourage them. Therefore, it affects not only the frequency 
of altered experiences of self but also whether such self experiences may bring distress or 
liberation to individuals (Ewing, 1990; Shweder & Bourne, 1984). In cultures where 
disruption in experiences of self is allowed or encouraged, dissociative experience might 
be used as a tool to release the repressed parts of the personality, express normally 
forbidden feelings and traits without negative social consequences, and allow the 
personality to achieve higher levels of integration, or to obtain new social space or new 
social roles (Lambek, 1981).  
To connect these two islands of scholarship and bring together the 
neuropsychological mechanism with the social construction of self, these researchers 
propose to understand dissociation based on Damasio’s framework of self (1994), which 
interprets self-regulation as a process that involves a continuous feedback loop 
between emotion, cognition, attention, and the behavioral environment. Under this 
framework of self, as Seligman and Kirmayer suggest, dissociation is “a type of cognitive 
resource-management strategy that is sometimes socially marked and sometimes not. 
Thus, dissociative experiences may be highly socially scripted, yet have a 
neurobiological substrate that is not ‘merely’ socially scripted, and can occur in forms 
that are independent of, contradict, or subvert social scripts” (Seligman & Kirmayer, 
2008, p. 33). 
In Seligman’s study of Candomblé ritual healing (2014), she further extends this 
self framework to the understanding of spiritual healing, and argues that at the core of the 




self-transformation. She argues that spiritual and ritual healing is a transformative process 
of restoring an incoherent self, and such incoherence or disruption in self may have a 
physiological or social etiology. Not only is it the case that dissociation can be better 
understood in this self framework, but spiritual and ritual healing, especially the complex 
feedback between meaning, symbol and body, could also be more fruitfully understood 
within the framework of embodied self-processes and self-regulation. Bio-looping is used 
in her theory to emphasize the ways that embodied processes and discursive processes are 
closely implicated and mutually reinforced to constantly construct, disrupt, and 
reconstruct self, and thus create the various forms of self-transformation experiences that 
mediums and supplicants undergo in healing rituals, causing therapeutic changes in the 
bodily and cognitive/affective aspects of selfhood. Similarly, although Taves once 
suggested that the psychological mechanism of dissociation is the greatest contribution to 
religious studies from psychology of religion (Taves, 1999), after a lengthy study of 
dissociative phenomena she proposes that dissociation might not take us far in the 
understanding of spirit possession and related phenomena (Taves, 2006), whereas self 
and its transformation might be more important in understanding religious healing (Taves, 
2011).  
Conclusion 
Neither the placebo effect nor dissociation can sufficiently account for the 
therapeutic effect of shamanistic rituals. This is not only because they are themselves 
controversial concepts, the definitions of which are far from definite, but also because 




continuations of the black-box mechanism problem, which refers to the fact that literature 
on religious healing frequently invokes nonspecific, black-box mechanisms (catharsis, 
trance, suggestion, etc.) to account for healing efficacy (Whitehead, 1987; Csordas, 1994). 
The realization of the importance of understanding mechanisms is itself an advance over 
the understanding of religious healing solely in terms of the rhetorical or evocative 
powers of symbols or meanings; unfortunately, these mechanisms and their assumed 
therapeutic effects remain unelaborated.  
Therefore, to understand the causal mechanisms of shamanistic healing, perhaps it 
is an ill-advised direction to search from the set of existing terms in psychology for a 
single or several mechanisms. We might need a new, broader theoretical framework, 
where the complex feedback between meaning and body can be understood. As has been 
shown above, the emerging trend in the study of dissociation suggests that the framework 
of self and its related processes might be a promising direction. Indeed, as many scholars 
of religious healing suggest, self is an important locus of healing, and self-processes are 
where social and cultural factors are located (Csordas, 1994), as well as being “the locus 
of interaction between mind and body, individual and context” (Seligman, 2014, p. 161). 
Exploring how self processes are manipulated by shamanistic practices to trigger various 
self states, and how the transformation of self brings about therapeutic effects, might 
provide a new and fruitful angle for understanding the efficacy of shamanistic healing. 
The connection of shamanistic healing to self is not new in itself; indeed, the 
importance of self in understanding healing experiences has been noticed since the 




argues that religious experience is caused by the incursion of the subliminal self into 
consciousness and emphasizes the therapeutic effect of religious experience in unifying 
the inner self. Peters (1989) suggests that an underlying similarity to shamanic, yogic, 
and other meditative traditions is the self-transformation process whereby a new self, 
what some are prepared to call a spiritual identity, is used to trigger mental and bodily 
effects. Winkelman (2010) also notes that one key element of shamanic healing rituals is 
the transformational experience where the boundaries of self are dissolved into a unified 
conscious state, and the transference of control from self to a powerful master is also 
typical. Csordas (1994, 2002) adopts the strategy of focusing on the self to interpret the 
efficacy of healing, and argues that charismatic healing essentially involves self 
processes. Seligman (2010), similarly, argues that suffering is caused by threats to self 
coherence on both cognitive and bodily levels, and healing is the process of restoring a 
coherent sense of self.  
Focusing on self can help restructure some classic problems in the study of 
healing. For example, peering into postulated black-box mechanisms requires a 
reconceptualization of the mind-body relationship and mental causation (Csordas, 1994; 
Winkelman, 2010). One recent trend emerging from cognitive science argues that self 
might be the key to addressing this problem (Eccles, 2012; Freeman, 2001; 
Metzinger, 2004; Damasio, 2010; Ramachandran, 2009). For example, Freeman (2001, 
2003) argues for the concept of “circular causality” to account the way self can somehow 
transform the very body from which it emerges. Damasio (2010) also emphasizes the 




through a process of neural simulation, and emphasizes the function of self as 
the leading representative of the variety of bodily life-regulation mechanisms. 
Ethnographic work also provides evidence of self-transformation in religious 
healing. Csordas’s ethnographical (1994) work shows in detail how charismatic healing 
works through altering supplicants’ indeterminate dispositions and transforming various 
self-processes. Seligman’s field work on Candomblé religion (2014) also shows how the 
reintegration of the ruptured self mediates the social, cultural, mental, and bodily 
processes involved in that tradition’s healing practices. Itzhak’s ethnographic work on 
neo-shamanism (2015) shows how discontinuities or disruptions to one’s implicitly 
coherent sense of self may also underlie the therapeutic effects of religious healing rituals. 
The relevance of a framework of self to the study of religious healing also lies in 
this assumption: to understand religious healing efficacy, one needs to first identify a 
proper locus of religious healing (Csordas, 1994). The major locus of efficacy for 
different healing modalities (biomedicine, counseling, social work, etc.) are various—
a body organ, a physiological system, family dynamics, a bad habit, or a community. 
Religious healing, like any other healing modality, may work on one or many of these 
levels, and it is difficult to specify one particular locus that all religious healing practices 
share. However, a recent trend in the study of religious healing has drawn attention to 
self as “a key mediator of these sociocultural, psychological, and bodily processes” 
(Seligman, 2014, p. 15).  
As shown above, self is an important locus of religious healing, and self-




With the recent converging of the study of personality and the study of self, using the 
framework of the developing self to understand dissociation seems to be a particularly 
fruitful approach that can benefit from the fast development in a much broader area of 
psychological studies. Many scholars who have examined dissociation and other 
mechanisms in order to understand spiritual healing and related phenomena have come to 
the realization that self and its transformation might be more important in understanding 
religious healing (Csordas, 1994; Seligman, 2014; Taves, 2011). The framework of self 
has the potential for a more fruitful integration of the biological and cultural approaches 
to shamanistic healing efficacy, rather than using the placebo effect, dissociation, or such 
other terms as catharsis and hypnosis as the black-box mechanisms underlying 
















THE HUMAN SELF: A SELF-ORGANIZING COGNITIVE-AFFECTIVE 
DYNAMIC SYSTEM 
It has long been noticed that radical forms of self-transformation are not a rare 
occurrence in shamanistic healing rituals, and these transformations of subjectivity are 
frequently associated with therapeutic effect and well-being (see Winkelman, 2010; 
Pandian, 1991). A converging consensus is that self is an important locus of these 
healings; to understand the process and mechanism of the therapeutic effects of religious 
healing, it is important to understand how self is transformed (see Csordas, 1994; 
Seligman, 2014; Itzhak, 2010). This chapter has three goals. The first is to review how 
studies of shamanistic healing and, more generally, religious healing, understands self. 
This group of literature from religious studies is voluminous, but to a large extent based 
on anthropological studies of self. However, the anthropological theories of self alone 
cannot represent the state of the art of the science of self, as the latter is an 
interdisciplinary area where important theories and research have come from multiple 
disciplines, including cognitive science, social psychology, clinical psychology, 
philosophy, neuroscience and more; together these disciplines and sub-disciplines 
provide insights on important aspects of self from different angles, and these insights 
combine to promote deeper and comprehensive understandings of self. By not embedding 
within the larger science of self and overly relying on anthropological theories of self, the 
understandings of most shamanistic healing focus on the symbolic and stable aspects of 




processes. This makes it hard to capture the complexity and subtlety of the transformation 
of self and to construe how symbols and meanings affect bodily states, since if both the 
shamanistic rituals and self are understood only as systems of meanings and symbols, 
then the interactions between them can only reside in the representational and abstract 
realm, and it would be impossible to explain how changes on the abstract realm affect 
bodily states. These particular theoretical foundations shape and limit how one could 
construe self-transformation in shamanistic healing, and theories of self disconnected 
from the broader discussions thus have hindered deeper understandings of the processes 
and mechanisms of the efficacy of shamanistic healing.  
Therefore, the second goal is to provide a perspective on the science of self. Since 
the relevant literature and research is scattered across many disciplines, a comprehensive 
overview of this topic is beyond the scope of multiple volumes, not to mention a single 
chapter. However, it will be helpful to traverse this dynamic and vibrant area and 
consider some critical issues and theories that can help construct a more appropriate 
framework of self in which we can better examine self transformation in shamanistic 
healing. In particular, I will traverse through diverse subfields to figure out whether there 
is any converging consensus and promising emerging trends that may help us understand 
the dynamical and computational patterns of self transformation. The third goal is to 
integrate the converging consensus that I have identified and apply it to the understanding 
of self.  
Self in Religious Healing Studies 




shamanistic studies and other forms of religious healing modalities. The thread of this 
study can be traced back to William James (1902/2003). James is interested in how 
religious practices and experiences involve in the unification of self. He believes that self 
is divided and in need of unification, and that religious practices and experiences help 
integrate the divided parts of self and thereby cause therapeutic effects. The 
contemporary studies of religious healing also focus on self and its processes, forming a 
converging consensus that self plays important roles in the therapeutic processes of 
religious practices and rituals (Csordas, 1994; Winkelman, 2010; Seligman, 2014). 
However, a detailed analysis would show that disciplinary boundaries negatively affect 
the understanding of self in religious healing studies.  
First of all, many shamanistic theories of self are based on anthropological 
understandings of self, which, as Itzhak (2016) notices, can be classified into two types 
based on two classic literatures: Marcel Mauss’s The Category of the Human Mind: the 
Notion of Person, the Notion of Self (1938/1985), and Irving Hallowell’s The Ojibwa Self 
and its Behavioral Environment (1955), where Mauss mainly focuses on the cultural 
construction and representation of the concept of selfhood, and Hallowell, on the other 
hand, focuses on the experiential aspect of self.  
The theory of Mauss greatly influences many early studies, where self is 
conceptualized as a collection of cultural and symbolic representations; such a self is a 
disembodied one, a purely cultural product. Therefore, the focus is mainly on how the 
cultural factors shape self. Here self has no agential or executive functions, and it is the 




says that self is treated as mostly a discursive formation in anthropology (Ewing, 1990; 
Rosaldo, 1984; Shweder & Bourne, 1984), and she is in agreement with Naomi Quinn’s 
observation (2006) that when anthropologists discuss self, self actually refers to self-
representation (Seligman, 2010, p. 298). Seligman argues that this notion of self as a 
discursive representation of oneself reflects the Western mind-body dualism where self is 
put into the purely mental realm where the embodied dimension of self is denied or 
neglected. This dominant anthropological notion of self influenced how early studies on 
shamanistic healing construed self. For instance, in Pandian’s theory of shamanistic 
healing (1991, 1999), he argues that there are symbolic and cultural laws of disintegration 
and integration of self, and shamans’ job is to deal with these symbolic laws, rather than 
physical laws, as the way to affect the formulations of self. The symbolic formulations of 
sacred beings engage in the symbolic laws of self and thus guide the reformulation of self.  
Research on religious healing that adopts the kind of self theory that privileges the 
symbolic representational level can only focus on the symbols and meanings of healing 
rituals. The discussions can only stay on the meaning level, forming a cleavage between 
the symbolic realm and the bodily realm. No wonder that, in the early decades of 
shamanistic studies, the “symbolic efficacy” of healing rituals became one of the most 
difficult issues. Indeed, the cleavage between the meaning and the bodily practices causes 
two recurrent and closely related problems: first, how are we to understand bodily 
practices and activities with high-arousal sensory-motor characteristics? Are their 
functions purely symbolic, or do they actually function through non-symbolic pathways? 




symbolic level affect the bodily level? 
Realizing limitations of the cultural representational theories of self, Hallowell 
(1955) proposes a theory of self that emphasizes the experiential aspect of self, as a way 
to complement the cultural and symbolic approach. He points out the relativity of self and 
culture: not only is self a cultural product, but culture is also a product of self. 
Importantly, his theory draws attention to the agentive quality of self: it is the self that 
makes choices and controls behaviors. To illustrate this, he connects self to 
psychodynamics, and makes the point that culture plays its role through affecting the 
psychological adjustment of individuals. Self is thus not only a cultural representation but 
also closely relates to the psychodynamic processes. However, Csordas, one of the most 
influential scholars in the area of religious healing studies, points out that Hallowell’s 
theory focuses on the “already objectified” self, and therefore it could not enable us to 
understand how self can be reformulated through changes in the pre-conscious, or pre-
reflective level. Csordas points out that this is because Hallowell does not ground self in 
embodiment — “our essential existential condition” (Csordas 1994, p. 7).  
Therefore, Csordas turns to Merleau-Ponty (1945/2013) and Bourdieu (1977) for 
theoretical complements, with Merleau-Ponty’s theory of perception to help understand 
how embodiment affects perception and objectification, and Bourdieu’s theory of habitus 
to integrate embodiment with practice. Ground on a synthesis of Merleau-Ponty and 
Bourdieu, Csordas proposes his cultural phenomenological approach, arguing that “the 
specificity we are looking for can be found in the way self processes grounded in 




ritual healing” (Csordas, 1994, p. 7). Central to this theory is that “the question about 
therapeutic efficacy as an operation on self now appears continuous with the question of 
how orientation takes place upon the ground of embodied existence” (Csordas, 1994, p. 
10-11). He believes the body is the perfect starting point for the discussion on the 
plasticity of self experience, as the body is not only an object of our perception but part of 
the perceiving subject—we use our bodies to perceive the world. Here we cannot even 
distinguish between body and mind. Csordas argues that this forms the basis for the 
indeterminate capacity of orientation of our self, and this indeterminacy is not biocultural 
nonspecificity but experiential indeterminacy. According to him, experiential 
indeterminacy means that by changing the embodied level of self, such as attention, one 
can reconstruct one’s experience. This view is in agreement with the current perspective 
that self is a set of ongoing processes and is always undergoing construction and 
reconstruction. 
Csordas’s theory of self has many important insights. However, during the recent 
decades, the contemporary science of self has grown rapidly, the findings from which 
have the great potential to further clarify any vagueness left by his study, and it is 
promising that an active engagement with the contemporary scientific research, 
especially those on the dynamics of self-processes, could complement Csordas’s insights 
on the transformation of self.  
Rebecca Seligman’s study on Candomble religion is an important recent 
examination of religious healing and self transformation (2010, 2014). Seligman (2010) 




associated with self-concept and self-representation, but also constituted through what 
phenomenologists refer to as ‘pre-reflective’ embodied elements that are prior to and 
fundamentally shape self-objectification” (p. 297). She emphasizes the role of bodily 
suffering in disrupting the coherence in the reflective and conscious level of self 
experience. 
Seligman (2010) argues that the anthropological studies of self neglect the 
embodied level, and although anthropologists that embrace the phenomenological 
approach have noticed the importance of embodied, pre-reflective elements of self, the 
underlying biological mechanisms is still inadequately engaged. To push advancement in 
this direction, she argues that there are three self-regulatory mechanisms that help 
organize information into an integrated self experience at the cognitive level: integrative 
neural capacities, attentional mechanisms, and symbolic practices (Seligman, 2010). 
There is a continuous looping among these different levels of self-regulatory mechanisms: 
attention shapes content of perception as well as cognition, cognitive models direct 
attention, and symbolic practices use narrative soothing techniques to help deal with the 
incoherence in conscious self reflection. She borrows Ian Hacking’s concept of bio-
looping (Hacking, 1995) as the mechanism through which various self-processes at 
different levels coordinate and affect one another. Based on this, she also argues that 
healing practices that simultaneously engage both the embodied and cognitive aspects of 
self can be particularly effective. She says that Candomble mediumship exemplifies such 
a healing modality, and uses data from Candomble possession religion to illustrate these 




  Seligman’s model of self and healing (2014) is a great improvement in the 
understanding of self in religious healing studies. Her model not only acknowledges the 
embodied aspects of self, but also goes a step further into exploring the possible 
biological mechanisms of embodied self and even discusses about the more challenging 
issue of how these different aspects of self mutually affect one another. This deeper and 
more specific theoretical conceptualization of self is very fruitful in helping her find 
important patterns: for example, her research shows that Candomble mediums have 
significantly better cardiac autonomic regulation. However, this model does not aim to 
specify the dynamical principles driving the complex construction and reconstruction of 
self-processes, and therefore can be complemented by research studies that explicate the 
dynamics of self-processes.  
  In summary, many theories of self in religious healing studies are not embedded 
within the larger field of self studies, but draw heavily from anthropological theories of 
self, which tend to focus on the representational and symbolic level of self— self as 
known, as an object, that is culturally shaped, already formed, and disembodied. More 
recent developments, represented by the paradigm of embodiment argued by Csordas 
(1994) and other psychological anthropologists, appreciate the embodied and dynamic 
aspect of self but still largely inadequately engage with the general science of self. This 
separation contributes to a cleavage between a phenomenological description and a 
causal understanding of the underlying mechanisms. This cleavage makes it difficult to 
construe the basic dynamical rules of self transformation and how these different aspects 




insufficient for a rigorous and principled explanation, without which there should be no 
wonder that outmoded models from psychology and psychiatry are still frequently 
adopted to account for the therapeutic efficacy of shamanistic healing. 
This unfortunate situation is understandable, given that the current state of self 
studies is complex, diffuse, and not well-integrated. As noticed by Morf and Mischel 
(2012), “Relevant work is scattered across diverse subfields and disciplines that often 
operate in isolation, impervious to developments just across the boundaries. As a result, 
integration and the growth of a cumulative science of self are exceedingly difficult, 
making it essential to cross those boundaries to obtain a comprehensive understanding of 
self” (p. 21). However, although a thorough review of self studies in all these areas is 
unrealistic, it is still possible and in fact necessary to review major development and 
recurrent issues in this area, as the understanding of self transformation, especially a 
systematic and rigorous understanding of the underlying rules for complex dynamics is 
impossible without drawing insights from the broader field of self science. Those worthy 
attempts from Csordas, Seligman and other scholars to import insights from empirical 
science’s understandings of self have greatly deepened the understanding of the efficacy 
of religious healing, indicating the necessity to continue integrating different theoretical 
perspectives from interdisciplinary studies of self.  Since few scholars on shamanistic 
healing or other forms of religious healing have systematically integrated research in the 
multidisciplinary study of self, the following section will start this important endeavor 
and provide a perspective on the science of self, although it should be made clear that a 




thus is not the goal here.  
Science of self 
There is a long history of inquiries about the nature of human self. Rene Descartes’ 
claim “I think therefore I am” sets the challenge for self studies. What is this “I”? We all 
undeniably have the experience of having a self, but as Chessick (1985) points out, “no 
two authors use this term in exactly the same way” (p. 81). It would require more than a 
lifetime to traverse through all the formulations about the nature of self (see Gallagher & 
Shear, 1999; James, 1902/2003; Klein & Gangi, 2010; Metzinger, 2004; Mischel, 1977; 
Popper & Eccles, 1981; Rosenberg, 1986; Siderits, Thompson, & Zahavi, 2011; Strawson, 
2009). In the following, several salient issues are presented from perspectives of different 
disciplines. However, this does not mean that there is any clear line between the focus of 
these disciplines, and most findings and converging consensus are the results of 
multidisciplinary communication and collaboration.  
1 Philosophy of Self: Substance or Process? 
The discussion of self is traditionally located in the area of philosophy. Most of 
the relevant philosophical discussions have centered on the nature of self. The dominant 
western traditional view regards self as a real, unified, immaterial but agentive entity. 
Perhaps the most representative scholar for this realism camp is Descartes, who argues 
that self is, in Dennett’s vivid description of Descartes’s view, “a sort of immaterial ghost 
that owns and controls a body the way you own and control your car” (Dennett, 1989). 
The important concept here is the “Cartesian self”, which refers to an individual mind 




famous thought experiment of doubting everything, the only thing Descartes says he 
cannot doubt is that he is thinking, which forms the sole evidence of his existence: “I 
must finally conclude that the proposition, I am, I exist, is necessarily true whenever it is 
put forward by me or conceived in my mind” (Descartes, 1641/1985). He thus concludes 
that he only knows one thing for sure, that is, the existence of his “self”. Within his 
framework of reality—one that is separated into the material realm and the mental 
realm—self is naturally situated in the mental realm, which is unified, permanent, 
independent, and has no extension in space (Descartes, 1641/1985). As philosopher 
Serife Tekin (2015) points out, because this view of self is compatible with most theories 
that postulate souls existing in an independent realm of existence, and also because it 
conforms to human intuition, Descartes’s view has dominated modern European 
philosophy.  
This theory of self, however, causes one serious issue—the mind-body problem. 
How could the immaterial mind influence the material body? Descartes proposes the 
pineal gland as the connecting point between mind and body, but this idea is largely 
repudiated by the contemporary academy. This conceptual difficulty is one major source 
of hindrance to any deeper understanding of spiritual healing. As Winkelman (2010) 
points out, a complete understanding of shamanistic healing efficacy requires a 
reconceptualization of causation that could enable us to tackle the mind-body problem 
and understand how the mental influences the physiological. 
The opposing perspective—eliminativism—is embraced by many prominent 




is no such thing as the Cartesian self that can be discovered introspectively: 
For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always 
stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, 
love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a 
perception, and never can observe anything but the perception.... If anyone, upon 
serious and unprejudiced reflection, thinks he has a different notion of himself, I 
must confess I can reason no longer with him. All I can allow him is, that he may 
be in the right as well as I, and that we are essentially different in this particular. 
He may, perhaps, perceive something simple and continued, which he calls 
himself; though I am certain there is no such principle in me. (Treatise, I, IV, sec. 
6.) 
 
On the other hand, however, Hume does not deny the intuitive sense of having a 
personal identity: “Even though my perceptions are fleeting and I am a bundle of 
different perceptions, I nevertheless have some idea of personal identity, and that must be 
accounted for” (Treatise, 1.4.6.4). He accounts for this phenomenological fact by 
resorting to the associative principles, “the resemblance or causal connection within the 
chain of my perceptions gives rise to an idea of myself, and memory extends this idea 
past my immediate perceptions” (Treatise, 1.4.6.18 ff.). It only causes problems when the 
idea of a stable and independent self is added to this experience (Treatise, 1.4.6.6). 
Essentially, Hume argues that self is merely the mental and physical processes, and other 




This view is embraced by many contemporary scholars. Daniel Dennett, for instance, 
proposes that self is like “the center of gravity of an object”—both are not an entity but 
an abstract, theorists’ fiction. Philosopher and cognitive scientist Metzinger (2004) also 
takes self not as a distinct ontological entity but a dynamical process. Likewise, 
neuroscientist Ramachandran believes that the Cartesian self—self as a unitary object—is 
an illusion. Evan Thompson, one of the representative figures on embodied cognition, 
also wrote a book with the central idea that “self is a process, not a thing or an entity” 
(Thompson, 2014, p. xxxi). It turns out the difference between realism and eliminativism 
is not whether there is any self, but how to understand the nature of self—is it a unitary, 
solid, stable entity, or is it a process or processes? If there is anything resembling an 
emerging consensus in the current study of self, it would be self is a process (or 
processes), not an entity. 
2 Psychology of Self:  Homunculus or Complex System? 
When modern psychological study came into being in the 19th century, it soon 
joined the discussions of self. This line can be traced back to William James, who 
devoted much thinking to the dynamics of self, especially the patterns underlying the 
division and unification of self. Through his interest in religious experience and 
miraculous healing, he notices that religion somehow closely engages in the 
transformation of a divided self into a unified one, the process of which is sometimes 
mundane and sometimes dramatic, and oftentimes brings about dramatic changes in 
personality and even therapeutic bodily effects (James, 1902/2003). This perspective 




of “decentering” as the mechanism to unify the divided self is a continuation of this 
theoretical focus (see McNamara, 2009). 
The study of self recedes in psychology in the following decades (1930s to 1960s) 
due to the dominance of behaviorism. The framework of behaviorism emphasizes 
stimulus-response and does not leave much place for self or consciousness. Fortunately, 
the study of self still receives attention from clinical psychologists in the 1950s who 
argue for a causal agentive role for self. That is, self functions actively in initiating and 
guiding the dynamics of our psyche. However, this brings about the homunculus problem. 
As Gordon Allport (1961) points out, “To say that self does this or that, wants this or that, 
will this or that, is to beg a series of difficult questions. … It is unwise to assign our 
problems to an inner agent who pulls the strings” (p. 129-130). The fair recognition of the 
active agential function of self in regulating our mental and behavioral states easily leads 
to the unfortunate conception of self as a little person in our mind, explaining how a 
person reasons by resorting to another smaller person in the brain, thus forming an 
infinite regress.  
Soon the limitations of behaviorism, basically the unfortunate neglect of the 
internal mental states and dynamics became keenly felt. But this time, with the joining 
forces of many empirical disciplines, scholars are equipped with more powerful tools to 
deal with the homunculus problem: information theory, cybernetic theory, the neural 
network perspective and computer simulation, the self-organizing and dynamical systems 
approach, etc. The importance of different cultural construal of selfhood has also been 




anthropological literature on the cultural constructions of selfhood. These powerful 
theoretical and technical tools push self studies into a new chapter. If self is a complex 
system, then its dynamics can be understood in terms of the self-organization of 
numerous pieces of self-relevant information without the need to resort to any “control 
center”. There is thus no longer any need to avoid talking about the agentive aspects or 
the organization of self due to fear of the homunculus problem.  
3 Neurobiology of Self: Disembodied or Embodied? 
On another important theoretical front, the mind-body problem is under 
continuous and fierce attack. With the theoretical development represented by embodied 
cognition, and the empirical study of feelings and emotions, it has been more and more 
evident that a comprehensive understanding of self cannot afford to focus solely on the 
cognitive and disembodied aspects of self. The embodiment of self and cognition stands 
at the core for any adequate understanding of self, and without acknowledging the role of 
body and feeling in initiating and shaping cognition, there would be no accurate 
understanding of self. 
An important theory is neuroscientist Antonio Damasio’s tripartite theory of self 
(2010), which takes an evolutionary and functional perspective on self. I summarize his 
theory of self by subtracting four key arguments. First, self is a process generated by 
organisms to better achieve the biological value—survival. Second, body plays an 
essential role in the generation of self, as “the essence of self is a focusing of the mind on 
the material organism that it inhabits” (Damasio, 2010, p. 191). Third, self is not only a 




in self process. Fourth, self is built in stages: the protoself, the core self, and finally the 
autobiographical self.  
According to Damasio, the brain maps the bodily states, and this mapping process 
creates images of the bodily states. The mapping of bodily states is not only an essential 
adaptive strategy enabling better control of the bodily states, but also forms a critical 
component of what will later become self. In this sense, he argues that the body is the 
central locus for understanding self. He believes that brain mapping of the bodily states is 
the “engine that transforms plain life regulation into minded regulation and, eventually, 
into consciously minded regulation” (Damasio, 2010, p. 114). The brain mapping of the 
external world is also via the mediation of the body.  
Closely related to the body, “feeling” is an important concept for Damasio’s 
theory of self. Following William James’ understanding of feeling as a read-out of body 
states, Damasio proposes that feeling, from the more primordial levels of feeling to the 
advanced level that is emotion, is related to bodily states and is part of homeostatic 
regulation. The primordial feelings have roots in the reward/punishment mechanisms that 
humans share with other animals. These affective elements play important roles in the 
construction of the protoself. The protoself is constructed from the part of the brain 
representing the internal states. As a representational structure, the protoself is “an 
integrated collection of separate neural patterns that map the most stable aspects of the 
organisms’ physical structure” (Damasio, 2010, p. 190).   
Here interception is an important concept, referring to the sense of the 




invariance that forms the basic stable scaffolding for the constitution of self, and 
therefore is the root for the unitary experience of self. He believes that this relative 
invariance is important as self is a singular process and there must be a biological basis 
for that singularity. Moreover, the body images produced by interception are “felt” body 
images—images with feelings. These primordial feelings, which describe bodily states, 
form the foundation of self.  
Damasio’s theory of self roots cognition in the body, or more specifically, the 
mapping of body states to form felt body images. This is in line with the embodied 
cognitive science, and strengthens it by providing empirical details of the dependence of 
cognition on body. Importantly, his theory represents an emerging consensus that self is 
not only a cognitive process, but an affective process, where emotion and feeling play 
essential roles and set up the roots for the ensuing more abstract levels of self. 
4 Evolutionary Studies of Self: What is Self for?  
One emerging trend in the study of self is the idea that, to understand the nature of 
self, one needs to begin with the evolutionary precedent of self, as it is believed that self, 
like other faculties of human beings, is not predesigned but emerged from evolution 
(Deacon, 2011; Damasio, 2010; Metzinger, 2004). Damasio believes that the reason that 
self appears is because of biological value, that is, self helps better regulate life so that the 
organism can have better chances of survival. He takes self as the first representative of 
the organism’s life-regulation mechanisms and the proxy of the biological value. The 





Metzinger’s self-model theory (2008) similarly proposes that self is “a transient 
computational module that is episodically activated by the system” (p. 219) to help the 
system better control itself in its interaction with the outside world. The self-model 
provides “an efficient two-way window that allows an organism to conceive of itself as a 
whole, and thereby to causally interact with its inner and outer environment in an entirely 
new, integrated, and intelligent manner” (Metzinger, 2004, p. 1). Metzinger believes 
the conscious self-model is the best invention of human evolution, and the conscious self 
is the decisive factor allowing our transition from biological evolution to cultural 
evolution (Metzinger, 2004).   
Similarly, Terrence Deacon (2011) argues that self appears in evolution for a 
reason. He goes further back into evolutionary history, not stopping at the minimal self as 
Metzinger suggests, but going further back to explore the simpler homologue of self. He 
argues that self is not limited to organisms with brains, but that a bacterium can be said to 
also have a self. This sense of self is closely related to the concept of “individuality,” and 
it is the dense interdependence of organism’s elements of structure and processes that 
constitute self/other distinction. This structural and functional interdependence is called 
dynamic circularity, and the causal power that determines the dynamics is not any 
ultimate forces or beings but the dynamical organization itself. In Aristotelian terms, the 
formal causation (the dynamical organization and mutual constraints among elements 
forming the structure) mediates the mechanical cause and the final cause (i.e., the 
survival of the organism). He argues that the core of this dynamic circularity is the 




dynamic patterns. He links the concept of constraint to thermodynamics, since constraint 
is a negative way of defining order. The maintenance of constraints is the maintenance of 
order, and it is also the basis for the capacity to do physical work. Therefore, he defines 
self as “a system of self-perpetuating formal causes: a dynamical organization that 
includes the capacity to continuously maintain or reconstitute that form of organization in 
the face of intrinsic degradation and extrinsic disturbances” (Deacon et al., 2011, p. 323). 
Deacon’s evolutionary approach to self appears to indicate the importance of 
thermodynamics, information theory and self-organization to the understanding of the 
origin and dynamics of self. In fact, besides the recognition of the embodied and 
processual nature of self, the realization of self as a dynamical system that may be best 
understood within a dynamical system framework is perhaps the most important and 
salient emerging consensus in the multidisciplinary science of self.  
5 Dynamical Systems Approach 
In recent decades, terms like complex adaptive system, information theory, 
thermodynamics, entropy, dynamical systems theory, etc. have frequently appeared in 
the discussion of various psychological processes including self (see Thelen & Smith, 
1996; Friston, 2000; Kelso, 1997; Deacon, 2011; Vallacher & Nowak, 1994; Nowak et al., 
2000; Collell & Fauquet, 2015). These terms are closely related and sometimes hard to 
clearly demarcate. I will here group these into two camps, the one focusing more on the 
complexity aspect, the other focusing more on the dynamics perspective, as a way to lay 
out the key elements of this framework. However, this does not mean that these two 




Systems being Complex: Self-organization and Emergence 
A system is complex when it contains numerous units that are interconnected. 
Complexity here does not refer to the intrinsic features of a single unit or the way they 
connect with one another—these can be very simple. However, simple elements 
interacting with one another following simple local rules may generate much more 
sophisticated patterns that cannot be understood by merely looking at these global 
features. 
Complex systems often have a hierarchical structure where the lower level 
interactions give rise to emergent higher level properties, while the global level properties 
cannot be reduced to the properties of the lower level units. What is important about the 
complex system is less about the nature of the basic units than the way they interconnect 
with one another; in other words, the rules that specify how each unit is constrained by 
other units, which give rise to feedback loops among different levels in the hierarchical 
structure.  
Complex systems are related to information theory. This is largely because 
complex collective behaviors of the system are normally achieved through the production 
and transmission of information about its internal condition as well as the external world. 
In Melanie Mitchell’s (2009) definition of complex system, she emphasizes that self-
organization of the system is achieved through information communication and 
processing. Moreover, the emergence of global patterns from basic units’ interaction is 
similar to the information integration process. No wonder complex systems are often 




It is generally believed that complex systems study is an interdisciplinary area that 
emerges from the systems theory in the 1960s. It begins with the application of 
mathematical formulations to the complex physical and chemical processes, but is then 
extended to study other complex systems such as living systems, society, economics, and 
brain. Complexity theory is closely related to dynamical systems theory, as a dynamical 
system, according to Vallacher, Read, and Nowak (2002), is “simply a set of elements 
that undergoes change over time by virtue of interactions among the elements. The 
primary task of dynamical systems theory is to describe the connections among a 
system’s elements and the changes in the system’s behavior that these connections 
promote” (p. 266).   
The complex adaptive system, strictly speaking, is a special class of complex 
system, and its uniqueness is located in its capacity to adapt its connectivity patterns to 
the changing environment (Mitchell, 2009). Adaptive systems such as humans can adopt 
novel strategies to deal with unexpected situations and avoid danger: on the lower level, 
homeostasis helps maintain internal order by importing resources and exporting entropy 
to the outside world; on the higher level, for example, one theory proposes that the self 
schemata are used as conceptual frameworks to guide quick reactions to the environment, 
and to process and store information efficiently (Markus, 1977).   
Self-organization and emergence are two defining and integral features of 
complex adaptive systems. The idea is simple— when the numerous basic units of a 
system mutually influence one another according to local rules, they achieve certain 




from the local interactions of lower-level units. These emergent properties are different in 
that they are not inherent in the lower-level properties, and they are not imposed onto the 
system by external forces. For example, the global properties of self, such as self-esteem, 
self-concept or self-certainty, are not properties of individual pieces of self-related 
information, but are emergent properties arising from the interactions of the numerous 
items of self-relevant thoughts and ideas. Emergence allows for complex patterns to 
appear based on simple local laws. The basic idea is that self-organization among basic 
elements of a system forms the basis for the emergence of high-order properties, and the 
emergent global structures coordinate activities of the basic elements on lower levels (cf. 
Haken, 1987; Kelso, 1997). A self-organizing system does not need a central control, but 
requires the capacity for emergence (Vallacher, Read, Nowak, 2002, p. 266).  
Systems being Dynamical: Nonlinearity, Attractor, and Entropy 
For the study of complex dynamical systems, the most challenging part is to 
figure out the rules of dynamics. When the dynamical patterns of the system are not 
imposed but emerge from the local interaction of system elements, the system’s dynamics 
radically depart from traditional understandings. First of all, it is hard to understand the 
dynamics merely from observations of global patterns. Similar global patterns may turn 
out to have quite distinct underlying rules, and a minor difference in initial conditions 
may result in radically different trajectories. Therefore, to study the behavior of complex 
systems often requires new mathematical and technological tools.   
The first important tool is the mathematical concept of nonlinearity. According to 




ideally suited to investigate internally generated dynamics, self-organization, the 
emergence of global properties from the interaction of basic elements and the time-
dependent relation between external influences and a system’s intrinsic dynamics” (p. 
267-8).  In a linear system, the change in one input variable is proportional to the change 
in the output variable. The output can be understood as the additive contributions from 
the input variables. However, in a nonlinear system, a change might not have any 
measurable effect on the output, but the same degree of change at another time, when the 
output variable is approaching a threshold, might cause dramatic differences.   
Closely related to the concept of nonlinearity is the another important concept —
attractors.  An attractor is “a state or a reliable pattern of changes (e.g. 
oscillation between two states) toward which a dynamical system evolves over time, 
and to which the system returns after it has been perturbed” (Nowak et al., 2005, p. 
354). There are three major types of attractors (cf. Nowak & Lewenstein, 1994; Schuster 
& Just, 2006): fixed-point attractors, periodic attractors, and deterministic chaos (cf. 
Nowak et al., 2005). As Nowak and colleagues note, among the three, the fixed-point 
attractor has received the most attention in the dynamical perspective as it is the 
most relevant to the emergence of stable internal states (Nowak et al., 2005). Self-
regulation can be analyzed in terms of the attractor of psychological processes, as certain 
initial states residing in the basin of a psychological attractor would develop towards that 
attractor, which forms the basis for stability in psychological states (Nowak et al., 2005). 
Freeman’s neural dynamics theory also argues that consciousness is the state of the 




network (Freeman, 2001).  
If the macro-level developmental trajectory can be captured by nonlinear and 
attractor dynamics, what might be the underlying rules that give rise to these dynamic 
patterns? An important development in recent decades is that many theories have noticed 
the importance of information theory and thermodynamics for understanding the 
dynamical rules of brain and cognition. Entropy is a core concept in both 
thermodynamics and information theory, and is also the concept that connects these two 
areas.   
As of the 19th century, the science of thermodynamics, and in particular the 
second law of thermodynamics, had shown that the entropy of any closed system can 
only increase with time. This important line of research is normally regarded as 
beginning with Carnot’s study in 1824 where the entropy is understood in the context of 
energy loss in the mechanical engine, where the input energy is always larger than the 
output energy. But the more influential definition of entropy is proposed by Ludwig 
Boltzmann in 1877, who gives a statistical mechanical definition of entropy as a function 
of the number of microstates that could comprise a macrostate. A macrostate that could 
potentially be comprised by a larger number of microstates has higher entropy level than 
a macrostate with fewer possible microstates. This sense of entropy is referred to 
as thermodynamic entropy, to be distinguished from the later information-theoretical 
entropy. Although isolated systems inevitably increase their disorder, physicist Ilya 
Prigogine notices a very important set of exceptions: dissipative structures. These are 




The system elements of dissipative structures form feedback cycles that sustain the order 
of the system; thereby these systems are referred to as self-organizing systems.   
Another important development of the concept of entropy is from Claude 
Shannon (1949), and this time this concept is extended into the context of information 
systems. Shannon defines entropy as a measure of uncertainty. Information can be 
measured in terms of how much entropy an information reduces. For example, tossing a 
coin reduces entropy—the information contained by the action of tossing reduces the 
uncertainty of being either head or tail to a certain result. Although there is still much 
debate as to whether Shannon entropy, or in other words, information-theoretic entropy, 
is the same as or qualitatively different from thermodynamic entropy, it is Shannon 
entropy, that is, entropy understood as a measure of the uncertainty, is most influential 
and applied to many other areas. 
Freud is among the pioneers who aim to construct a science of the mind based on 
insights from thermodynamics. In the 1870s, he proposes that thermodynamic laws may 
be applied and extended to the mental and brain processes. He believes the natural 
tendency of the mind is towards a state of minimal energy, similar to other 
thermodynamic systems. The normal release of neuronal energy causes actions in the 
world, but this neuronal energy needs to be bound by goals or belief structures. When 
conflicting information enters the brain, it disturbs normal processing, and thus the 
normal process of releasing energy into action is blocked. As a result, the energy 
becomes “free energy” that causes disorganization in the neural structure, which 




mental disintegration (Freud & Breuer, 1895/2000; Ellenberger, 1970). This increased 
disorganization is the “entropy” of the mental system. As such, Freud extends 
thermodynamic principles into the study of mind. The subjective experience of stress, 
anxiety, and trauma is a reflection and a result of the increase of entropy in the 
neural/mental structure as the entropy disturbs the normal associative processes of the 
brain. 
Based on Freud’s original contribution (his later thought shifted into a different 
direction), neuroscientist Petr Bob notes that the actual process might be more complex: 
the neuro-cognitive system might anticipate the potential increase of entropy, and self-
organize in certain ways to compensate the actual or potential entropy increase. In other 
words, the neural and mental system may reorganize itself to achieve different ways of 
connection and organization so as to avoid or lower the increase of entropy. As Bob 
(2015) says, “This problem seems to be critical for psychoanalytical viewpoint because 
when a mental disorder is only a transition increasing randomness in the mind then this 
pathological process is psychologically and biologically determined. On the other hand, 
mental disease may be linked to re-organization and new self-organization of systems 
components that serve as compensatory defense” (p. 10). Bob notes that the adaptation of 
the mental system is reflected in Freud’s idea, as Freud mentions that even if mental 
disorders may reflect the increased entropy in psychological processing, it may also be 
part of the psychological defense mechanism—some forms of mental disintegration may 





There are many later developments that continue this application of 
thermodynamics and information theory to the study of complex systems. In 
1948, Norbert Wiener wrote Cybernetics which signaled the foundation of the science of 
cybernetics. Information and control are the two core themes for this science, as the focus 
is on the control of a system via the communication of information. The following 
discussion owes a great deal to Carver and Scheier’s book (1981) about a control-theory 
approach to human behavior. 
Similar to other sciences that draw on information theory, cybernetics 
conceptualizes information as closely related to the concept of entropy (J. G. Miller, 
1978/1995; Shannon & Weaver, 1949). In fact, Wiener defines entropy as disorganization 
within a cybernetic information system (Hirsh et al., 2012). Reduction of entropy 
amounts to the reduction of uncertainty and thus the increase of predictability. 
Information can be distinguished in terms of how much uncertainty is reduced, but it can 
also be defined in terms of which level it resides in, from the most concrete level to the 
most abstract level. Information on a more concrete level can be processed and 
transformed into information on more abstract levels, and numerous pieces of concrete 
information can be integrated into fewer pieces of denser and more compact information. 
As Carver and Scherer (1981) argue, “As lower-level information becomes ‘represented’ 
to higher-level neuronal structures, the higher-level information is fundamentally 
different from the lower-level information. Every time one of these integrations occurs, 
some new characteristic is being created that was not there before. The newly created 




information. By integrating the lower-level information, this structure conveys ‘upward 
to higher-level structures information about this new, more abstract characteristic” (p. 13). 
The example they give is how the information about sensory pulses is transformed into 
more complex and abstract information as it is sent to higher neural centers where 
information of a lower level is integrated: “The perceptual event that is being experienced 
has been analyzed in such a way that its characteristics along a great many logical 
dimensions have been assessed by the various integrating centers. Its essence has been 
abstracted, in terms of characteristics that exist at the various levels of analysis to which 
it has been subjected” (Carver & Scheier, 1981, p.13). Information processing not only 
refers to the integration of lower level information to form more abstract and complex 
information, but also includes the storage of already-processed information into memory. 
These items of stored information form structures where many elements are 
interconnected to one another, and this structure forms a frame of reference for 
subsequent information processing (see Carver & Scheier, 1981). In summary, the first 
theme of cybernetics is information, which can reduce uncertainty, and the lower levels 
of information can be processed and integrated to form higher level and more abstract 
information; this processed information is stored in memory and forms organization 
structures to guide the subsequent processing of input information.  
The second theme is “control”. Different from traditional formulations of control 
where a central organ or agent is needed to monitor the activity and communication of 
basic system elements, in cybernetics control is “continuously cycled among the 




system perform self-organization to regulate the system with no central “headquarters”. 
Self-organizing systems often comprise hierarchical levels, and the numerous feedback 
loops within as well as between these levels transfer information between units and 
implement the regulation of the system through information communication. Essential for 
this control process is the existence of some comparison value, against which the 
system’s current state is constantly compared. If discrepancy between these two values is 
detected, actions are taken to reduce it. The comparison value for a certain level is 
normally provided not externally but from a superordinate system that lies in the same 
hierarchical system, and the reference value can be altered when the superordinate 
control system changes (see Carver & Scheier, 1981). Cybernetics has become very 
influential in psychology, in particular social psychology, especially after Carver and 
Scheier adopted the cybernetic approach to examine self-regulation and attention in the 
1980s.   
Entering this century, another major theoretical development is from 
computational neuroscience, when Carl Friston (2010) proposes his free energy principle 
(FEP), and claims this might be a unified brain theory that integrates the understanding of 
perception, action, and inference. Friston’s use of free energy is different from either the 
thermodynamic sense or Freud’s usage, but he conceptualizes it in a Bayesian statistical 
fashion. His theory is also closely related to the concept of information entropy, and the 
free energy is a mathematical formulation based on the informational sense of entropy. 
Friston (2010) proposes that any self-organizing system at equilibrium with its 




that most people would agree on— that a self-organizing system aims to maintain itself 
within a limited state space (for example, human beings keep their body temperature in a 
certain range), which has long been well-known from Schrödinger’s book What is Life 
(1944). What is new here is the way Friston proposes that the brain achieves that. He 
argues that brain minimizes entropy in two ways: predictive coding and active inference. 
Put in a more informal way: our brain does not passively reflect the external world 
through sensory mapping, but takes a more active way of predicting the causes of sensory 
information. What is transferred to the higher level of cognitive process is not a 
representation of the world, but the prediction error. Human beings face numerous 
information in their lifetimes, but by trial and error their brains construct representational 
structures that help them efficiently and reliably predict the states of external information 
as well as internal states, buying them tremendous time to plan in advance and avoid 
potential dangers.   
Friston’s free energy principle is notoriously difficult to understand, not so much 
because of its mathematical sophistication as the way he defines free energy. There have 
been debates on the mathematical meaning of free energy and what uncertainty refers to 
when it applies to different levels of brain activity. Yet due to its mathematical rigor and 
the potential for unifying multiple processes of the brain, it has received wide attention, 
and recent years have witnessed many researchers apply this principle to understand 
various psychological and cognitive phenomena. Andy Clark (2013) embraces this 
approach and in particular emphasizes the construction of a hierarchical generative model 




principle to describe how perception works and extending this principle to interpret 
higher cognitive levels such as thoughts, emotion and memory. He believes that the free 
energy principle has the potential to unify multiple levels of human cognition and mental 
states, but also recognizes the difficulties in applying this principle to more abstract 
levels.  
When the free energy principle is applied to the more basic and prereflective 
levels, the problem is not as evident. For instance, Limanowski and Blankenburg (2013) 
have applied the free energy principle into understanding minimal phenomenal selfhood, 
or the “basic, pre-reflective experience of being a self” (p. 1). Different from the higher, 
more abstract levels of self, the minimal self is more related to and dependent on body 
states. Metzinger argues that the mechanism for the formation of minimal phenomenal 
selfhood is a self-modeling mechanism. That is, the brain, as a representational system, 
constructs and simulates a model of the world (including the external and internal 
environment) as a way to reduce ambiguity and uncertainty so as to achieve adaptive 
success. Following Meztinger’s argument that to explore the specifics of self-modeling 
mechanisms we need to focus on the functional properties of the brain, Limanowski and 
Blankenburg (2013) argue that Friston’s free energy principle might be the underlying 
principle for understanding self-modeling processes. But they also note that sensory 
information is not directly relevant to self, and they believe this implies that there are 
additional levels of information processing before forming information that directly 
relates to self (Apps & Tsakiris, 2014).  




ambiguity in terms of how to redefine the related concepts. For example, Hirsh and 
colleagues (2012) formulate an entropy model of uncertainty based on information theory 
and dynamical systems theory, in which entropy, understood as uncertainty, is defined as 
the experience of competing affordances. The entropy model of uncertainty is composed 
of four major tenets: “(a) Uncertainty poses a critical adaptive challenge for any organism, 
so individuals are motivated to keep it at a manageable level; (b) uncertainty emerges as a 
function of the conflict between competing perceptual and behavioral affordances; (c) 
adopting clear goals and belief structures helps to constrain the experience of uncertainty 
by reducing the spread of competing affordances; and (d) uncertainty is experienced 
subjectively as anxiety and is associated with activity in the anterior cingulate cortex and 
heightened noradrenaline release” (p. 304). 
According to Hirsh and colleagues (2012), it seems that entropy used in the 
context of self-organizing complex systems is related to spatial orderliness instead of 
temporal predictability— “High-entropy states, in this context, reflect a lack of internal 
constraints among the system’s interacting parts, such that knowing the state of one 
component provides minimal information about the others” (p. 305). In reviewing the 
conception of entropy, they acknowledge the importance of such conceptions as 
Schrodinger’s (1944) and Prigogine’s (Prigogine & Stengers, 1997), where entropy is 
formulated as structural disorder rather than lack of temporal uncertainty. However, when 
extending entropy to psychological systems Hirsh and colleagues (2012) define it more in 
line with the information entropy, without mentioning the spatial order sense of entropy. 




constraint among the system elements, then it would be easier to predict the successive 
state of each element given the current states of that and other elements, even if these 
elements may also be affected by forces external to the system. However, even if entropy 
is defined in this model as the feeling of uncertainty from conflicting perceptual and 
action affordances, when it is used it sometimes refers to the structural coherence and 
other times as the subjective ambiguity deriving from sensory input and interpretative 
schemes.    
Importantly, they note that uncertainty can be located in different levels, and 
sometimes individuals may voluntarily choose to leave familiar environment, for instance 
to find a new job, as a way to deal with the uncertainty in a higher level (e.g., uncertainty 
in terms of self-identity). Although for a short term the uncertainty is increased due to the 
change of job, in a longer time frame the uncertainty is decreased in terms of a clearer 
understanding of self. This is important because it suggests that, as human cognitive 
systems are complex and highly flexible, the control of entropy may exhibit more 
complex dynamics.   
A clearer application of self-organization and information theory including 
entropy is represented by Nowak and Vallacher’s studies on self-concept and personality 
(see Nowak et al., 2000; Vallacher, Read, & Nowak, 2002). They propose that self-
concept is a self-organizing complex system, in which numerous self-relevant pieces of 
information are self-organized into relatively coherent structures and patterns. This 
coherence is important as it forms a stable frame of reference for interpretation and 




the self-organizing of self-relevant information via mutual constraint. This is based on the 
fact that there is some common parameter to measure each element, which they believe is 
the evaluation of self-relevant information. That is, self-relevant information “runs the 
gamut of possible self-evaluation, from memories of misdeeds and perceived character 
flaws to memorable accomplishments and firmly held values” (Vallacher & Nowak, 2009, 
p. 315). As the parameter for self-information is malleable and susceptible to the 
influence of other elements, multiple feedback loops are formed via the mutual 
constraining of system elements. These serve as the basis for stability in thought, action 
and emotion. Pieces of information with the same evaluation provide cross-validation for 
each other, and those with incongruent evaluations tend to eliminate the incoherence by 
changing each other or by isolating the incongruent elements.   
The dynamical systems approach offers the best clue to the mechanism 
underlying self-transformation. With its mathematical tools and the technical tools of 
computer modeling and simulation, it promises to clarify the black-box of mechanisms 
underlying self-transformation and further clarifies the causal mechanism of shamanistic 
healing. As neuroscientist Walter Freeman (2003) notes, although these are “quite new 
entries into the situation”, they can nevertheless “provide valuable insights into the nature 
of brain function, how information theory can be applied, and the ways in which 
nonlinear dynamics may be used to construct new and more powerful brain theory” (p. 
55).  
Conclusion 




study of self. In particular, I have discussed the dynamical systems framework, and 
various models that attempt to apply this paradigm to the study of psychological 
processes and especially self. However, these important developments have not been 
successfully incorporated into the religious studies of shamanistic healing, or more 
generally the study of religious healing. One of the major arguments of this dissertation is 
that shamanistic healing would greatly benefit from a better understanding of self and its 
transformative dynamics. In this respect, I propose a new theoretical framework of self 
that incorporates important insights from the recent developments of the science of self, 
especially the dynamical systems approach.  
The basic tenets of the proposed framework are a set of interrelated premises: 
First, the human self is a complex embodied cognitive-affective system. Body 
plays an essential role in the formation and reconstruction of self processes. Normal 
fluctuations in bodily states may not affect the higher level sense of self directly, but 
certain manipulations of bodily states may destabilize self-structure and cause altered self 
experiences. The numerous pieces of information constituting the self structure lie in 
different levels ranging from the most concrete to the most abstract. The more abstract 
the information is, the more influence it has on information processing but also the more 
difficult it is to change it when it is negatively biased, as normally the sensory 
information one is exposed to in daily life tends not to disturb higher level self processing 
directly. But realizing the bodily foundation for self structure, it is understandable that by 
manipulating the basic self-modeling on the embodied level in certain dramatic ways, one 





  Second, this complex system works in a self-organizing fashion (cf. Deci & Ryan, 
1991; Damasio, 2010; Deacon, 2011; Freeman, 2001; Metzinger, 2004; Thagard, 2014; 
Markus & Wurf, 1987). In particular, one important dynamical principle is to minimize 
entropy. Entropy has distinct meanings in different levels of self-processing. For instance, 
in lower-level self-processing—perception—entropy is conceptualized mainly in an 
informational sense, as illustrated in Friston’s free energy principle, that the hierarchical 
generative model actively infers the causes of sensory data to avoid surprise (Friston, 
2010; Friston et al., 2006). In higher level self-processing, one aspect of that complex 
process is to preserve structural coherence, and avoid drastic organizational change, 
through the mutual constraints of self-relevant information based on some common 
parameter. One plausible parameter is evaluation, and self-relevant information with 
various contents can be gauged in terms of their affective valence (Nowak et al., 2000; 
Vallacher et al., 2002). Nowak and colleagues’ study on self-concept shows how the 
complex self-organization of self structure can be based on self integration in terms of 
evaluation (Nowak et al., 2000). Other than that, the culturally embedded self-schema or 
social roles (see Markus, 1977) may also play roles in this process through providing the 
possible ideal self as scripts for self-development, or via invoking the power of 
imagination and role play to arouse correlated emotional or physiological responses. 
Third, integration of the self-system requires energy, and can be affected by 
fluctuations in energy supplies as well as by chemicals introduced into the body from 




Siegelman, 1978/1995). There have been several attempts to connect the thermodynamic 
interpretation of the brain (reflecting the energetic aspect) and the informational 
interpretation of cognition (reflecting the information processing aspect) (see Collell & 
Fauquet, 2015; Brillouin, 1953), arguing that there is an energetic cost associated with 
obtaining or processing information. This framework can help understand the relationship 
between bodily practices in shamanistic healing rituals and the symbolic and meaning 
aspect of the rituals. The resource theory of religious ritual can also be better understood 
within this framework. 
To conclude, I aim to examine self-transformation processes from a framework of 
self that takes advantage of the important developments in recent studies of self, 
especially those relevant for understanding transformative dynamics. Having synthesized 
these developments and constructed this framework, the next chapter will explore the 













Chapter Five  
A Model of Self-Transformation Underlying Shamanistic Healing 
This chapter turns to a theoretical understanding of the transformative effect of 
shamanistic healing techniques. As Csordas (1994) says, “Only by closely tracing this 
transformation can we approach the issue of efficacy that lies at the center of debate 
about religious healing practices” (p. 57). Rather than citing masses of specific 
experiences of these psychological transformational phenomena—as data in this aspect 
are abundant and any choice of it inevitably reflect theoretical biases – I will first 
summarize and analyze what scholars have frequently abstracted from these data.   
The first group of scholars are cultural anthropologists in ritual studies. The 
second group is psychologists of religion that work on religious experience. The third 
group is researchers of forcible conversion and brain-washing. After presenting the 
strengths and weaknesses of these models, I propose a model of self-transformation based 
on the theoretical framework of self established in the last chapter to reevaluate and 
integrate these existing findings. The main thrust of this chapter is to explain the process 
of sudden and dramatic forms of self-transformation. However, the aim of this chapter is 
not to disqualify any previous theories, as “Every sophisticated interpretative framework 
can assimilate the same evidence in basic ways” (Wildman, 2011, p. xii), nor to 
demonstrate that the model proposed in the second part is a definite conclusion, as “no 
approach, no researcher, no writer, and no book will speak the last word on RSEs [note: 
religious and spiritual experiences]” (ibid, p. xi), which includes religious healing 




multidisciplinary comparative inquiry” proposed by Wesley Wildman (2011, for a more 
systematic illustration of this approach, see Wildman, 2010), which works by “steadily 
eliminating rational and evidential flaws in promising hypotheses” (2011, p. 245) by 
placing findings in various disciplines in conversation. 
Cultural Anthropologists in ritual studies 
The angles with which cultural anthropologists view psychological transformation 
in ritual processes are best reflected in their discussions of symbolic efficacy. This topic 
has come to the forefront of anthropology since the 1960s and has become one of the 
most important topics in ritual and healing studies. Many important anthropologists have 
offered theories about this topic, aiming to dissect the exciting but uncanny connection 
between symbols and psychophysiological change (see Levi-Strauss, 1949/2000; Dow, 
1986; Whitehead, 1987; Csordas, 1994; Seligman, 2014). A sufficient understanding of 
ritual is incomplete without understanding the psychological and physiological effects it 
causes, and the healing effect is perhaps the most intriguing transformative effect 
religious rituals bring. How are such effects made possible? There have been many 
efforts to uncover the underlying mechanisms, a few of which will be discussed here.  
Levi-Strauss, in his classic work “The effectiveness of symbols” (1949/2000), 
argues that ritual healing is essentially “symbolic curing,” which reflects his predominant 
focus on the power of symbols. In his discussion of Ndembu healing, Levi-Strauss argues 
that the therapeutic result comes from the reorganization of the patient’s experience by 
symbols carried in the healer’s chanting. The chant is special in that there is a structural 




images of the chant have similar structural qualities to the patient’s experience at that 
birth event: from a chaotic scenario with no structures and order towards gradual 
organization, and finally achieving coherence. This structural correspondence allows the 
shamanic healer’s chanting to capture the patient’s experience, and thus by manipulating 
these images the patient can reorganize her experience and somatic processes. In this 
process, symbols provide access to the patient’s inner states and bodily processes. The 
reordering of these special symbols helps reorder the patient’s mental and somatic 
processes.  
How is narrative change in symbolic representation translated into a change at the 
level of bodily experience? Levi-Strauss argues that during the healing ritual, somatic 
experience is mapped symbolically onto a representational space of myth. The narrative 
structure of the ritual thus can change the representational space, which then transforms 
patients’ bodily experience. The critical precondition for this symbolic manipulation is 
the creation of a homology between body and symbolic narrative. However, the 
mechanism underlying the creation of this homology remains unclear; nor is it clear why, 
in ritual situations, in contrast to daily life, the sufferers seem to become more susceptible 
to the manipulation of mythic symbols. Although not a specific formulation on healing, 
Geertz’s (1972) perspective on rituals may be quite relevant to this question. Geertz is 
intrigued by the power of ritual to make people accept religious world views, and his 
research reaches the conclusion that the secret lies in “the moods and motivations which 
sacred symbols induce in men” (p. 112). Geertz believes it is these feelings and 




more receptive to these religious doctrines. Similarly, it is also likely that these feelings 
and emotions aroused in rituals play important roles in creating the homology between 
symbolic narratives and bodily responses.    
Levi-Strauss and Geertz’s interpretations have had a great influence on the 
cultural anthropological studies of rituals, myth and magic in the following decades. As 
Whitehead (1987) notices, many significant scholars, including Nancy Munn, Terence 
Turner, Victor Turner, and Sherry Ortner, all form their own theories on how symbols 
could affect psychological or bodily states. Importantly, Dow’s model of symbolic 
healing (1986) constitutes a major advancement in this respect. His work, as Itzack (2015) 
notes, has set “the tone for much of the subsequent scholarship on the topic” (see Bilu et 
al., 1990; Devisch, 1990; Greenfield, 1992; Luhrmann, 2013; Seeman, 2010; Somer & 
Saadon, 2000). In Dow’s classic article “Universal Aspects of Symbolic Healing: A 
Theoretical Synthesis” (1986), he attempts to uncover the deep structure of symbolic 
healing. Dow argues that symbolic healing constitutes a significant pathway to achieve 
therapeutic effects in shamanic rituals and psychotherapy, although other factors may 
also function in these healing modalities. Dow’s model can be mainly summarized with 
three arguments: first, there is a deep structure for symbolic healing; second, this deep 
structure should be understood in terms of the theory of living systems, or in other words, 
the hierarchical control system theory; third, emotion is the generalized medium that 






 Figure 5.1 An Illustration of Dow’s Universal Structure of Symbolic Healing 
In Dow’s model, emotion plays a particularly important role. Emotions are 
generalized media that link the somatic level and the representational level. For example, 
pain and the associated feeling of fear constitute a message to the conscious level that 
there is something wrong at the physical level that needs attention. Some emotions, such 
as shame or anxiety, may not be specified in physiological sense as directly as such, but 
could similarly drive the conscious level to take actions to change the current situation or 
to motivate one to modify the current processing patterns. According to Dow (1986), 
emotions have an integrative control function as they summarize complex and numerous 
processes at the lower subconscious level and form a denser and more abstract message 
to send to the higher level. Dow also argues that symbolic healing allows the somatic 
processes to be controlled by symbolic communication at the higher social level through 
the transaction of emotion. 
But how does the conditioning of symbols and emotions develop? According to 
Dow (1986):   
...symbolic healing exists, in part, because humans developed their capacity to 
communicate with each other from an earlier capacity to communicate within 




level of emotional thinking is primarily adaptive...as culture and language have 
developed, the capacity to communicate has been extended into symbols 
accessible within social systems. Symbolic healing exists, therefore, because of 
the way in which social communication has drawn with it the structure of 
emotional communication. (p. 66) 
 
Moreover, a critical element for spiritual healing to work is the 
patient’s acceptance of the therapist’s redefining of the relationship between the patient 
and the mythic world. If the patient does not accept the therapist’s defining of this 
relationship, the symbolic narratives will not arouse the expected emotions, and therefore 
cannot affect the patient’s bodily states. This indicates the importance of the healer-
patient relationship, as patients’ trust of healers is a precondition for the efficacy of 
healing. Dow (1986) suggests that trance, magical flight, ecstasy, and other therapeutic 
preludes are means by which magical healers gain authority and win trust from their 
patients. Once a strong healer-patient relationship is formed, patients are more likely to 
accept healers’ manipulation of their emotional reactions via transactional symbols (i.e., 
symbols that are linked with certain emotional reactions).  
Dow’s symbol-and-meaning approach further extends Levi-Strauss’ symbolic 
approach, not only by Dow’s emphasis on emotion and the healer-patient relationship, 
but also in that he conceptualizes this healing process in the framework of the hierarchy 
of living systems and control signals. These different levels — social symbolic level, 




systems, and the efficacy of symbols depends on the transmission of control signals in 
this hierarchy. Generalized symbolic media, in the sense that the meaning and value of 
the symbols and myths are shared by the community where the healer and the healed both 
live, serve as communication devices, which enable lower-level processes to be 
transacted at a higher level in the control hierarchy. An effective symbolic healing thus 
starts with the presence of a generalized symbolic medium, which could then be 
particularized by the healer to affect the patient’s transaction of emotion in his/her self 
system.  
Despite all those insights, this model doesn’t answer a critical question: if healing 
requires that patients abandon self-control of their own emotions and instead (consciously 
or unconsciously) allow healers to manipulate their emotional responses, why are patients 
willing to do this during rituals and not in ordinary situations? This question can be seen 
as an extension of Geertz’s question: what makes ritual settings special in that people 
become more susceptible to religious world views? Geertz and Dow’s emphasis on the 
role of emotion might be very true but still it is a vague answer as important links are 
missing— even if therapeutic effects may result from the shift from self-transaction of 
emotion to symbolic transaction, why does this shift appear much more frequently in 
ritual settings than ordinary settings? Moreover, as Itzhak (2015) notes, it cannot explain 
the efficacy of healing when patients are unaware of the meaning of language (Kleinman, 
1980b) or don’t understand the languages used by the healer (Lindquist, 2007; Sherzer, 
1983). Csordas and Kleinman (1996) even point out that this symbolic explanation does 




another problem is that patients’ own understanding and experience remain unelaborated, 
and patients are assumed to be passive beings (Hollan, 2001).  
Another significant development adopting the structural approach is the model 
proposed by Harriet Whitehead (1987), which is based on a Piagetian structuralist theory 
of mental schemata. She proposes the model of renunciation as the causal mechanism 
underlying religiously relevant psychological transformation. The most salient argument 
of her theory is for the reinsertion of the role of practice into our understanding of the 
efficacy of religious rituals. These instrumental practices could be of various kinds: 
chanting, dancing, fasting, sensory deprivation or bombardment, drug ingestion, etc. 
After reviewing related cultural anthropological literature, Whitehead points out the 
problem with this part of literature is the predominant focus on symbols and lack of 
appreciation of the role of instrumental practices. She thus argues for the incorporation 
and integration of the psychological literature on religious experience, altered states of 
consciousness and the study of forcible conversion and brainwashing. She believes that 
the literatures of cultural anthropology and the psychology of religion form a 
problematic contrast: “The religious psychology discussion, by contrast, begins with the 
recognition of a general class of extreme psychological states from which proceed ... 
insights and articulations... There may be special situations conducive to these states, but 
in the end individual temperament plays a decisive role; these states of mind are not 
accessible to everyone” (p. 22-23). For psychologists of religion such as William James 
and Gershom Scholem, religious experiences “are taken more as the starting point than 




religious mind is not a passive entity being acted upon but an active source of awareness 
and expression. Therefore, unlike cultural anthropologists, they are more cautious 
about “singling out specifically cultural or social determinants of visionary experiences” 
(p. 19), as ecstatic experiences can sometimes automatically occur in non-religious 
contexts, which makes it problematic to associate such experiences with religious 
contexts. As Whitehead (1987) points out, “it seems to be the consensus, at least among 
the writers just cited, that however much environmental factors may contribute to an 
individual’s visionary career… they do so only insomuch as they fall upon the fertile soil 
of a special personality and temperament” (p. 19). 
Whitehead argues that the separation of cultural anthropological studies of ritual 
and psychological studies of religious experience hinders a deeper understanding of the 
religious and ritual transformative process, and thus she aims to bring together the two 
literatures and integrate the two perspectives. To make the integration, she argues, we 
need to answer two questions: first, how religious rituals tend to trigger religious 
experience; second, how these religious experiences relate to and function for particular 
religions and ideologies. Whitehead believes this requires us to introduce a third body of 
literature on subjective transformation, which is provided by researchers on brainwashing 
and forcible conversion. This group of studies demonstrates that religious experiences 
can be induced in ordinary people by religious rituals and other techniques, and such 
altered states could be ideologically exploited. As various as the mind altering 
mechanisms or the contextual factors are, Whitehead notices that the invoked 




sudden organization of perspective, heightened sense of meaning, etc. That is, the 
phenomenological experiences these scholars of brainwashing have found in cult victims 
are very similar to what psychologists of religion have found in religious converts. These 
findings are important in that they show clearly that “the critical ingredient in 
psychologically transformative situations may not be so much the symbolism employed 
as the instrumental practice that accompanies it” (Whitehead, 1987, p. 23).  
Important as these brainwashing studies are, Whitehead believes they are “too 
often leap over the symbolic significance of the experiences to arrive at the frailties of 
brain mechanics, physiology, or biochemistry that make such disastrous experiences 
possible” (Whitehead, 1987, p. 24): 
….as William Sargant puts it, in qualifying his own (stimulus-response) approach, 
“the eating of a large supper and the supine position in bed do not explain all that 
needs to be known about the subsequent nightmare” (1957:237). Just so, the 
invoking of stimulus-response patterns, biochemical factors, or even “holographic” 
models of the brain, notwithstanding the fact that intriguing correlates of 
experience can be found, still leaves the explanations many degrees removed from 
the specifics of how an experience acquires meaning for the experiencer. The 
second half of the needed demonstration, how special states of mind are made 
religiously or ideologically relevant, still presents a puzzle. (p. 24) 
Whitehead believes that a critical shortcoming of this approach is that it fails to 
answer why altered experiences make individuals in such states more likely to accept 




which also fails to account for why individuals in ritual settings are more likely to loosen 
their ego defense and accept the persuasion of the healer.  
Therefore, Whitehead argues that it is essential for scholars of religion to work 
through these different opinions systematically and produce an understanding of the 
religious psyche that takes into consideration the role of both religious practices and 
symbols. She thus proposes her model of religious ritual transformation: when religious 
rituals and practices take effect, it is because they activate a particular psychological 
process—renunciation. The developmental phases are as follows: first, religious practices 
use various ways of attacking the structuring activity of the mind, which then initiates a 
process of restructuring of the mind. In the restructuring phase, the symbolic system 
intervenes, interpreting and guiding this reconstruction. Renunciation is a dual process 
where cognitively it takes the form of dedifferentiation of cognitive structures and 
affectively it is a withdrawal of emotional attachment and “an inward migration of 
desire” (Whitehead, 1987, p. 25). Whitehead points out that “the process has been 
recognized and particularly comprehended under various theoretical rubrics: regression in 
psychoanalytic theory, deautomatization in recent cognitive psychological studies of 
meditation, renunciation in the older vocabulary of western mysticism” (ibid). Her 
understanding of this dual process is based on Arthur Deikman’s theory of mystical 





   Figure 5.2 An Illustration of Whitehead’s Model of Renunciation 
 Importantly, Whitehead’s model of renunciation draws attention to the 
respective roles of religious practices and religious symbols: ritual practices attack the 
psychological structuring activity, forcing a restructuring, which is reflected on the 
phenomenal level as the loss of control, suspension of agency, and various altered states 
of consciousness; symbols do not engage in producing the altered states but provide a 
frame of reference to help make sense of the experience and thus also shape and orient 
one’s perception and feeling. In a word, symbols only start to play their role after rigid 
structuring is destabilized. As Whitehead (1987) says, “It is here that an established 
symbol system may begin to intervene—capturing, interpreting, and guiding the wealth 
of autistic material set loose by renunciatory techniques … by giving a name and a set of 
implications to the otherwise senseless elements of experience” (p. 27). 
 Interestingly, she points out that to be able to guide patients’ experience, 
symbols need to have specific characteristics. Essentially, symbols need to be able to 
account for and describe altered states of consciousness that have been invoked by 
instrumental practices. If the symbolic system provides systematic interpretation and 




had an altered experience. This emphasis on special features of successful symbols 
greatly complements previous understandings of symbols. In altered states people are 
generally more susceptible to external influence, but not all symbols have an equal power 
to arouse emotion and establish belief. Whitehead’s insight may also help understand 
another important question in religious experience studies: why does the occurrence of 
intensive experience (some of which might happen automatically in non-religious 
settings), more often than not lead the experiencers to embrace religious interpretations? 
It is possible that when experiencers attempt to search for explanations for their 
experience, religious doctrines provide systematic explanations, which makes them more 
readily accept those religious worldviews they may have found hard to embrace before. 
Whitehead’s model incorporates the neglected but important role played by ritual 
practices in generating psychological effects3, while at the same time acknowledging the 
role of symbols and meanings in directing psychological changes. In particular, she 
construes psychological transformation in religious rituals as composed of the attack on 
the structuring activity of mind by instrumental practices, and the automatic restructuring 
of it under the guidance of established symbols with meanings from sociocultural 
contexts. However, how to account for the bodily effects of symbolic healing, as the 
effects are by no means limited to the psychological level? Whitehead’s approach would 
                                                
3According to Whitehead (1987): “The effects that theorists ascribe to symbolic presentations and 
performances are various. The myth, rite, or magical manipulation may heighten social solidarity 
and reorient participants to the norms of the group; it may inspire or renew belief in a particular 
religious cosmology; it may help to resolve emotional and moral dilemmas; it may promote 
healing in the sick. Often it can be seen to accomplish several of these results simultaneously. … 
The salient question is how are such effects achieved? In what way does a symbolic presentation 




be greatly complemented by statements of how the changes are not only on the mental 
level but also closely reflected by changes in bodily experience, and without such 
statements this model is largely located within the mentalistic approach. As psychological 
anthropologist Rebecca Seligman (2014) points out, the mentalist approach is limited in 
that our experience can never be categorized as purely mental or somatic: “In fact, in 
some important sense, mental and bodily experiences constitute one another; mental 
experience is the product of physical, bodily processes, and bodily experience is 
perceived and attended to via mental processes” (p. 135). According to Seligman (2014), 
interpreting trance and possession as purely reflecting social meaning and serving 
communicative functions (c.f., Ong, 1988; Lambek, 1981), or regarding trance states as 
purely biological responses to ritual induction practices (c.f., Lex, 1979; Prince, 1982; 
Rouget, 1985; Ervin et al., 1988), shares the similar limitation that they “have never been 
integrated to explore how meaning, practice, and biology interact” (p. 118). 
Fortunately, the embodiment paradigm arising in the past several decades in 
anthropology provides a necessary corrective to the mentalistic approach (Seligman, 
2014, p. 135). Seligman (2014) draws attention to the fact that biological processes play a 
significant role in the self transformation, which unfortunately has not received sufficient 
consideration in cultural anthropology. In particular, in terms of the role of religious 
ritual practices, she argues that ritual practices provide “an opportunity to relearn bodily 
ways of being, shed old patterns of behavior, and even to reshape physiological responses 
that reflect a past form of selfhood” (p. 20). Seligman (2014) proposes that in order to 




is the place where mental, bodily, and social dimensions converge. She believes that “self 
has important social, cognitive-discursive (mental), and bodily dimensions. It consists not 
only of self-understandings and representations, but also of experiences that are not 
conscious and not part of language-based self-representation —experiences of occupying 
a physical body, of perceiving and being in the world” (p. 135).   
In terms of how the body, practice, and meaning aspects of embodiment interact 
(Seligman, 2014, p. 115) to contribute to the transformation of self, she proposes bio-
looping as the underlying mechanism, explicating how the embodied and representational 
dimensions of self converge (p. 135). Bio-looping is a term originally coined by 
philosopher Ian Hacking (1995) as a metaphor to refer to the looping process in 
psychiatric illness, emphasizing the social constructions of these illnesses. Seligman 
(2014) borrows bio-looping to “draw attention to the ways in which embodied processes, 
including biologically ones, are implicated in the continuous and mutually reinforcing 
relationships among meaning, practices, and experience” (p. 117, also see Seligman & 
Kirmayer, 2008). According to Seligman, this bi-directional loop is not only between 
mind and body within the same individual, but also connects individuals with their social 
and cultural contexts. This shares similarity with Dow’s (1986) hierarchical living 
systems model where the control signals communicate information between these levels. 
However, different from Dow’s model, Seligman (2014) argues specifically that bio-
looping is the model for the different dimensions of self to converge together in these 
feedback loops, contributing to transformations in the self-experience of the sufferers.  




changes at a higher level, such as a renewed self-understanding or self-narrative, 
contribute to changes in bodily states, where “old patterns of bodily response are 
unlearned and new ones learned” (p. 21); on the other hand, the accumulation of new 
bodily experiences also contributes to changes in subjectivity and self-understanding. Her 
model of the mechanism of transformation constitutes another important advancement in 
the right direction, as it demonstrates that the functions of ritual practices and symbols 
are not sequential in the transformation process, but can work simultaneously in looping 
processes to bring about changes of self in its bodily, mental, and social aspects. In 
particular, this bio-looping mechanism can also account for the fact that different patients 
respond differently to religious healing: each individual has a distinct innate temperament 
and acquired patterns, and one’s biological constitution is both cause and effect of the 
transformation experience (Seligman, 2014, p. 116); therefore, different people react 
differently as a function of their biological constitution and external influence. Our body 
is affected by learning and experience, but also shapes our way of learning and 
experiencing (Seligman, 2014, p. 115-6). 
Importantly, Rebecca Seligman draws attention to the often-neglected fact that 
self can be disrupted, and is one typical object that is repaired by religious healing. 
According to her, self could be disrupted via embodied processes or cognitive processes. 
Suffering, either physical pain, psychological conflicts, or social distress, can contribute 
to the disruption of self in all its aspects. Seligman (2014) argues that those suffering 
experiences not only “undermined their cognized senses of self, but also set up for each 




multiple levels of self-experience” (p. 157). As a result, it might be insufficient to address 
only the cognitive aspects of self. “Any process of self-healing”, she argues, should “act 
to reshape body, behavior, and meaning all together” (ibid). She refers to this as 
“embodied learning or relearning”, and argues that the healing of selves must involve this 
process (ibid).  
Culture or meaning system matter in this healing process because they are sources 
of self models. Cultural traditions provide models of ideal selves that motivate 
community members to change their self models in order to conform to the ideal self 
image. Seligman believes that these integrations and transformations of the social self can 
reduce psychological distress, and the changes in one self-narrative can also alter one’s 
phenomenal experience of self. A renewed self model could provide positive 
interpretations of one’s negative experiences and bring a sense of meaning and hope to 
sufferers. As one’s self-narrative is constantly in danger of being “overwritten or torn 
apart” (Seligman, 2014, p. 105; also see Hunt, 2000; Bury, 1982) by physical, 
interpersonal or social misfortunes, cultural models of the ideal self provide templates for 
the recovery of a disrupted self and the reconstruction of a new integrated self-narrative.  
In summary, Rebecca Seligman’s model (2010) argues that ritual healing 
practices can divert attention from symptoms, interrupt cycles of symptom amplification, 
and retune physiological arousal, while religious symbols serve as cultural tools to 
“contribute to transformations in both cognitive and bodily processes of incoherence, 
ameliorate distress and create positive looping effects that allow selves to recohere” (p. 




body and society, suffering can threaten the coherence of self through ways that affect the 
cognitive, bodily or social level, and healing practices can facilitate the recovery and 
reintegration of self-experience by working on these different levels. Seligman (2010) 
emphasizes that “healing practices that simultaneously address the cognitive-discursive 
and embodied aspects of the self can be particularly effective” (p. 298). 
From the analysis of these models of religious ritual transformation proposed by 
anthropologists, we can see that the accumulation of ethnographic data and the 
integration of multidisciplinary views have shifted the plausibility towards the 
perspectives that take account of both ritual practices and symbolic systems, and that 
emphasize not only mental changes but also embodied transformations. We have already 
seen that anthropologists of religious healing have actively sought insights from 
psychologists of religion to enrich the understanding of the underlying causal 
mechanisms. In the following section, I will examine how recent developments in 
neuropsychology of religion contribute to the understanding of religious transformation. 
In particular, I will review and analyze one influential model —McNamara’s decentering 
model of religious experience. 
McNamara’s Model of Decentering 
An important mechanism is proposed by neuroscientist Patrick McNamara (2009), 
who suggests that decentering is the essential neuropsychological mechanism underlying 
religious experience. According to him, decentering is essentially a process of self-
transformation, the replacement of an old self by a new one. This dissertation owes much 




paradigm McNamara launches, a paradigm that focuses on the mechanism of self-
transformation as an angle for interpreting religious phenomena.   
According to McNamara, decentering occurs in four stages. First, the sense of 
agency is inhibited, that is, the old self-identity is decoupled from the executive control 
system and intentionality is suspended. Second, the self-structure is put into a 
suppositional logical space, or “possible world box”4. Third, a process aimed to reduce 
the discrepancy between current self and ideal Selves occurs through a search for a more 
integrated self in the semantic memory. Finally, the old self is integrated into the new self 
via integration of the old semantic story into the new one, and self-narratives can assist 
this process. The result of this four-step process, if all goes well, is the replacement of the 
old self by a more complex and more unified self. Essentially, McNamara construes 
decentering as a process of linking the old, less integrated, less complex self with a more 
complex and integrated self. 
For any model of self transformation, it is critical to say what may trigger the 
dynamical transformative processes. The following paragraphs are most relevant for 
understanding how McNamara construes this question: 
                                                
4 “Possible world box” is a term that McNamara borrows from Nichols and Stich. According to 
Nichols and Stich (2000): “Like the Belief Box and the Desire Box, the Possible World Box 
(PWB) contains representation tokens. However, the functional role of these tokens, their pattern 
of interaction with other components of the mind, is quite different from the functional role of 
either beliefs or desires. Their job is not to represent the world as it is or as we’d like it to be, but 
rather to represent what the world would be like given some set of assumptions that we may 
neither believe to be true nor want to be true. The PWB is a work space in which our cognitive 
system builds and temporarily stores representations of one or another possible world. We are 
inclined to think that the mind uses the PWB for a variety of tasks including mindreading, 
strategy testing, and empathy. Although we think that the PWB is implicated in all these 
capacities, we suspect that the original evolutionary function of the PWB was rather to facilitate 




Assume a decision impasse occurs because of internal conflict or conflicting 
desires. The decision-making system then halts its operation and sends inhibitory 
feedback to the beliefs and desires boxes (i.e., the current Self). The message is to 
suspend operations temporarily while a solution space is searched. The Self and 
agency are inhibited or reduced to trigger the search process. This suspension in 
agency may be involuntary if the problem simply cannot be solved; the Self may 
just experience a defeat in the real world; or the discrepancy between current and 
ideal Selves may suddenly become salient, thus triggering discrepancy reduction 
processes. Anguish, suffering, and depression can all issue in a reduction in 
agency and, under the right conditions, trigger a decentering process. 
 
Alternatively, a suspension in agency may be accomplished via religious practices 
such as the use of ascetical techniques that may include fasting, sleep deprivation, 
performance of rituals, and so forth. Hallucinogenic drugs can also impair agency 
and induce a decentering process.  (McNamara, 2009, p. 49-50) 
 
A figure (Figure 5.3) was drawn below to show the multiple possible pathways 






Figure 5.3 An Illustration of McNamara’s Decentering Model of Self Transformation 
 
It seems that the first pathway is as follows: patients have conflicting feelings and 
thoughts, which cause decision impasses that makes the decision system halt and send 
inhibitory feedback to the beliefs-and-desires boxes (which McNamara treats as the 
current self). This leads to the inhibition and reduction of the agency of self. He also 
notices that anguish, suffering and depression can all issue in reduction in agency. Other 
than that, he acknowledges that religious practices such as ascetic techniques and drugs 
can also suspend agency. As various as these pathways are, we can see that this model 
takes the suspension of the current self as a critical phase. Without the suspension of the 
current self, there would be no subsequent phases of decentering. The inclusion of 




is in agreement with many other theories. For example, Vago and Silbersweig’s (2012) S-
ART (self-awareness, self-regulation, and self-transference) neurobiological model of 
mindfulness and Seligman’s bio-looping model (2014) both emphasize that suffering, 
with either physical or non-physical origins, could cause disruption in self-experience or 
destabilize self-processing patterns.  
Moreover, McNamara argues in multiple places of his book (2009) that the 
discrepancy between the actual self and ideal self, that is, between what one wants or 
hopes to do and what one can actually do (p. 46), drives the inhibition of the agentive self. 
But in other places this model also locates the trigger for decentering with the need for 
reconciliation of mutually conflicted desires. This might reflect the influence of William 
James, who focuses on the division of the self and its need for unification. It remains to 
be clarified whether the need is to unify the conflicting desires of the divided self or to 
reduce the discrepancies between the ideal and the actual self, as the decentering model 
holds these two as different processes, and the answer to this question directly relates to 
how this model construes the nature of self. To figure this out, we need to examine 
McNamara’s understanding of self.  
McNamara’s model of self focuses on the representative and conscious level of 
self, and is built on two classic approaches to self, as mentioned by him: 
In the recent empirical psychological literature, two theories of the Self are 
particularly well supported by the data: the Self as a collection of schemas 
(Markus & Wurf, 1987) and the Self as a story (Bruner, 1990). The Self as a 




processing properties of the self-concept (e.g. Markus, 1977), and the Self as a 
story is rooted in the tradition of narrative psychology (e.g. Bruner, 1990; 
McAdams, 1996). Both of these metatheories contribute to two subtheories of the 
Self that I will be relying on throughout the book: the theory of self-regulation 
and the theory of possible Selves. (McNamara, 2009, p. 24) 
 
McNamara’s concept of the ideal self is based on the theory of possible selves and 
the theory of self-regulation. “Possible selves” is proposed by Markus and Nurius (1986), 
referring to “individuals’ ideas of what they might become, what they would like to 
become, and what they are afraid of becoming” (p. 954). McNamara argues that the ideal 
self is a special possible self, and its specialness lies in that this ideal self “is crucial for 
self-regulation” (McNamara 2009, p. 24). McNamara shows the way how possible selves 
work in the process of self-regulation:  
Possible Selves appear to be elaborated out of imaginary narratives involving the 
Self both in childhood and in adulthood (e.g. Erikson, 2001; Markus & Ruvolo, 
1989; Whitty, 2002). Possible Selves consist of a description of a set of 
behavioral actions aimed at some goal designed to overcome some conflict, along 
with causes and consequences of those imaginary actions, with an end state that is 
described as an event. … narratives about future Selves provide interpretations 
about what we see as possible. As stories, they help to integrate material about 
conflict involving the present Self into a resolution of that conflict – a resolution 




supported this narrative-related, integrative function of possible Selves. We 
evaluate our current and past Selves with reference to possible Selves (Markus & 
Nurius, 1986). (McNamara, 2009, p. 24-25). 
 
There is no denying that an ideal possible self could provide the motivation for 
regulating the current self and modify it towards a better executive self. However, 
probably not everyone would choose to set the standard as high as achieving the saintly 
or godly self. It might be safe to say that in almost every religion, only a small percentage 
of the population would seriously try to achieve the ideal saintly self. As McNamara 
acknowledges, to achieve a high ideal self, discrepancy reduction behaviors must be 
enhanced (2009, p. 43), which means that this process might take more energy and effort 
than many are willing to pay. So why is it that in religious practices individuals’ search 
for self normally ends with such a high self, while in ordinary situations they might rather 
not set the standard to be that high?  
It might also be safe to say that in many situations, the fervent willingness to 
strictly follow gods’ image is more a result of religious practices and experiences than a 
precondition for religious experience to happen. This actually brings us back to the 
question made salient by Geertz and noticed by Whitehead, that is, what makes people 
more readily accept religious doctrines in and after religious rituals, which they may find 
hard to accept before these rituals? According to McNamara, in the normal process of 
decentering, the search for self starts from the simplest self, and only proceeds to the 




conflicts. We may then need to ask why in the contexts of religious rituals, this normal 
proceeding does not work, and the range of possible selves is greatly narrowed down and 
even is limited to a certain one —God or a supernatural being? How does this 
constraining process come about and why would only very high self-images be regarded 
as acceptable in ritual contexts?  
McNamara doesn’t directly answer this question, but we may draw some hints 
from a close reading of his theory. Essentially, he seems to believe that there is nothing 
qualitatively special about decentering in religious settings. If there is any difference at 
all, it is merely in terms of strength—“This editing and shaping of the Self-construct via a 
mild form of the decentering process likely occurs on a daily basis, which is why we 
change over time” (McNamara, 2009, p. 53)—while “within a religious ritual context, the 
editing and shaping of a new Self occurs in a much more profound and indelible fashion 
because religious ritual constrains the search space in such a way as to entertain only the 
deepest solutions to the conflict” (ibid). He continues to talk about the function of ritual – 
“Ritual allows for the entertaining of a very high conception of a possible Self – indeed, a 
saintly or even a godlike Self. The potential Self that is the aim of the search process is 
given to us by a religious tradition” (ibid). However, even if religious traditions 
predispose people to hold strong motivations to achieve the saintly or godly self image, 
the discrepancy reduction process could still happen in ordinary conditions. The influence 
of religious tradition cannot account sufficiently for the difference between religious 
ritual settings and ordinary realities. Another possible explanation, as McNamara briefly 




Depending on the intensity of the decentering mechanism effected by a particular 
religious practice, operations and consciousness of the central executive Self are 
transiently suspended, and thus the individual enters a liminal state. … Religious 
practices and rituals provide the protective cognitive scaffolding to promote 
integration of all kinds of cognitive and emotional content in such a way as to put 
that content into the service again of the executive or agentive Self. This Self is 
enriched, transformed, and transfigured by religious beliefs and practices—
depending on the intensity of those beliefs and practices. (McNamara, 2009, p. 5-
6) 
His model has rightly noted that religious practices assist in the process of self-
transformation (McNamara, 2009, p. 53), but perhaps understanding the self mainly on 
the representational and conscious level instead of construing self with a hierarchical 
systematic perspective makes it hard to explicate the role that the bodily or sensory 
manipulation of religious practices plays in influencing self-transformation. An expanded 
model of self, one that incorporates not only the representational but also the embodied 
levels of self, may complement and strengthen the explanatory power of this mechanistic 
model of self-transformation, which would allow us to understand how bodily practices 
may trigger changes on the conscious level.  
However, another reading might suggest that the constraining of the search to 
those high self models is due to the special quality of these self models. McNamara 
argues the high self models are believed to provide the deepest solution to internal 




have solved them in optimal ways. They are worthy models to imitate” (McNamara 2009, 
p. 53). Combined with his previous point that the particular self concept that finally wins 
the competition “represents a possible solution to the internal conflict that caused the 
shutdown in the decision-making process” (p. 50), it seems to suggest that the answer lies 
in the ability of the supernatural agent models to solve internal conflicts. However, if the 
god image has the potential to solve and guide the integration of internal conflicts, it 
should be able to do so in ordinary settings. He also notices that some other contextual 
factors also play roles here: “If the individual was wearing a mask, the identity depicted 
in the mask would likely be at an advantage in the competitive process… If ritual 
processes referred to ancestor spirits, totem animals or gods would then have an 
advantage” (McNamara, 2009, p. 185). It remains to be clarified how being depicted in 
the mask can give the identity an advantageous status in winning the competition.   
Despite these places where this model could be further clarified, McNamara’s 
model constitutes an important and rewarding step towards a thorough understanding of 
religious transformation, and has redirected much scholarly attention to the self-
transformation, or more specifically, self-concept or personality change, which occurs 
more often and more dramatically in religious rituals than ordinary settings. To explore 
more deeply the more dramatic forms of self-transformation, another group of literature 
is worth examination and comparison: the psychological literature on forcible religious 
conversion and brainwashing. 





Sargant: Abreaction, Religious Conversions, Possession Healing 
As Hefner and Koss-Chioino note, “it is unfortunate that from the 1970s to the 
1990s the major focus of the literature was on religious-cult activities and on conversion 
as negative, as a form of brain washing (Singer & Lalich, 1995). The emphasis obscured 
for a time the positive effects of conversion” (Koss-Chioino & Hefner, 2006, p. 5). 
Fortunately, the value of this research on forcible conversion has been noticed in this 
century by some important researchers. For example, the prominent neuroscientist Walter 
J. Freeman’s book on neurodynamics (2001) has favorably discussed psychiatrist 
William Sargant’s study on conversion and brainwashing. Sargant produced two classics 
in this area, Battle for the Mind: A Physiology of Conversion and Brain-Washing 
(1957/1997) and The Mind Possessed—A Physiology of Possession, Mysticism and Faith 
Healing (1974). Both books focus on the question of how the brain could change 
dramatically to dissolve existing patterns of belief and behaviors and form new patterns. 
According to Freeman, such a change is not a change in one piece of belief but is a 
wholesale perspective-shifting, which requires the change of tremendous numbers of 
neural connections and even the whole meaning system. How could it do so in such a 
rapid fashion?  
Sargant aims to provide a mechanic model for such transformation based on 
Pavlovian theory—not Pavlov’s famous theory about classic conditioning, but one of his 
later insights inspired by an accident that occurred in his lab. During that accident, his lab 
was flooded and all the dogs there were saved just before they were almost drowned. The 




found that their recently acquired conditioned reflexes disappeared, just as if their brain-
slate was dramatically wiped clean, so that they became more readily conditioned with 
new behavioral patterns. However, other dogs that were also excited but not to the point 
of collapse didn’t lose these recently acquired patterns. Given this, Pavlov proposed his 
theory of “transmarginal inhibition.” He found that although dogs responded to this 
stressful accident differently based on their temperament, past a certain threshold all dogs 
were unable to endure the stress and broke down. They may enter a complete inhibitory 
collapse, followed by a suppression of many conditioned behaviors; or into a state 
compared with hypnosis or hysteria in humans, more open to adoption of new patterns. 
Interestingly, Pavlov argues that humans are the same here – if people are stimulated by 
strong negative emotion or intense internal conflicts beyond their capacity for 
maintaining habitual responses, their higher nervous activity would result in rupture and 
they may enter a floating state where new patterns are more easily forged.  
Sargant notes similarities between Pavlov’s findings and what he has seen in his 
treatment of soldiers with PTSD. Previously, the treatment for PTSD was to recreate the 
actual scenes that originated the great fear and anxiety in the patients, as a way to trigger 
the same intense emotional release. Reading Pavlov’s theory makes Sargant think that 
perhaps the effective factor is not reliving those actual incidents but using some way 
(such as imaginary happenings or chemicals) to arouse the same degree of non-specific 
intense excitement. As Sargant puts it, “in some instances at least, … it was the severity 
of the emotional upheaval itself that mattered in treatment, regardless of what had 




emotions about such imaginary happenings than by making the patient re-live actual 
happenings in detail” (Sargant, 1974, p. xxvii). He also finds that patients’ previous 
psychological structures or brain organizations also matter. If patients originally lack 
personality stability, it is almost impossible for this treatment to bring them back to a 
normal stable personality. That is, it generally only works for previously normal and only 
recently ill patients. However, Sargant also notices the possibility of using this time 
window of increased suggestibility to reconstruct new personalities: “…because an 
increased state of suggestibility is a result of the treatment, it may be possible afterwards 
to redirect the basic drives and previous constitutional strengths of some patients to new 
ends” (Sargant, 1974, p. 10).  
Realizing this might reflect some universal aspects of the mechanics of human 
psyche and brain, Sargant continues to extend this to the discussion of sudden religious 
and political conversions, suspecting their underlying processes may share similar 
mechanical patterns. The fear of burning in hell induced by the preaching of John Wesley, 
Sargant suspects, might function similarly to the fear of being burned in a tank that he 
arouses in the soldier PTSD patient. He believes that these different physiological 
triggers induce similar mechanical processes, which allow the release of strong emotions 
and thus bring about a wholesale change of belief and behavioral patterns. He also notes 
similarities between faith healing, especially trance and possession healing, and those 
sudden personality changes in his PTSD patients, and also religious and political 
converts:   




which have invaded them follows the same sort of pattern as our drug abreaction 
treatments of battle neuroses. The “possessed” patient is worked up into a 
condition of frenzied emotional excitement, in which he expresses intense anger 
and fear, and this leads very often to a collapse, which may be followed by a 
feeling of calm and release from the “demon” which has been tormenting him, 
just as our patients felt released from traumatic memories (Sargant, 1957/1997, p. 
45).  
Sargant argues that simple physiological mechanisms for conversion, or more 
specifically, sudden changes of beliefs and behavioral patterns, do exist. Although he 
notes that genetically inherited constitutions and temperament play roles here, as different 
people have distinct capacities to endure the stress, still almost all people, he suggests, 
would collapse after a certain threshold. The ways to induce this collapse can be 
categorized into two major types. The first is to lower resistance to stress through 
excessive exercise, sensory stimulation, sleep deprivation and other ways to cause 
physical debilitation. This change in physical condition would then lower the individual’s 
capacity to endure stress and sustain psychological stability. The second type, as Sargant 
mentioned, is to heighten emotional arousal, stirring emotional turmoil to reach a climax. 
The ways by which emotion is stirred up do not matter —it can be by reliving of past 
actual occurrences or imagining fake experiences. What matters is the degree of intensity 
of the emotional arousal. Here a particular observation from Sargant is that not every 
emotion has the same effect. The most effective emotions are fear and anger, while 




stir up the mental and brain organization to the degree of a final collapse. Chemicals can 
also function in this process—in fact, Sargant experimented with different chemicals in 
his abreaction treatment and found some of them are more effective in helping emotional 
intensity buildup than others.   
After a certain threshold, all would collapse, as Sargant says. He notices that 
patients would fall on the couch inert, and after that they would often report a sense of 
release, the disappearance of neurosis and a sudden change in their outlooks. However, 
after the collapse they would often enter a highly suggestible state, where they are far 
more susceptible to the influence of the healer and the environmental factors, and become 
much less cautious. In Sargant’s words, “the normal brain computer is temporarily put 
out of action, and new ideas and beliefs are uncritically accepted” (Sargant, 1957/1997, p. 
195). Sargant cites Pavlov’s explanation for this phenomena, where Pavlov argues that 
this is because the mind is trying to preserve itself — the processing of trauma makes 
patients question previously established patterns, and in this way the trauma can be 
processed more easily without having to break down the whole system.  
There is a subtle difference here: in Sargant’s successful treatments of soldiers 
with neurosis, after the collapse the patients returned to their normal personality from 
before they got the neurosis, rather than forming completely new beliefs and behavioral 
patterns. But in religious and political conversion, what normally occurs is the replacing 
of old patterns of belief and behaviors with novel ones. Sargant notices this, arguing that 
these techniques “are equally effective in maintaining the status quo and keeping people 




acceptance of new ideas which overthrow tradition and orthodoxy” (Sargant, 1957/1997, 
p. 196).   
In his model, emotion, or more specifically, the great emotional excitement that 
leads to mental collapse, is the core factor. He believes that faith healing, similar to 
religious conversion and other sudden personality changes, “depend[s] on the induction 
of emotional excitement to achieve the breaking up of old behavior patterns and the 
emergence of new ones. Faith healing and spiritual possession rarely happen in a calm, 
rational atmosphere…Emotion must be aroused for success to be obtained. …Any 
method which induces states of excitement leading to a suitable degree of exhaustion and 
consequent alteration in brain function can work miracles in its own” (Sargant, 
1957/1997, p. 198). Sargant says that although many would argue that in religious 
conversions the intellectual elements are what matters, he insists that “people’s beliefs 
and behavior can only be changed radically and swiftly by the methods we have been 
considering, and very rarely by purely intellectual and rational argument” (ibid, p. 
199). This might be an overstatement, but his emphasis on emotion foresees the later 
recognition of the importance of affective factors (see also Shults & Sandage, 2006, p. 
19), and any psychological model of such transformations would be insufficient without 
taking into account the role of emotion. Sargant also notes that sudden personality change 
is a different dynamical process compared with ordinary gradual changes. His model also 
provides better explication for the excessive exercise, repetitive dancing and drumming 
that are used frequently in religious healing rituals, indicating that they serve to either 




emotional stress.  
Unfortunately, Sargant’s model is still more of an observation of what happened 
in his clinical experiences and experiments rather than a principled theorizing of how 
these unique dynamics of self transformation come about. For a deeper understanding of 
why there are such dynamical patterns, another important source that focuses on the same 
phenomenon—sudden personality change—among cult converts can be helpful.  
 
Conway and Siegelman: the Snapping Model of Self Transformation 
Conway and Siegelman’s Snapping (1978/1995), which records numerous actual 
events of brainwash and deprogramming in cult members, proposes to use the framework 
of catastrophe theory to interpret the psychological process underlying dramatic changes 
in personality. They construe personality in a broad sense — “the living system of the 
human mind in its combined individual and social nature” (p. 9). They propose the 
concept of snapping to refer to the “sudden drastic alteration of an individual’s entire 
personality” (p. 126). In the snapping state, “it was as if the massive assault of new 
information blew out their existing personalities and unquestioned perception of the 
world around them. In many instances, this snapping moment took people by storm, 
creating a deluge of new sensations and dredging up a slurry of buried images and 
emotions from the past” (p. 127-8). The uniqueness of their approach comes from its 
examination of the effects of religious sects and cults practices from the perspective of 
information processing and the communication sciences. Their major argument is that the 




undergoing the practices of cults and religious sects are caused by the ability of these 
practices to affect individuals’ capability of information processing. Their approach 
partly depends on Norbert Wiener’s cybernetic framework. In Wiener’s classic book 
Cybernetics: Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine (1948), Wiener 
talks about the informational dimension of mental disturbances and says that many of 
them may result from the perturbation in the information traffic of the brain.  
Conway and Siegelman’s model for the developmental stages of abrupt 
personality change is illustrated as follows:  
  
 Figure 5.4 An Illustration of Conway and Siegelman’s Snapping Model 
 
The first stage comprises three major kinds of predictable elements: “intense 
physical experiences (such as singing, dancing, jumping, drumming and other vigorous 
group activities), recognized physiological stresses (such as lack of sleep and a poor diet), 
basic information stresses like noise, isolation, and other forms of sensory overload and 
deprivation” (p. 126). They argue that these experiences, in the right circumstances, may 
produce a peak moment that is followed by a physical or emotional collapse. However, 




same as a high state but is rather "the sudden drastic alteration of an individual’s entire 
personality” (p. 126). According to Conway and Siegelman, it requires a different type of 
information in order to trigger snapping:  
It consists of the intense inner stresses generated by the potent tools of the 
technology of experience. These human tools may include specific rhetorical 
ploys, ritual practices, individual and group techniques, mass-marketing strategies 
and more subtle communication methods. They may include everything from 
fervid sermons and lectures to searing confessions, from casual conversations to 
aggressive confrontations to slickly packaged personal appeals, from repetitive 
prayers to prolonged practices of chanting and meditation, from passive 
indoctrination and small-group study sessions to active methods of role playing, 
psychodrama, guided fantasy and directed visualization (p. 126-7). 
 
  Various as these tools are, Conway and Siegelman suggest that they all affect the 
individual’s communication capacities, “from the most rudimentary and automatic 
biological functions to the highest reaches of human awareness” (ibid). These practices 
cause heightened mental and emotional conflict, which drives people to seek release from 
it. Then comes the most critical phase in the whole process: “often in a sensuous, 
seductive or totally foreign environment, or immersed in an atmosphere of love, warmth, 
acceptance, sharing, openness, honesty and community, a person may yield to some call, 
either from without or within, to ‘surrender,’ to ‘let go,’ to ‘stop doubting’ and 




invisible act of surrender, more than anything else, that sets off the inner explosion we 
call snapping” (p. 126-127). 
From the above it seems that purely physical exhaustion is insufficient by itself, 
and it contributes to the snapping moment only if it facilitates the build-up of inner 
stresses and conflicts. When intense inner stress reaches a point where individuals 
are desperate to find a release from it, then the key state—surrender—may happen. 
Conway and Siegelman believe the invisible act of surrender, a moment of forgoing 
the control of one’s ego, is most essential for the snapping moment, which is in 
agreement with McNamara’s emphasis on the inhibition of self agency. When snapping 
occurs, individuals’ personality may fall apart, which may trigger a “holographic crisis 
across the whole of the mind, brain and body” (p. 127). The change is not purely 
cognitive, but contains changes of various aspects of self: 
 
The experience itself may give rise to a rush of physical sensation: a blinding light, 
a floating feeling, …The immediate impact may be felt as awe, ecstasy, 
amazement, a quiet peace or complete collapse. In the aftermath of the moment, a 
person may feel a whole new sense of being…(p. 127)  
 
For some, it was as if the massive assault of new information blew out their 
existing personalities and unquestioned perception of the world around them. In 
many instances, this snapping moment took people by storm, creating a deluge of 




past. Afterward, people were faced with more than a simple sensation of being 
“reborn” … (p.127-128) 
 
The dramatic changes in experience may be hard to integrate into the mental 
structure: “For the person who experiences it, the snapping moment may pose terrifying 
dilemmas. He may find it impossible to integrate the keen, clear presence of his new 
sense of being with some vague notion of his former self which he is no longer able to 
locate or define. In some instances, a person may feel catapulted across a one-way 
threshold that was more than he ever bargained for in his search for self or spirit...” 
(Conway and Siegelman, p. 128). After the snapping of personality, individuals come to a 
critical time-window where they are vulnerable to suggestion, or in neuroscientist Walter 
J. Freeman’s words (2001), they enter a period of malleability. Conway and 
Siegelman argue that this is because “in the aftermath of this shattering break, the brain’s 
information-processing capacities may become physically disorganized, not simply 
leaving the mind open to new ideas and information, but in fact rendering it receptive to a 
whole new plan of organization” (p. 128). In this malleable state, the influence of the 
healer or the meaning system turn out to have heavier weights than they usually do in 
shaping people’s beliefs and behaviors:  
Someone whose sense of self has just been detonated in this way may seize upon 
the first available interpretation or explanation of his experience. If he is told that 
his overwhelming ecstasy was the Holy Spirit visiting his mind and body, he will 




depersonalization represent a state of “cosmic oneness with the universe,” in all 
probability he will find that not merely acceptable but absolute truth (Conway & 
Siegelman, 1978/1995, p. 128).  
 
Similar to McNamara, Conway and Siegelman also use the words “state of 
searching” to describe this stage, but they emphasize that it is a stage of reorganization of 
mental and brain patterns subject to external manipulation. The context in the aftermath 
of the snapping moment is essential for deciding where the personality reconstruction 
would end:   
…if the person returns to his former surroundings and actively restores his earlier 
relationships, the effects of the snapping moment may dissipate in a relatively 
short time. If, however, out of fear and panic he flees or withdraws into himself, 
he may linger in its mind-boggling aftereffects and extreme vulnerability to 
suggestion. If he remains in alien settings with little or no connection to his 
former life and relationships, his personality will almost certainly be refashioned 
in the image of his new surroundings, and his awareness will fall into line with 
that of the people around him (Conway & Siegelman, 1978/1995, p. 129). 
 
In the aftermath of the snapping moment, a person’s information-processing 
capacities may be altered, causing what they call the information disease. Information 
disease is “an alteration through experience of a person’s everyday information-




imagination and conscious choice” (Conway & Siegelman, 1978/1995, p. 147). 
Information disease is different from damage to the basic biological machinery of the 
brain, as the brain may still be able to serve its basic functions of perception, memory, 
and thinking. Information disease, in contrast, “represents an organic alteration of the 
brain’s complex organization” (p. 147), as "ongoing, organic information stress responses, 
physical impairments of thought and feeling, and deeper alterations of mind and 
personality” (p. 146). Information disease “marks a lasting change of awareness at the 
most fundamental level of personality” (p. 147). In terms of “how information in the 
human form of experience is metabolized—broken up, distributed and reorganized—
throughout the brain and nervous system” (p. 146), they found that this natural organic 
process of information processing “may become subject to disease, not in the usual 
medical sense, but an affliction nonetheless of the physical organization of a person’s 
everyday powers of mind” (p. 146). Their interpretation of these mental disorders and 
altered sensations from the perspective of information traffic and brain organization 
foresees many important neuroscientific discoveries.   
Conway and Siegelman didn’t know how to construe these patterns of 
psychological transformation until they encountered catastrophe theory and its potential 
as a formal tool to provide a mathematical interpretation of complex dynamic trajectories. 
Catastrophe theory was proposed in the mid-1970s by French mathematician Rene Thom 
to describe discontinuous changes. These changes may occur in various 
arenas: earthquakes, stock markets, and abrupt conversion. The similarity among these 




opposing forces” (Conway & Siegelman, 1978/1995, p. 139). Applying this to forcible 
religious conversion, the battle between conflicting ideas and emotions may destabilize 
the previous relatively stable brain organization, and this destabilization may express 
itself as “a sudden upheaval in the brain” (p. 139). As the human mental structure is a 
complex system, multiple opposing physical and mental stresses are interacting with one 
another, and “abrupt changes in appearance and behavior, the instant transformation of 
lifelong patterns of thought, feeling and social relationship, all suggested the catastrophic 
resolution of opposing physical, mental and emotional stresses” (p. 139). They note that 
in rituals where snapping is triggered, “long-standing patterns of personality that have 
developed since childhood may give way to an entirely new personality formed from the 
mass of new information the person has absorbed. In the process, old pathways in the 
brain may be destabilized, physically disconnected and destroyed, and new pathways 
may be formed” (ibid).  
In summary, the snapping model of psychological transformation in religious 
settings has strengths in that, first, it notes that the changes are not merely on the mental 
level, but also on the bodily and perception level. More importantly, Conway and 
Siegelman use information to merge the gap between mental and physical. They also use 
a broader conception of personality to denote changes in these various self levels. In fact, 
in their follow-up surveys, they find there is a significant correlation between the time 
those ex-cult members spend in mind-altering rituals and their reported difficulties in 
recovery afterwards. They admit that correlation is not causation, but believe that those 




people’s information processing abilities. They also found different practices have 
distinctive effects in causing information disease. For instance, the auditing technique, 
which Whitehead (1987) in her research on Scientology has also given close examination, 
is believed by Conway and Siegelman to be among the most pernicious religious 
techniques in disrupting information processing abilities. Their use of the catastrophe 
model also foresees future applications of complexity theory in the understanding of 
complex dynamics of psychological and cognitive processes. Although it is more like a 
theoretical suggestion than a specification of processes of transformation in a principled 
and rigorous fashion, their study still constitutes a promising step towards a deeper 
understanding of complex dynamics of abrupt self transformation in religious settings.   
Disruption-Reintegration Model of Self-Transformation 
From the above, it can be seen that various mechanisms for the dynamic processes 
of self change have been proposed. Each model proposes plausible insights on certain 
aspects of the phenomena but fails to account adequately for other aspects. As stated in 
the beginning, the aim of this chapter is not to disqualify any theory, but to make clear 
what are the more plausible elements of each theory that need to be stabilized in future 
studies, and what are the less plausible ones that need to be complemented by insights 
from other theories. From the previous analysis, we see the “plausibility scale”, using 
Wildman’s (2011, p. 248) term, is pushed from the symbol-centered approach, which 
looks for the cause of healing efficacy in symbols, towards the direction of the practices-
and-symbols approach (see Whitehead, 1987; Csordas, 1994), which considers the roles 




self processing towards both the higher and lower levels — or in other words, from a 
narrow conception of personality towards a broader conception of self, which 
incorporates personality but also comprises of lower levels of self processing, thus 
forming a hierarchical system (see Seligman, 2010; Damasio, 2010); from taking gradual 
and abrupt self transformation as the same dynamic process towards a realization that 
they may represent two distinct dynamics5; finally, from the neglect of either relational 
and cultural contexts or the intraindividual dimensions towards the recognition of the 
necessity of both aspects (see Shults & Sandage, 2006, p. 172)6. 
I argue that the dynamics of therapeutic transformation in shamanistic healing can 
be better understood within the framework of self transformation. To achieve a more 
specific, and thus more fallible model of self change, I delineate two common elements 
from the developmental trajectory: a deconstruction or disruption phase, and a 
reconstruction or reintegration phase. I argue that this two-phase model is the universal 
structure of shamanistic healing. 
1. Disruption of Self 
The disruption phase of self has been referred to using different names in previous 
theories: the liminal phase, the trance phase, the agency suspension phase, or the de-
                                                
5 Both Whitehead (1987) and Shults & Sandage’s (2006) conceptualization of these two types of 
change refer to Piaget’s model of assimilation and accommodation. 
6 Sandage’s comments on theoretical models of development: “Some psychological models of 
development neglect consideration of the relational and cultural contexts that influence 
development.  Sociological or systems-based models of development sometimes carry the 
opposite limitation of ignoring the intraindividual dimensions of personhood in favor of social, 
familiar, and cultural levels of analysis. The trend in contemporary theories of human 
development is toward bioecological awareness and a stress on person-context relations” (Shults 




automatization phase. I don’t mean that these terms mean exactly the same thing, but I 
believe the phenomena they refer to all constitute some reflection of the self disruption 
process, in which the rigid equilibrium of self is destabilized.  
  Victor Turner’s (1969) liminal stage might be a good starting point to examine 
this particular phase of development. The concept of the liminal stage constitutes the core 
element in Turner’s understanding of symbolic efficacy and ritual healing. He argues 
that the liminal stage is the central phase in the ritual process. During the liminal phase, 
communitas – a state where all previous orders are broken – replaces the daily reality 
where there are clearly structured relations. Turner’s understanding of liminality builds 
on Van Gennep’s three-part structure for rites of passage (1960/2013), where the liminal 
state is the middle stage of the tripartite phases. Turner (1969) says that this stage has no 
structures but paradoxically is the source of all structures, from which arise novel 
configurations: “Liminality may perhaps be regarded as the Nay to all positive structural 
assertions, but as in some sense the source of them all, and, more than that, as a realm of 
pure possibility whence novel configurations of ideas and relations may arise” (p. 
97).  Importantly, Turner argues that liminal stage is not only a phase in ritual processes 
but also in psychological transformation processes. Ritual induces an unusual state of 
consciousness, the fluidity of which provides a unique opportunity for transformation of 
both social status and self-experience. The liminal state thus forms the condition for 
possible creativity and transformation. Turner (1969) argues that the transformation can 
reach the psycho-physiological levels through symbolic manipulation of symbols. Ritual 




and psychical structures” (p. 4).  
  I argue that the nature of the psychological liminal state is actually the 
phenomenal-level reflection of the underlying disruption of the self processing 
structure. The destruction or dissolution of structural qualities is not uncommon for 
complex systems in general. Complex systems are composed of many elements, and it 
requires a certain degree of coordination and coherence to achieve system-level functions. 
As Nowak et al. (2000) point out, it requires the operation of integrative mechanisms. 
Carver and Scheier (2002) also note that complex living systems incorporate a necessary 
pressure for internal integration, without which living systems would die quickly. 
  As necessary as the pressure toward coherence or integration is for complex 
systems, the coherent state is not a default but a high-maintenance state that requires 
ongoing dense connection and information transmission. When unexpected situations 
occur either due to environmental changes or internal fluctuations, the necessary 
connections and communications could be disrupted, which threatens the integration of 
the system. Shults and Sandage, in their discussion of spiritual transformation, cite 
William Miller and Janet C’de Baca’s (2001) study of quantum changers (people who 
experience sudden and dramatic transformation), who often report experiencing stress 
and discontent as precipitation for their later transformation (Shults & Sandage, 2006, p. 
19). This stress and discontent may exert continuous pressure on the self structure, and 
once the pressure goes above a certain threshold, structural integrity cannot be 
maintained any more. In Sargant’s model and Conway & Siegelman’s model, we have 




precipitate the qualitative transformations of self. These techniques affect the system’s 
ability to maintain its press for integration, to the extent that the system cannot sustain its 
state attractor.  
  Nowak et al. (2000) argue that this generic integration mechanism for complex 
systems also operates in the self system. They believe that many important global 
properties of the self actually reflect the operation of this integration process. They also 
point out that the strength of the press for integration critically affects the self-
organization of the self-system. If the press is strong, the self is more capable of resisting 
inconsistent information; even if the self system is temporarily perturbed by the 
inconsistent information, they can reestablish equilibrium shortly after. In contrast, if the 
press is weak, the self is more susceptible to external information, and once it is 
perturbed it is difficult to restore the previous organization. The following section will 
examine in detail what may influence the press for integration. 
The Press for Integration 
In a dynamical system consisting of numerous interconnected elements, the press 
for integration is implemented by the mutual constraints of connecting elements – the 
state of each element adjusts itself under influence of the current state of other connecting 
elements (Nowak et al., 2000). Nowak et al. cite Tesser’s (1978) attitude polarization 
research to illustrate it: the results of Tesser’s study show that when people think about 
something that has personal importance, thoughts in agreement with the initial evaluation 
reinforce each other while thoughts inconsistent with it are suppressed or reinterpreted, so 




system may actively monitor and detect possible inconsistencies so as to ensure a 
necessary degree of system consistency. However, the press for integration might be 
affected by environmental changes, or it might change in line with fluctuations in internal 
states. The following examines this from a number of diverse perspectives.  
The press for integration might closely depend on the availability of cognitive 
resources. According to Schjoedt and colleague’s (2013) “Cognitive Resource Depletion” 
theory in religious interactions, attention and executive functions, relying on the same 
frontal regions, may compete for cognitive resources. A dramatic increase of cognitive 
load from attention may render the executive processes lacking cognitive resources. For 
example, it has been demonstrated that the classic Stroop tasks closely related to 
executive control show impaired responses as a result of an increasing attentional load 
(Garavan, Ross, & Stein, 1999). Schjoedt and colleagues term this as cognitive resource 
depletion (2013). Nowak and colleagues (2000) also notice that the integration 
mechanism of self requires cognitive resources, the amount of which may increase until 
the integration is accomplished. But they also reference Gilbert (1993)’s study to show 
that if there are parallel tasks that drain cognitive resources, cognitive resources available 
for use in the integration mechanism could be affected. As complex religious rituals exert 
a great demand on attention and emotional processing, the press for internal integration of 
self may be reduced with internal constraints becoming less strong, which renders the self 
structure more subject to external influence such as authority or mythic narratives.  
Psychedelics may also weaken the press for integration. Vollenweider (1998) 




the alterations of the ego, ranging from slight loosening of ego boundaries to the 
dissolution of the self as a center of reference, underlying which are the ongoing ego 
structuring processes. He proposes the cortico-subcortical model of psychosensory 
information processing, which argues that psychedelic states can be conceptualized 
as arising from the deficits of sensory information processing in cortico-striato-thalamo-
cortico (CSTC) feedback loops, which are associated with the neural network distribution 
and the interaction between neurotransmitter systems.  
Some psychological constructs might reflect innate individual differences in terms 
of the press for integration. For example, transliminality measures the degree of gap in 
the gating mechanism between the subliminal and the conscious mind, and people with 
high degree of transliminality are more susceptible to ideational and affective input from 
the subliminal (Thalbourne, 2000). Mental boundaries, or the thinness of cognitive 
boundaries, is a similar construct (measured by Ernest Hartmann’s boundary 
questionnaire, Houran, Thalbourne, & Hartmann, 2003), and Hartmann (1991) suggests 
that this reflects individual differences in the extent to which one experiences their 
psychological processes and other individuals as separate or permeable. McClenon 
argues that thinness of cognitive boundary is an essential component of “shamanic 
syndrome” (McClenon, 2002, p. 134). No matter whether the boundary is between one’s 
own psychological process and others’, as reflected in thinner cognitive boundaries, or 
between the subliminal and the conscious level, as in transliminality, it may reflect a 
more basic innate difference in the press for integration of the self system, corresponding 




individuals lower in press for integration more susceptible to contextual influences. 
The press for integration may also be reflected in dissociative states. An important 
approach in dissociation research is the self approach of dissociation, embraced by 
Nijenhuis (2012) and Putnam (1994, 1995), among others. This approach argues that 
dissociation has much to do with the development and integration of self, and 
pathological dissociative disorders cause disruptions in self (Putnam, 1994, 1995) or are 
caused by disturbances in self (Liotti, 1992). Steele et al. (2009) argue that trauma-related 
dissociation “refer[s] to the existence of two self-organizing systems of psychobiological 
states” (p. 239). The nature of dissociation is regarded as “an ongoing integrative deficit 
that results in a structural dissociation of the personality” (p. 240). Self is “an inner 
organization of attitudes, feelings, expectations, and meanings” (Sroufe, 1990, p. 71), and 
self development is defined in terms of the equilibrium between complexity and 
integration. Patients with dissociative disorders might be lacking sufficient press for 
integration, causing imbalances between complexity and integration. Edelman and 
Tononi (2000) also argue that both psychiatric dissociation syndromes and neurological 
disconnection syndromes can be unified as “disorders of integration” (p. 67). According 
to this hypothesis, it is not changes in the activity of a brain area or in psychic functions 
but the changes of the interactivity between those areas or functions that cause these 
disorders.  
However, recent neuroscientific findings concerning dissociative states 
demonstrate that there is an interesting transitional period: dissociated consciousness is 




which indicates greater complexity and lesser integration, but is then “interrupted by time 
periods when the dissociated state is released into consciousness, which leads to 
narrowing attention, with decreased complexity and increased connectivity, and 
information integration” (Bob, 2011, p. 61). This finding may help understand the 
differences between the pathological disorders of dissociation and the beneficial 
dissociative states that can often be triggered by ritual manipulations: although these two 
might share the abnormal independence among neural subsets and lack of integration, the 
beneficial dissociative state triggered in rituals is a temporary reduction of the press for 
integration, which functions to destabilize the rigid self structure and allow it to 
reconstruct itself, while the lack of integrative power in the pathological dissociation 
cases may be more ingrained and chronic, rather than a temporary and flexible 
adjustment. It is possible that the dissociative disorders may be the by-products of the 
mind’s adaptive strategy of distracting from traumatic anxieties, and the beneficial 
dissociative states are triggered to reintegrate the separated sub-self-systems. The 
problem with the existing literature on dissociation is its vagueness concerning how to 
measure the level of integration. For example, although Nihenhuis (2012) suggests that 
an insufficient degree of integration is responsible for the dissociated mind, he remains 
vague about how we may measure integration of self.  
Literature on neurodynamics can be helpful here, which indicates that the 
lowering of press for integration might be physiologically actualized by the release of 
neuromodulators. Neuroscientist Walter J. Freeman says the release of neuromodulators 




beliefs and their replacement by new ones” (Freeman, 2001, p. 150). He also mentions 
one possible neuromodulator, oxytocin, which is released only briefly in one’s lifetime 
and facilitates the formation of new intentional structures and behaviors. Freeman 
postulates that religious healing rituals may employ techniques to trigger the release of 
neuromodulators which would then stimulate the state transition of the complex neural 
system. Freeman refers to this mechanism as unlearning, “a remarkable achievement of 
biological and cultural evolution of mammals” (p. 152). He suggests that at some 
important moments in human life when people transition into a new identity (e.g., 
becoming adults) or encounter catastrophic changes (e.g., serious illness), their old habits 
and meaning structures are no longer fit for survival and thus need to be relinquished so 
as to make room for new ones. Freeman refers to this as “a large-scale conversion of the 
intentional structure of meaning” (p. 149) and says that “a unique process is necessary to 
dissolve the existing meaning structure and replace it with a new one…” (ibid). He traces 
the unlearning to the famous experiment of Ivan Pavlov that has been discussed earlier in 
this chapter.  
Interestingly, Freeman’s finding is in agreement with the robot learning 
discoveries of Jun Tani, one of the leading researchers in neuro-robotics, who studies the 
underlying mechanism for embodied cognition and mind. Tani (1998) has developed a 
neural network model consisting of multiple modules to investigate the interactive 
dynamics between bottom-up and the top-down processes. His real mobile robot 
experiment shows that the robot’s learning spontaneously switches between steady and 




bottom-up perception achieve coherence, while in the unsteady phases, when coherence 
is lost, a chaotic attractor in the neural dynamics occurs. Tani (1998) attempts to extend 
this discovery to the understanding of the human self, and suggests that self is an open 
dynamic structure featuring “co-existence of stability in terms of goal-directedness and 
instability caused by embodiment”, and that “the open dynamic structure causes the 
system’s spontaneous transition to the unsteady phase where the ‘self’ becomes aware” (p. 
5). 
Freeman (2001) further suggests that at some point in evolutionary history 
humans discovered ways to trigger trance states so as to achieve unlearning, and that 
trance states are an “extreme form of neurochemical-behavioral conversions” (p. 153). 
He laments the fact that even today little is known about the neurochemistry and the brain 
dynamics underlying this process; nor is much known about the way “recently learned 
material is selected for retention, integration, or dismissal, under the direction of the 
emergent intentional experience of each individual” (ibid).  
Freeman’s neurodynamic model of unlearning as the mechanism for self 
transformation is based on his conceptualization of consciousness as attractors formed in 
the dynamic neural network processes. Humans in evolutionary history gradually learn 
the techniques of unlearning to destabilize ill-fitted attractors and guide the formation of 
new ones, and use these techniques in religious rituals to cultivate trance states where 
participants can unlearn the old intentional structures. The new intentional structure, 
corresponding to the new orientation in Csordas’ terminology (1994), may lead to better 





2. Reconstruction of Self 
The previous section has investigated the ways that the integrative capacity of the 
self system could be reduced, which leaves the self more malleable and more subject to 
external influences. The lessened inner constraints of the self structure provide a time 
window for the self to be reintegrated. Described using terms from dynamical systems 
approach, the old attractors of the self system are no longer sustained and new 
bifurcations may be reached to form new attractor states.  Since the strength of inner 
constraints is reduced, external information has more weight in this reconstruction 
process. This section will examine this reconstruction or reintegration process of self-
transformation. 
I argue that a large part of answering the question of what shapes this 
reconstruction process, is to figure out why there is an almost universal presence of spirit 
concepts and images in the shamanistic healing rituals. This presence has been a classic 
question in shamanistic studies. As Emma Cohen asks, “in light of the physiological 
evidence, why is it that concepts of spirits and healing so often accompany the 
documented changes in brain physiology? In short, what is the appeal of these concepts? 
Why spirits?” (Cohen, 2007, p. 97). Cohen notices that spirit images, serving as 
“instrumental agency”, are often construed as playing a significant role in the 
reconstruction of meaning in time of crisis. According to anthropologist and shamanism 
expert Michael Winkelman (2010), spirit concepts not only represent social processes as 




symbolic representations of spirits may represent cognitive structures of self, and thus 
could potentially affect the modification of self-concepts. McNamara’s model of self-
transformation also emphasizes the role of ideal self-image, often represented by the 
image of God, spirits, or power animals, in affecting the self-transformation process. 
There are two groups of literature that are particularly relevant for understanding the role 
of spirit concepts and images: the literature on self-schemas, and the work on 
imagination.  
Self-Schema and Possible Selves  
A self-schema is a set of self-knowledge that structures and integrates self-
relevant experience (see Kihlstrom & Cantor, 1984; Markus & Sentis, 1982; 
Rogers,1981). Self-schema organizes and shapes our interpretation of the world and 
guides behaviors. As Markus and Nirius (1986, p. 955) put, self-schemas “reflect 
personal concerns of enduring salience and investment, and they have been shown to 
have a systematic and pervasive influence on how information about the self is processed. 
In particular domains, these well-elaborated structures of the self shape the perceiver’s 
expectations. Moreover, they determine which stimuli are selected for attention, which 
stimuli are remembered, and what types of inferences are drawn (e.g. Kihlstrom & Cantor, 
1984; Markus, 1983; Markus & Sentis, 1982).”   
To see how self-schemas contribute to the understanding of the role of spirit 
concepts in shaping the reconstruction of self, it is essential to refer to a related important 
concept, also proposed by Markus and Nurius (1986): possible selves. Possible selves 




and what they are afraid of becoming, and thus provide a conceptual link between 
cognition and motivation” (p. 954). A possible self is a special kind of self-schema 
compared with knowledge of one’s habits or gender, as “they function as incentives for 
future behavior (i.e., they are selves to be approached or avoided), and second, because 
they provide an evaluative and interpretive context for the current view of self” (p. 955). 
The invoking of a certain possible self image could select among future behaviors and 
thus guide one’s reaction. Possible self images also organize and shape one’s 
interpretation of oneself and the world, thus regulating emotional reactions and feelings. 
Possible selves derive from past experiences and self-representations, represent 
individuals’ hopes and fears, but are also socially embedded, as many possible selves are 
“the direct result of previous social comparisons in which the individual’s own thoughts, 
feelings, characteristics, and behaviors have been contrasted to those of salient others” (p. 
954). From the perspective of relational spirituality, Sandage also argues that 
relationships with those that serve as models or narrative images “can be highly 
influential on psychosocial development and spiritual formation” (Shults & Sandage, 
2006, p. 162).  
The theory of possible selves reflects an underlying conception of development, 
where development is understood as a process of achieving an ideal self or avoiding 
feared selves. The selection of the ideal self and the resisted self actively guides self 
development (e.g. Kendall, Lerner, & Craighead, 1984). Possible selves constitute the 
potential for growth and change of personality. When certain self-conceptions are 




Markus and Nurius (1986) argue that it remains unclear whether it is the desire to reduce 
the discrepancy between current self and ideal self, or the desire to avoid feared self, that 
serves as the dominant motivation in guiding behaviors and feelings.    
Another important feature of possible selves is that, while the self concept is 
relatively stable and resistant to information that conflicts with current beliefs, the 
possible self is more sensitive to contextual changes. As Markus and Nurius (1986) note, 
possible selves are particularly sensitive to novel and inconsistent information about the 
current self: a low grade for an assignment may not affect much the stable self concept of 
being a generally intelligent student, but it may invoke the feared possible self image as a 
loser student who fails that course eventually. They argue that this feared possible self 
image may drive the feelings and following actions of that student even if she/he still 
considers herself/himself as a smart student overall; this temporarily-invoked possible 
self image plays more important roles than the stable self-image in driving actions and 
emotions, and perhaps particularly so when the stable self-image has lost its usual social 
and contextual scaffoldings. In shamanistic ritual contexts, the stable self-image, which 
is “a result of invariances in social feedback, in the targets of social comparison provided 
by the environment, or a result of individuals’ needs to present themselves in a consistent 
fashion” (p. 964), may be more easily destabilized (in shamanistic rituals, social contexts 
usually become different from daily life, and usually imply less need to present oneself in 
a consistent fashion than in daily life); and what kind of possible self images are to be 
invoked is largely contingent on the contextual factors. The possible self image that is 




does not need behavioral evidence and is less bound by social reality, and thus is more 
easily influenced by the ritual contexts. This thus creates the opportunity for spirit images 
to become salient and guide the feeling and action of ritual participants, reconstructing 
their self-processing patterns.  
Markus and Nurius (1986) argue that the contribution of the possible selves 
theory is that it suggests that possible selves are the “personalized cognitive carriers of 
some of the dynamic aspects of personality” (p. 966). Possible selves can involve 
themselves in and drive the dynamic change of self because they shape how one feels and 
reacts in certain situations, provide incentives and goals for following behaviors, and 
affect how people evaluate their current situation. The spirit images and narratives in 
shamanistic rituals render the possible selves in congruence with the spirit images more 
accessible and more readily invoked, which then guide and shape one’s self-processing 
patterns.  
The Work of Role-Taking and Imagination 
Many ritual scholars argue for the therapeutic potential present in role taking, and 
suggest role theory may shed light on the mechanism for self development and 
transformation (Peters & Price-Williams, 1983; Holm, 1997; Pandian, 1999; Winkelman, 
2010). This approach argues that integration of others’ roles by adopting their scripts for 
self constitutes an integral part of the development of self. For instance, Winkelman 
emphasizes the therapeutic potential of spirit concepts and images via role-taking (2010). 
He points out that different shamanistic traditions, including shamanism, mediumistic 




(Winkelman 2010, p. 218). According to him, the role-taking in shamanistic rituals 
“enables one to treat spirits as social others and incorporate their qualities as aspects of 
one’s own identity” (ibid). Laughlin et al. (1992) postulated the concept of “shamanic 
projection” — positively projecting an ideal image that is in a more advanced state of self 
development onto others based on the transference of control. Sacred images provide 
models for self-development, and guide the direction of self-transformation. Pandian 
(1991) suggests this might be how the actual self and the sacred self become united.  
To understand how these conceptions of spirits or sacred animal images facilitate 
self transformation, a detailed analysis of role play or pretend play theory is needed. Our 
emotion responds not only to actual events but also to imagined events. Harris’s theory 
(2000) offers an explanation of how imagined inputs can arouse the human emotional 
system. He claims that people can “take up a vantage-point within an imagined spatio-
temporal framework” (p. 65). That vantage point, specified by the locus of the main 
protagonist, determines what we focus on and what we put in the foreground. By taking 
the vantage-point of that protagonist, we become absorbed when the imagined events 
rather than the actual events drive our emotional system. Moreover, the emotional 
response to those imagined events is shaped from the perspective of the main protagonist. 
Our own emotional pattern is temporarily set aside and the emotional pattern of the 
protagonist takes charge. Imagining a situation where one attempts to feel as if he/she is 
the protagonist produces different emotional responses compared with imagining a 
situation but not identifying with the main protagonist. As individuals’ appraisal 




Harris argues that after becoming absorbed in the imagined world, this process is 
appraised from the adopted protagonist’s vantage-point instead of the vantage-point of 
the person herself/himself (Harris, 2000).  
Even if participants know that the situation is not real but imagined, the 
physiological accompaniments to emotion such as increased heart rate or skin 
conductance change can still be detected. These physiological responses are especially 
likely when participants are prompted to focus on these bodily responses or when the 
situation is of personal importance. Harris (2000) suggests that the reason for our genuine 
response to imagined situations and the taking-up of an imagined vantage-point is that by 
doing so “we can trigger in an anticipatory fashion the emotions that we would feel were 
we to actually do it” (p. 88). This anticipatory planning function of emotional response 
helps us make more appropriate decisions compared with those only based on a rational 
calculation. Therefore, in shamanistic healing rituals, by taking the vantage-point of the 
ideal image rooted in the ritual symbols and myths, participants can drive their emotional 
system in a more socially acceptable fashion, retuning their emotional response patterns 
and other automatic regulations.  
3. Relational Factors Affecting Disruption and Reconstruction of Self 
Relational dynamics constitutes an essential factor in the transformative dynamics 
of the human self. This point is clearly and comprehensively demonstrated in Sandage’s 
Relational-Spirituality model (Shults & Sandage, 2006), which illustrates how human 
development and transformation is greatly affected by relational factors. Families, 




development, as self is inevitably “constituted in and through relationships” (Shults & 
Sandage, 2006, p. 25). In illustrating this point, Sandage cites multidisciplinary evidences. 
For example, Sandage cites Lewis Rambo’s study, which shows that for more than 90 
percent of his research participants, relationships are believed to be a very important 
factor for their conversion process (Rambo, 1993). Sandage also cites Kirkpatrick’s study 
(2005), which demonstrates the correlation between attachment styles and the degree of 
intensity of religious experience.  
Importantly, this relational model “opens conceptual space” (Shults & Sandage, 
2006, p. 162) to understand the negative forms of self-transformation. In Conway and 
Siegelman’s (1978/1995) discussion of the snapping model, we have seen numerous 
cases of negative transformations of self. Sandage suggests that this is because the 
relational and contextual factors can “oppressively impede the processes of spiritual 
formation and transformation or even shape the pathology of spiritual malformation” 
(Shults & Sandage, 2006, p. 172). According to Sandage’s Relational-Spirituality model, 
spiritual transformation is “a process of profound, qualitative change in the self in 
relationship to the sacred” (Shults & Sandage, 2006, p. 163). The negative 
transformations, such as in antisocial spiritual transformations like Satanism, can also be 
understood as relating to the sacred. This helps clarify that not all self transformations are 
healthy or moral, due to the dependence on contextual relational factors and perhaps also 
the nature of nonlinear development.  
Sandage also emphasizes that healers, families and communities can foster or 




particularly critical role in the dynamic transformation of supplicants’ self system. Their 
ability to affect transformation processes might be closely related to two factors: their 
own experience in self-transformation (especially skillful control of altered states of 
consciousness), and their cultivated ability of “radical empathy”, among others. As Koss-
Chioino (2006) points out, “initiation into the healer role is both preceded and 
accompanied by changes in self and world-views” (p. 48). As the so-called wounded 
healers, shamans often undergo severe illnesses and manage to recover from them, from 
which they have gained experience and skill in manipulating the self to achieve 
therapeutic effects. Based on their own experience of self-transformation, they are more 
likely to effectively guide the destabilization and reconstruction of supplicants’ self 
experiences. They may also provide better explanations and predictions of patients’ 
experiences and thus gain authority and trust. As Whitehead (1987) suggests, people in 
altered states actively seek for interpretation and explanation, but not all myths or 
symbolic narratives can work the same effect in making patients accept their explanations. 
Healers with past experiences in self changes are more likely to provide credible 
explanations and predictions of patients’ experiences. 
The concept of radical empathy is proposed by Koss-Chioino in her model of 
shamanistic ritual healings (2006). Empathy is believed to be a powerful source of 
therapeutic change (Shults & Sandage, 2006, p. 25), and it is closely related to the 
theories of role taking. Radical empathy is an advanced form of empathy, where emerges 
“an inter-subjective space where individual differences are melded into one field of 




Through radical empathy, the healer gets to experience the feelings of patients. However, 
radical empathy needs to be cultivated. Koss-Chioino suggests that healers often form a 
continuous relationship to their woundedness, which constitutes their source of authority 
and healing powers and forms the basis for radical empathy. Healers can also greatly 
facilitate the establishment of personal relevance and attachment of spirit images for 
patients. As Espinosa and Koss-Chioino (2013) say, “if a healer is present who 
establishes a significant association between a spiritual entity and the hope of, or actual 
relief from danger and/or suffering, the spirit can take on significant personal meaning for 
the sufferer” (p.121). 
Conclusion  
Understanding shamanistic healing with this disruption-reintegration model has 
the following merits. First, it helps us to understand one of the classic questions for 
religious and symbolic healing: how do we put into proper perspective the roles played 
by ritual practices and the symbolic effects of spiritual entities? The answer is simple if 
we take the perspective of this nonlinear disruption-reintegration dynamic model of self, 
where clearly both of these two factors have important functions in the process. This 
might also shed light on Seligman’s observation (2010) that healing rituals where 
meaning and embodied experiences converge are particularly effective. Moreover, this 
model shares similarity with Whitehead’s claim (1987) that ritual practices and symbol 
systems both play critical roles in reconstructing mental processes, but further integrate 
these two factors within a unified theoretical model, which helps to situate shamanistic 




Second, it has long remained a difficult problem to find the rationale for the 
diverse forms of shamanistic healing practices that span such a wide range from 
repetitive dancing and drumming, to consuming psychedelics, to sensory deprivation or 
bombardment, fasting and so on. There have been many attempts to explain the functions 
of these practices, but most propositions either lack width of coverage or lack specificity. 
This model treats those various forms of practices as essentially the techniques of 
destabilizing self. Self is a hierarchical system, the different levels of which form circular 
causation, and a perturbation on one level could affect lower and upper levels. These 
techniques of self destabilization attack different levels of self processing through top-
down and bottom-up pathways, until the self system can no longer hold the necessary 
degree of stable connections and thus the old attractor is broken, which creates space for 
the formation of new ones. This model can also provide an integrated understanding of 
diverse phenomenal experiences occurring in patients and shamans in healing rituals. As 
noted by Whitehead (1987), instrumental practices in rituals produce similar phenomenal 
experiences—loss of control, sudden organization of perspective, increased suggestibility 
and dependency, the sense of rejuvenation, etc. These various forms of altered states of 
consciousness may constitute phenomenal-level reflections of a reduced level of the press 
for integration in self, or the state of the self-system when the old attractor of connectivity 
breaks up. Moreover, this model can better understand why supplicants are easily 
affected by contextual interpretations – when the self structure is destabilized, the patient 
enters a stage of higher malleability, and the reduced press for integration corresponds to 




susceptible to external manipulation.  Furthermore, under this model, it is easier to 
understand why trance states seem to pave the way for the effective use of shamanistic 
techniques.    
This model, construing self-transformation in terms of a nonlinear process 
breaking old attractors and creating opportunities for the formation of new ones, supports 
a new conceptualization of the function of shamanistic healing. Destabilizing biased self-
processing attractors constitutes an important factor in this therapeutic processes. 
Similarly, as Y. Shapiro (2014) says about psychotherapies in general, “One function of 
therapeutic interventions becomes to shift the patient’s system away from its rigid 
equilibrium or chaotic attractors, thus allowing for new bifurcations to create a more 
functional attractor landscape and for the self-organizing process to reestablish itself” (p. 
190). The model proposed here emphasizes that shamanistic healing rituals have the 
potential to provide a short window of opportunity to reconstruct biased self-processing 
patterns nonlinearly. Although, as Freeman (2001) laments, not much is known about the 
neurochemistry and the brain dynamics underlying this abrupt transformation process (p. 
153), yet with computational simulation techniques, we may detect the details of this 
important mechanism.  
As stated in the beginning, the author does not argue that this model can “speak 
the last word” (Wildman, 2011, p. xi) for this complex and fascinating topic of self 
transformation in shamanistic healing. The aim of this model is to synthesize plausible 
insights from many important models proposed in diverse disciplines, but also to design 




computational threads of research – for instance, the computational social science of self 
studies (see Nowak et al., 2000), and the computational neuroscience of consciousness 
(see Edelman & Tononi, 2000). Both provide formal platforms of computational models, 
and quantitative measures of integration and differentiation (complexity), that allow us to 
examine the dynamics of self transformation in a rigorous and principled fashion. 
Specifically, Nowak et al.’s computational model of self (2000) will form the basis for 


































CHAPTER SIX  
COMPUTATIONAL MODELING AND SIMULATION OF SELF-
TRANSFORMATION 
This chapter sets forth a cellular automata model consisting of a large number of 
cells, each representing a piece of self-relevant information. This model permits 
investigation of the interactive dynamics between shamanistic healing ritual practices and 
the influences of spirit symbols. The simulation experiments show that both ritual 
practices and spirit symbols play essential roles in self dynamics, and the co-presence of 
the two factors produces the optimal self-transformation result. Simulation results also 
suggest that a temporally-controlled invocation of trance-like states provides a window 
for ritual symbols to achieve optimal healing efficacy. 
The Black-Box Mechanism Problem 
How and under what circumstances does religious healing work? When it does 
work, what is actually being healed? Religious scholars have long been preoccupied with 
these questions (Turner, 1964; Levi-Strauss, 1949/2000; Goodman, 1988; Frank & Frank, 
1993; Csordas, 1994; Winkelman, 2010; Luhrmann, 2013). In recent decades, scholarly 
interest in the pathways by which social and cultural practices influence human mental 
and bodily wellbeing has increased. A review of related literatures might leave an 
impression that the underlying psychophysical mechanisms for religious healing have 
already been identified and well understood. Indeed, terms like “catharsis,” “absorption,” 
“hypnosis,” and “dissociation” have been constantly referred to as the underlying 




really account for the efficacy of religious healing. How do these different terms relate to 
one another (is dissociation the same as hypnosis? Is trance the same as absorption?) 
Most importantly, why are these mechanisms therapeutic? It is debatable whether any 
account of religious healing resorting to these unspecified mechanisms counts as a 
genuine explanation. As Csordas (1994) observes, many theories make inference to the 
nonspecific efficacy presumed to be inherent in one or more of these “black box” (p. 3) 
mechanisms; however, these mechanisms and their assumed therapeutic effects remain 
unelaborated — “perhaps the patient goes into trance, but what it is that makes the trance 
therapeutic remains essentially ambiguous” (ibid).    
Therefore, as much as scholars lament under-theorizing about the cultural 
specificity of healing efficacy, a more serious problem might actually be the under-
theorizing of the underlying mechanisms. It is widely acknowledged that the central issue 
lies in “the dialectical relationship that exists between culture and biology” (Danforth, 
2016, p. 52), as healing is “at once a cultural, social, psychological, and physiological 
process” (ibid). However, scholarly attention has been mostly focused on the cultural and 
social regulations while the psychological and physiological processes are often taken for 
granted by simply mentioning the name of one or several psychological terms. Just as 
Seligman and Kirmayer (2008) point out, anthropological studies of healing-related 
phenomena tended to adopt outmoded psychodynamic models as explanations. Inspired 
by these discussions, and in particular Csordas’ critique mentioned above, I refer to this 
as the black-box mechanism problem— there must be one or more causal mechanisms 




and not much effort has been made to peer into the black box to understand how these 
mechanisms actually work.  
As previous chapters have illustrated, a great improvement in recent decades is 
the relocation of the locus of shamanistic healing efficacy onto the self-processes, which 
transfers the weight of solving the black-box mechanism problem onto figuring out 
mechanical understandings of self-transformation processes. As long as one understands 
how the self works and changes, as well as the principles and constraints of the self 
system, one can peer into the black-box to see how ritual healing practices engage in and 
take advantage of these dynamics to transform the self in a therapeutic direction. Indeed, 
a mechanistic understanding of how self processes are manipulated by shamanistic rituals 
to trigger various self states, and how the transformation of self brings about therapeutic 
effects, might provide a new and fruitful angle from which to understand the healing 
efficacy of shamanistic trance healing.  As James L. McClelland says in the forward of 
Computational Explorations in Cognitive Neuroscience: Understanding the Mind 
by Simulating the Brain: “Whatever the exact target phenomenon, the essential goal is to 
understand the mechanisms involved” (O’Reilly and Munakata, 2000, p. xx).  
However, traditional methods in religious healing studies, such as ethnography, 
verbal reports or other empirical research, often find it hard to provide a solid mechanical 
explanation for self change. It is a very challenging task to build a strong connection 
between the postulates and the assumed conclusions—some theories may postulate clear 
mechanisms and believe these mechanisms could produce the observable phenomena, yet 




also hard to contrast different proposals to see which is more valid than others. The self 
as a complex system is reasonably affected by various variables, and it is hard to 
distinguish the most essential ones that may produce qualitative changes from those 
peripheral ones that may only produce quantitative changes.  
Fortunately, as James L. McClelland argues, one can “explore this by laying out a 
set of postulates that define an explicit computational process, its inputs and its initial 
conditions, and then … run the process on a computer to see how it behaves. Typically, 
there will be outputs that are intended to correspond in some way to behavioral responses, 
and there may be internal variables that are intended to correspond to observable neural 
variables, such as neuronal firing rates” (O’Reilly & Munakata, 2000, p. xxii). This 
explicit computational modeling and simulation approach has the potential to go beyond 
the limitations of traditional methods, and as O’Reilly and colleagues have cogently 
argued, it has some important advantages (O’Reilly & Munakata, 2000; O’Reilly et al., 
2012).  
Advantages of Computational Modeling and Simulation 
  First, by quantifying important theoretical concepts with explicit values, theories 
can become more explicit. One can compare theoretical predictions with simulation 
outcomes to see whether theoretical postulates could indeed give rise to expected results 
(O’Reilly & Munakata, 2000). McClelland uses three examples to demonstrate that “the 
inference from data to the modular architecture of the mind is not at all straightforward, 
and that explicit computational models can provide alternatives to what in some 




modules…” (O’Reilly & Munakata, 2000, p. xxii). Indeed, “it isn’t clear in advance of a 
specification and implementation just what the detailed predictions of each of the 
accounts might really be” (ibid). Moreover, implementing a model in a formal way 
pushes one to formulate precise and explicitly defined theories (O’Reilly et al., 2012), 
since there must be a high level of conceptual clarity and specification in order to 
implement a model. This is also a risk-free way to test possible scenarios, and can save 
money and time compared with experiments with human subjects (ibid).  
  Second, by defining an explicit computational process for each theory, one can 
test which one among the competing theories produces the expected outputs, and thus has 
stronger explanatory power, by comparing each output of the corresponding theory with 
any possible empirical data (O’Reilly et al., 2012). Third, by specifying the inputs and 
outputs and observing the dynamical changes on these parameters, one can directly test 
the causal relations and any possible temporal patterns (ibid). Moreover, computational 
simulation may generate patterns that have not yet been thought of before, and thus 
provide new directions for further empirical research, or generate unexpected relations 
that lead to novel interpretations. As McClelland puts it, “an explicit computational 
perspective often leads to new ways of understanding observed phenomena that are 
apparently not always accessible to those who seek to identify subsystems without giving 
detailed consideration to the mechanisms involved” (O’Reilly & Munakata, 2000, p. xxi). 
These advantages may account for why computational modeling is “becoming more and 
more central to the effort to understand the nature of the underlying mechanisms of 




  A frequent concern is that the computational model, due to its simplicity and 
abstraction, cannot reflect the real phenomenon in its entirety, and thus can only 
constitute a partial or even distorted reflection of it. However, abstraction and simplicity, 
rather than being a weakness of the computational modeling, are where its strength lies. 
In fact, one may design the model to be very complex and add many variables as possible 
to make it more resemble the phenomenon in question, but this may be no help at all – to 
understand complex phenomena, abstraction is not only preferred but is in fact necessary. 
Indeed, to understand a complex system, we must draw out essential principles and 
critical variables and leave out those peripheral or secondary features. As Einstein says, 
everything should be as simple as possible but not simpler. The hope is to catch important 
aspects of the nature of the complex system through building a model that incorporates 
the principles and variables that are believed to play defining roles in dominating the 
system’s dynamics. As James L. McClelland says in the forward of Computational 
Explorations in Cognitive Neuroscience: Understanding the Mind by Simulating the 
Brain: 
One might have the goal simply to provide a detailed characterization of the 
actual physical and chemical processes that underlie the cognitive processes in 
question. … But most researchers who call themselves cognitive neuroscientists 
are probably looking for something more general; I think most researchers would 
like to say it is not the details themselves that matter but the principles that are 
embodied in these details. As one example, consider the phenomenon observed of 




by an incoming neural impulse. The exact details of the molecular mechanisms 
involved in this process are a focus of considerable interest in neuroscience. But 
for cognitive neuroscience, a key focus is on the fact that this depletion results in 
a temporary reduction in efficacy at the affected synapse. The principle that 
activity weakens synapses has been incorporated into several models, and then 
has been used to account for a variety of phenomena, including alternation 
between distinct interpretations of the same percept (also known as “bistable 
perception”). The point is that the basic principle can be built into a model that 
captures emergent perceptual phenomena without incorporating all of the 
underlying biophysical details. (O’Reilly & Munakata, 2000, p. xx) 
 
Therefore, in this chapter, I will adopt computational modeling and simulation to 
explore the mechanism of self-transformation and integration. In particular, I will build a 
formal platform to examine how to conceptualize the effects of shamanistic practices and 
symbols in terms of their role in the self-transformation process. This model is thus 
designed to understand a nearly universal cross-cultural feature in shamanistic healing: 
the co-presence of high-arousal ritual practices and the use of images of supernatural 
beings (and the evocation of belief concerning such images). The theoretical model built 
in the previous chapter makes an explicit claim that this co-occurrence is not an accident, 
but could provide important insights on the causal mechanisms underlying shamanistic 
healing.  




This section describes a cellular automata model of self that is built to reflect my 
interpretation of how religious practices and sacred symbols interact to affect self 
processes. Cellular automata are “dynamical systems composed of many simple elements 
that may display two or more discrete states” (Vallacher & Nowak, 1997, p. 90). 
Although sharing many similarities with neural networks, cellular automata are special in 
that their elements are normally arranged in a two-dimensional grid. Each cell’s state at a 
certain time is influenced by the states of its neighbors at the previous time step. This 
exhibits the mutual constraints of system elements, which is common for complex 
adaptive systems. The intrinsic mutual constraints may generate global spatial or 
temporal properties and patterns that “were not directly programmed into individual 
elements” (ibid). Therefore, cellular automata modeling is particularly useful for 
exploring dynamics of complex systems with emergent global properties.  
The model built here is based on the “society-of-self” model of Nowak et al. 
(2000), which is a particular cellular automata model examining the generic features of 
the integration process of self. Self is apparently a complex system, composed of 
numerous pieces of self-relevant information that relate to each other in various ways. 
The interaction and constraints among pieces of self-relevant information constitute the 
basis for the emergence of any integrative global properties of self, such as self-concept, 
self-esteem, or self-certainty. The classic society-of-self model has been an influential 
computational model in social psychology, incorporating the dynamical systems 
approach. It was built by the forerunners of computational social psychology, Andrzej 




the self system, and demonstrated that “important global properties of the self reflect the 
operation of integration processes that are generic in complex systems” (ibid, p. 39), and 
is an excellent case to show that a complex-systems approach to the self can lead to many 
insights about it, “some that resonate with phenomena that have already been established 
empirically and others that may establish a research agenda for future empirical work” 
(ibid, p. 40).  
Importantly, the simulation results from the “society of self” model demonstrate 
that one of the order parameters — “the press for integration”, which plays a critical role 
in self dynamics and integration process—may closely relate to the availability of 
cognitive resources: the lack of sufficient cognitive resources would weaken the self-
organizing tendency of the self structure, and make it more vulnerable to external 
influence and manipulation. This conclusion is very relevant to our theoretical model of 
self transformation, which postulates that many shamanistic healing practices affect 
available cognitive resources and thus disrupt the normal structuring tendency of the self 
system. This propels us to follow Nowak to build a similar formal platform, upon which 
to examine important questions related to our model of self-transformation built in the 
last chapter.  
The model built here would thus preserve some important settings and 
assumptions of Nowak’s “society of self” model. Essentially this dissertation follows 
their assumption that there is an integrative mechanism in the self system, which is a 
generic feature for many complex adaptive systems. Moreover, this integrative tendency 




intuitive assumption that external information also plays roles in self-transformation 
processes. Importantly, I agree that the optimal integration of the self is not a global but a 
differentiated integration. In particular, although the integration of the complex system of 
self would depend on many aspects or criteria, the principle of integration based on 
evaluation—evaluation coherence—would be one critical principle for achieving 
coherence of the self. As Nowak et al. (2000) note,  
The attainment of self-concept coherence by means of self-organization is 
possible because the elements of self-structure, though diverse by many criteria, 
can be scaled with respect to the common parameter of evaluation. Self-relevant 
information runs the gamut of possible self-evaluation, from memories of 
misdeeds and perceived character flaws to memorable accomplishments and 
firmly held values. The elements of self-structure do not have a fixed valence, 
however. Rather, the self-evaluation associated with an element of self-relevant 
information is malleable and open to influence from the valence of other elements. 
An element incongruent with neighboring (thematically related) elements may 
change its valence or change the valence of its neighbors, so as to establish 
evaluative coherence with the related elements. (p. 315)  
 
Like the society of self model, the model built here assumes that self is 
represented by 400 cells that lie on a 20×20 two-dimensional square grid. Each cell 
represents an item of information relevant to self. As self-related information can be at 




information is on the most rudimentary of these levels. As Nowak et al. (2000) point out, 
“The integration of such elements results in the emergence of evaluatively consistent 
areas of the self-structure that serve as a basis for higher order features of the self (e.g. 
traits, areas of competence)” (p. 43). I also follow the society of self model to set the 
basic qualities of the cell, each with an evaluation and a weight. The evaluation is binary, 
either positive (with the value of 1) or negative (-1). I also follow the society of self 
model to maintain the bipolarity assumption. That is, for personally important judgments, 
evaluation is normally dichotomous. Given that self is obviously an important target of 
evaluation, the valence of self-relevant pieces of information would be set as either 
positive or negative in the model. Weight represents the importance or centrality of the 
self-information, with self-information having a high weight exercising more influence 
among its eight neighbors, while self-information with low weight is more subject to the 
influence of its neighbors. As in the society of self model, the weight of self-relevant 
information is set as a number between 2 and 10, and it is assumed that the weight does 
not change during each simulation. Because it is natural that the self would have several 
areas, and that each area would have its own dominating, central self-relevant thought, 
three maximally random elements that are spatially distanced would be picked to have 
the weight of 11 (which is different from the society of self model for technical reasons), 
and the elements surrounding these three elements would have gradually decreasing 
weight.   
Order Parameters 




exhibit regular patterns at the global level, which renders it possible to describe the 
characteristic states of the system with a limited set of global variables. These variables 
are often called “order parameters” (Vallacher & Nowak, 1997). Finding proper order 
parameters is an important task, but is also a hard one (Vallacher & Nowak, 1997). In the 
society of self model, Nowak et al. (2000) identify three order parameters, which I 
preserve in this model: self-evaluation, evaluative differentiation, and self-dynamism. A 
new one is added to this model to capture another aspect of the dynamism of the self-
system: how many time steps it takes for a self to achieve an equilibrium, as a way to see 
the rate of recovery of self in the face of varied degrees of press of integration and varied 
external influences. In each set of simulations, all of the following four order parameters 
will be examined.  
Self-evaluation 
This order parameter is the “weighted average of all the elements in the structure” 
(Nowak et al. 2000, p.45) in terms of their evaluation. The formula to compute it is as 
follows (v represents value and w represents weight): 
      
This parameter is important in that it reflects the overall evaluation of the self-
relevant information. It is reasonable to hypothesize that this order parameter might be 
closely related to or directly reflect overall self-esteem, and a low level of self-evaluation 













parameter may indicate a healing effect. In a simulation of self changes in an efficacious 
religious ritual healing, the self-evaluation of the self system is expected to increase.  
 
Self-integration 
This order parameter reflects the degree of differentiated integration of the self 
system. It is calculated as follows: 
  
Cabs is “the number of existing links between neighboring elements of the same 
valence”, while Cchance is “the number of links between neighboring elements of the same 
valence expected in a randomly ordered system”, and Cmax is “the maximum number of 
links between neighboring elements of the same valence that is possible in a system in 
which positive and negative elements form two compact clusters” (Nowak et al. 2000, p. 
45).   
In the society-of-self model, this parameter is named “evaluative differentiation” 
because it “reflects the degree to which the elements form the clusters of similar valence” 
(Nowak et al. 2000, p. 45), which seems to be more like a reflection of differentiation 
rather than integration. However, as a higher value of this parameter reflects that more 
elements share same valence with their neighbors, it constitutes a direct reflection of 
differentiated integration. Nowak et al. (2000) note that a self system high in this 
parameter has adaptive advantages, as this structural feature helps individuals respond 
more quickly (the regional evaluative integration in each self area allows one to reach 





decisions quickly on issues related to that self aspect), and these benefits “are likely to be 
manifest only when the elements within regions of the self are evaluatively coherent …” 
(Nowak et al., 2000, p. 56). As the optimal integration is “differentiated” integration, 
“integration” and “differentiation” become relative terms to some extent, and to choosing 
which term to use depends on which aspect one aims to emphasize. Since the emphasis 
here is on the integration of the self, I name this order parameter as “self-integration” to 
emphasize its reflection of the integrative tendency of the self.  
Self-dynamism 
This parameter computes the amount of self-relevant information whose 
evaluation is changed in one given simulation step, and is computed in each simulation 
step according to the following formula:  
 
Here n is the total number of pieces of self-relevant information, (400 in this 
model), while k refers to the number of cells that changed their valence in that given step 
of the simulation. If one runs the simulation for 50 steps, one will get 50 values that 
reflect how many elements are changed during each of the 50 steps. By tracking this 
number through these 50 steps one can see whether there is any temporal pattern for the 
evolution of the self system.  
Self-stabilization 
This newly-added parameter is closely related to self-dynamism, and can be 






It computes how many steps of simulation it takes for the self-system to recover a state of 
equilibrium. A larger value of self-stabilization indicates that the self-system takes longer 
to restore a state of equilibrium. It is simply computed by finding after which particular 
time step the value of self-dynamism remains zero.  
It is possible that there are other order parameters that could also reflect important 
characteristics of the self processes, and these four parameters are certainly not 
exhaustive. However, as Vallacher and Nowak (1997) point out, “the search for order 
parameters is somewhat of an art” and “it is one that can prove quite difficult to 
accomplish” (p. 78). It awaits future research to find other order parameters that may 
reflect more important features of the system’s dynamics or reflect the same feature in 
more appropriate ways. 
Control Parameters  
Control parameters are variables that affect the states and behaviors of a 
dynamical system (Vallacher and Nowak, 1997). Although a complex system may have 
many control parameters, “it is typically the case that only a relatively small subset of 
them promote noteworthy qualitative changes” (ibid, p. 79) while others only affect the 
system quantitatively. Capturing this small subset of control parameters is thus more 
important for understanding the system dynamics, and “focusing only on the subset of 
factors representing critical control parameters, in other words, may prove sufficient for 
making qualitative predictions of behavior” (ibid).  
According to Vallacher and Nowak (1997), identification of the most important 




first to isolate independent variables that may influence the system, and then to 
distinguish factors that make qualitative changes from those that only cause quantitative 
changes. In the society of self model, Nowak et al. (2000) propose two control 
parameters: the press for integration, and external incoming information. These two 
parameters are closely relevant for the model built here, because the press for integration, 
as has been discussed in the last chapter, is closely related to religious practices via the 
mediation of the practices’ effect on cognitive resources; and the incoming information 
maps well onto the religious symbols and images that contain highly affective 
information that relates to one’s self-image (e.g., propelling one to re-evaluate one’s self 
understanding or pushing one to aspire for an ideal possible self conveyed by certain 
religious symbols). Therefore, the following sets of simulations explore how these two 
control parameters independently and jointly work on various configurations of the self 
system to affect the above order parameters. By these simulations, I hope to shed light on 
how religious practices and religious symbols work independently and jointly on the self 
processes during shamanistic healing rituals.  
Computer Simulation of the Self Transformation Model 
In this section I run simulations to explore critical issues relevant to the 
theoretical model of self-transformation proposed in the previous chapter. First, I explore 
how the self may be affected by different levels of press for integration. The prediction is 
that a stronger press for integration would strengthen the initial tendency toward 
integration of the self-configuration, and thus make the self more evaluatively integrated. 




tendency and that the self shows varied self-organization dynamics with different degrees 
of this tendency, as well as that evaluative coherence is one essential principle of self-
integration.  Second, I investigate how the self is affected by incoming information with 
varied valence and intensity. This question is important as another basic hypothesis 
proposed in this dissertation is that the self-integration dynamics are not only constrained 
by internal structures and tendencies, but are also affected by external information. Third, 
the simulation investigates the combined effect of varied press of integration and 
incoming information with varying valance and intensity on the development of self, as 
well as on self that has already reached an equilibrium with a dominant negative 
evaluation. This simulation thus could test the hypothesis that shamanistic ritual practices 
and symbolic effects both play roles in the healing of a biased self. Finally, I investigate 
what is the optimal arrangement of practices and symbolic effect to heal a formed 
negative self, in order to find out whether there are any temporal patterns in this process.  
Simulation Group 1 
The first group of simulations starts with a system that is disordered and has not 
achieved any evaluative structure. Of course, in real life situations this rarely happens, as 
any self would have at least some structure and pattern in terms of evaluation. But in 
order to explore the intrinsic dynamics of the self system—how the mutual 
interdependence of self-relevant elements give rise to global patterns—the simulation 
starts with this extreme situation (also without considering any external influences) and 
then turns to more lifelike situations in later simulations. Moreover, to make it resemble a 




assumption in self-evaluation (cf. Taylor & Brown, 1988): 60% of the self-elements are 
set to have positive valence (+1) and 40% negative valence (-1). The initial average self-
evaluation would thus be around 0.2 instead of 0. 
Similar to any cellular-automata model (cf. Wolfram, 1986), it is assumed that 
each element can influence and be influenced by its neighbors. (In the society of self 
model and the model built here, it is assumed that neighbors refer to the four cells on 
adjacent sides and four on diagonals.) In each simulation step, there are 400 instances of 
random pick up of an element in the Monte Carlo fashion (each cell is represented by a 
number between 0 and 399; at each of the total 400 instances, a random number generator 
is used to generate a random number between 0 and 399, and then the cell having the 
corresponding number is picked to update its state; since the random number generation 
is independent, a number being chosen before does not affect its chance of being chosen 
again, but on average each cell has one chance of being chosen in one simulation step). 
Some cells might be chosen more than once or not at all as I adopt sampling with 
replacement. Once an element i is chosen, the weighted valence of its eight neighbors is 
computed and are added together to produce the sum. Nowak et al. note that this 
computation process is similar to information integration (cf. Anderson, 1981). The sum 
of all eight neighbors’ weighted valence would then be compared with the cell i’s own 
weighted valence. If these two values are both positive or negative, then there is no need 
to change. However, if the sum of the neighbors’ weighted valence has a different sign 
from the chosen cell’s own valence, and the sum’s absolute weighted value is also larger 




to its opposite.  
It is generally harder for a high-weight cell with low-weight neighbors to be 
changed, as the summed weighted valence of its neighbors is generally smaller than its 
own weighted valence. This makes intuitive sense, as one self-relevant thought that is 
held as important for an individual is generally hard to change by other, less-important 
pieces of self-relevant information. This step will be repeated until no more cells change 
their valence, and the system is in a state of equilibrium (here the equilibrium is static 
instead of dynamic, but the latter is also theoretically possible). I choose to run the 
simulation for 50 time steps, since in almost all cases the system would reach an 
asymptote before step 50.  
 















Figure 6.4 Self-Organization in the Self System with High Press for Integration (before 
simulation. Yellow represents a positive value, and blue represents a negative value. 
Darker yellow and darker blue both represent higher weights, while lighter yellow and 
lighter blue represent lower weights)  
 
 




simulation. Yellow represents a positive value, and blue represents a negative value. 
Darker yellow and darker blue both represent higher weights, while lighter yellow and 
lighter blue represent lower weights) 
 
Figure 6.6 Self-organization in the Self System with Low Press for Integration (before 
simulation. Yellow represents a positive value, blue represents a negative value. Darker 
yellow and darker blue both represent higher weights, while lighter yellow and lighter 
blue represent lower weights) 
 




simulation. Yellow represents a positive value; blue represents a negative value. Darker 
yellow and darker blue both represent higher weights, while lighter yellow and lighter 
blue represent lower weights) 
Figures 6.1 to 6.3 show the temporal changes in the three order parameters in the 
self system during the 50 steps of the simulation (the results are averaged over 50 runs). 
Figures 6.4 and 6.5 show the starting and final configuration of the self system when the 
press for integration is high, and Figure 6.6 and 6.7 show the starting and final 
configuration of the self when the press is low. The changes are purely due to the 
intrinsic integrative tendency of the self system.  
One can see that due to the internal integrative tendency, several clusters of 
evaluatively integrated areas form in the self system (this pattern is especially evident 
when the press for integration is high). One can also see that the initial positivity bias 
becomes more pronounced with the progress of the simulation. The mutual influence of 
self elements gives rise to the above features, and such mutual influences reflect the 
intrinsic press for integration in the self-system. The press for integration is a generic 
feature for any complex adaptive system, and without such a press the complex system 
would not sustain its global properties. As has been mentioned in the previous chapter on 
self, the complex collective behaviors of the system are achieved by feedback loops 
between local elements that follow dynamical updating rules. These rules provide the 
basis for the integration and exhibit the press for the local elements to change their states 
according to influence from their neighbors.  




may not be constant. As Nowak et al. point out, when there is severe stress or cognitive 
overload (cf. Bargh, 1997; Gilbert, 1993), there might not be sufficient cognitive 
resources to maintain the integrative tendencies. They also note that performing 
challenging or stressful tasks may exhaust cognitive resources and thus weakens the 
integrative tendency of the self system. In the “press for integration” section of the last 
chapter, I have examined the possible mappings of the press for integration to the 
cognitive depletion theory and other psychological variables. Therefore, rather than 
simply comparing the sum of the weighted valences of neighbors with the cell’s own 
weighted valence, I follow the society of self model to multiply the sum of the weighted 
valence of neighbors with the parameter p, where p represents the press for integration (p 
= 1 represents typically high press for integration and p = 0.1 represents typically low 
press for integration).  
From Figures 1 to 3, one can see that the self system shows distinct dynamical 
features with different values of press for integration. With high press for integration, 
self-dynamism is higher (more cells changed their valence), self-integration is higher (the 
self system forms a more differentiated integrative structure), and self-evaluation is also 
higher (the final self is more positive when press is high).  It also takes more time for the 
self to achieve equilibrium when the press is high, indicating that it takes longer for self 
to restore stability. 
These results suggest that, with sufficient cognitive resources, one can have a 
strong self-organizing tendency and can thus form a more organized self structure. But 




point out, is not developed in a vacuum, but in a constant interaction with social 
environment and cultural contexts. Social values and others’ feedback constitute a major 
defining factor in shaping our self-understanding. They not only affect how people think 
of themselves, and how they evaluate themselves in various aspects, but may even affect 
how they pay attention, how they feel, and how they interpret their feelings and emotions. 
Therefore, the next simulation set will examine the interaction between varying degrees 
of press for integration and intensity of external information.  
Simulation Group 2 
 
 
Figure 6.8 Final Value of Self-Dynamism as a Result of Varied Press-for-Integration and 
Intensity of External Information (sd refers to standard deviation; larger standard 
deviation indicates that the external information is more intense) 
  This group of simulations approaches more realistic scenarios: when the intrinsic 




intensity. Here it is assumed that the external information is of mean value of 0 (thus 
being neutral in valence in general) and of standard deviation of 1, 3, and 6 respectively. 
Higher standard deviation indicates higher intensity of incoming information. With a 
standard deviation of 1, the information would be between -1.96 and 1.96 during 95% of 
the time; with a standard deviation of 6, between -11.76 and 11.76. (Nowak et al., 2000, p. 
47). Figure 8 indicates two patterns: first, the higher the intensity of information, the 
more influence of external information on the self system (directly reflected by the 
increase in self-dynamism); second, the incoming information has much less effect under 
high press for integration than under low press for integration (as one can see that when 
the press for integration is low, self-dynamism increases more dramatically than when the 
press is high). This simulation exhibits similar patterns to the society of self model, which 
also shows that higher press for integration—which corresponds to “having sufficient 
cognitive resources available” (Nowak et al., 2000, p.48) — “enables people to actively 
resist incoming information that might otherwise undermine their existing sense of self” 
(ibid), while with weak press for integration, the self is more subject to manipulation by 





Figure 6.9 Final Self-Evaluation by Press-for-Integration and Intensity-of-Incoming-
Information (sd refers to standard deviation; larger standard deviation indicates that the 
external information is more intense) 
 
 
Figure 6.10 Self-Integration by Press-for-Integration and Intensity-of-Incoming-




external information is more intense) 
  However, concerning the first conclusion, the situation is more subtle, as reflected 
in Figure 9 and Figure 10. From Figure 9, one can see that when standard deviation 
increases from 1 to 3, self-evaluation increases (becomes more positive) even if the mean 
of the external information is neutral (mean = 0), and self-integration level also increases. 
Nowak et al.’s (2000) simulation experiments show similar patterns, and they interpret 
this as showing that when the external information is not too intense, it “has a way of 
facilitating the person’s self-integration” (p. 50), and this “suggests that people may turn 
to others, not to learn specific things about themselves, but to facilitate their own internal 
process of achieving coherence in their self-concept” (ibid). If this is true, this may help 
us understand the efficacy of attending shamanistic rituals for the general public – just 
attending the ritual may facilitate the self-integrative processes. 
  However, when standard deviation increases to 6, with low press of integration, 
self-evaluation decreases. This tendency is also seen in the case of high press, although it 
is less evident. Self-integration is also lowered when standard deviation reaches 6 in the 
low press situation, but not so in the high press situation. This indicates that “under weak 
press for integration, a person’s existing sense of self is insufficient to provide a basis for 
rejecting incoming information” (Nowak et al., 2000, p. 50) and this “makes the person 
vulnerable to evaluatively intense social feedback and other sources of self-relevant ideas” 
(ibid). Nowak draws an important conclusion that “when the system lacks the cognitive 
resources to check for possible inconsistencies and conflicts among elements, it becomes 




incoming information, even patently absurd ideas may be initially incorporated into the 
system without much of a fight (cf. Gilbert, 1993)” (ibid). I agree with Nowak’s 
interpretation concerning the importance of cognitive resources. This conclusion is 
especially relevant to studies of religious rituals. The “cognitive resource depletion” 
theory of ritual practices proposed by Schjoedt and colleagues (2013) suggests that 
complex religious rituals exert a great demand on attention and emotional processing, 
which leaves the executive processes with insufficient cognitive resources. The 
inadequacy of cognitive resources weakens the internal structural constraints, which 
renders the structuring of the self-processing system more subject to the influence of 
outside information such as authority or myth.  
Simulation Group 3 
Starting from simulation group 3, the focus is relocated from replicating important 
conclusions from Nowak’s society of self model towards simulating scenarios that are 
more closely relevant to the understanding of shamanistic healing. In this group of 
simulations, the initial self would not have a positivity bias (which would more resemble 
a normal, healthy self, rather than the group of people who typically seek help in 
shamanistic rituals, that is, individuals who already formed an “ill” self – a self-system 
with a negative level of self-evaluation, little dynamism [meaning that the self has gone 
through the self-organization process and has achieved certain structures], and thus also 
high level of self-integration). That is, the simulation starts with the self structure that 






Figure 6.11 Self-Evaluation in Negative Stable Self by Press-for-Integration and Intensity 
of Incoming Information (mean = 0, sd = 1, 3, 6) 
 
 







Figure 6.13 Self-Evaluation in Negative Stable Self with Positive Noise Input (mean=3) 
by Press-for-Integration  
The first round of simulations tests the response of such an ill-formed self to 
neutral noise input (mean = 0) as well as positive noise input (with a mean intensity of 
information of 3), each with varying standard deviations (sd = 1, 3, and 6, respectively). 
From Figure 11 to 13, one can see that, for a negative stable self, low press works better 
both for neutral noise input and positive noise input with varied intensity. In particular, in 
Figure 13, one can see that positive noise input can only make the ill self become positive 
when it is accompanied by low press for integration. From Figure 13, one can see that 
when press is high (p=1), a positive noise input, instead of decreasing the negativity of 
self, makes the ill self more negative. This indicates that high press of integration 
prevents the ill self from benefiting from positive external information, which may explain 
why healers commonly trigger trance states in patients—to make it easier for them to 
benefit from positive suggestions.  




of positive noise (That is, instead of inputting a random matrix with a positive mean value 
and a certain standard deviation at the start of each simulation step, I input exactly the 
same matrix, representing the symbol, in all simulation steps). The rationale for doing 
this is that sacred symbols in shamanistic rituals normally have culturally-stabilized 
meanings and implications, and exert effects on one’s self understanding in a relatively 
stable way (for example, a sacred symbolic image of a spirit often has certain powers and 
characteristics, which relates to certain aspects of an individual’s self-understanding. A 
symbolic image that represents a warrior god may make salient an individual’s 
appreciation of his/her own bravery, or propel one to release his/her previously repressed 
personality characteristic of assertiveness or self-confidence. Alternatively, a sacred 
image with complex personality features may serve as a new frame of reference for an 
individual to reevaluate his/her strengths and weaknesses, and help to integrate a 
previously conflicted self-understanding). In a word, the symbolic information from the 
healing rituals may relate to the person in a relatively stable way, at least in that one 
healing session. Therefore, instead of inputting a random matrix of information to the self 
system, in every simulation step I apply the same information matrix to see how that 






Figure 6.14 Self-Evaluation in Negative Stable Self with Positive Symbol  
 Input (mean=3, standard deviation=3) by Press-for-Integration 
 
Figure 6.14 shows that a positive symbol decreases the negativity of the self 
(indicating a healing effect) when the press of integration is relatively low (p=0.1 or 0.3), 
but worsens the ill self when the press is high (p=1). Interestingly, one can see that, when 
press of integration is increased from 0.1 to 0.3, the healing effect is more obvious, 
indicating stronger healing effect, but when the press for integration continues to increase 
to 1, rather than being healed, the negativity of the self system is worsened. Therefore, it 
seems that, starting from a certain point in time, a qualitative change happens – the 
increasing of the press of integration stops strengthening the healing effect but on the 
contrary prevents self from benefiting from positive symbolic influence. This is in 
agreement with the previous finding that a high press for integration makes the self-
organizing tendency so strong that it prevents any external factors from influencing the 




by intrinsic tendencies—for instance, when the self is initially dominated by negative 
valences, the strong mutual constraints among self elements would render the self more 
negative. This scenario resembles a person who holds a strong and stubbornly negative 
self-understanding. This also indicates that, to achieve an optimal healing effect, healers 
might need to control the depth of the trance-like or hypnotizable state, as both deep 
trance and no-trance states might be worse than a medium-level trance-like state.  
 
Figure 6.15 Self-Evaluation in Negative Stable Self by Press-for-Integration and Intensity 
of Symbol (mean=3, standard deviation=1 for low intensity, standard deviation = 6 for 
high intensity) 
 
 In the third round of simulation, I continue to explore more complex scenarios. In 
the previous round of simulation, the intensity of the positive symbol is kept at a constant 




or 6)? The results of such simulations are illustrated in Figure 15. It can be seen that a 
high-intensity positive symbol has much stronger healing effects than low-intensity 
positive symbols when the press is lower (p = 0.1 or 0.3), but this advantage disappears 
when the press becomes very high. From Figure 15 one can see that the best healing 
effect among the six comparison groups is when press is lowest (0.1) and the intensity of 
the symbol is highest (sd = 6). However, when the press approaches 1, positive symbols 
have no way to correct the negativity of the self, regardless of whether the symbol 
intensity is low or high. Interestingly, if one compares this scenario (press = 0.1, symbol 
with mean of 3 and sd of 6) with Figure 14, one can see that this scenario works better 
than the best conditions in Figure 14 (press = 0.3, symbol has mean of 3 and sd of 3). 
This indicates that, when the symbol is sufficiently intense (sd = 6), the lowest value of 
press for integration generates optimal results.  
Simulation group 4 
 In this group of simulations, I start to explore two questions. First, how long 
should trance-like states last to achieve optimal healing efficacy? The previous 
simulations demonstrate that lowering the press for integration helps the ill self to benefit 
from positive symbolic influences, but does that mean that the longer we keep a low level 
of press for integration (i.e., the longer the trance-like state is maintained in patients), the 
better the healing efficacy? Second, does low press for integration need to co-occur with 
the presence of positive symbols? Is it likely that what matters is solely the lowering of 
press for integration, and that there is in fact no need for exposure to positive symbolic 




possible that the only thing that matters is to generate altered states of consciousness, 
which alone cause therapeutic effects, and that the symbols and myths are just accidental 
occurrences which have no necessary relation to healing effects? With these two 
questions in mind, several rounds of simulations were run and the results are illustrated in 
Figure 16 and 17.  
 
Figure 6.16 Self-Evaluation Change and Self-Integration in Negative Stable Self by 
Different Arrangements of Press for Integration (In the left case, press = 0.1 for the first 
10 steps and then rises to 1; on the right, press = 0.1 for all 50 steps. Self-evaluation 






Figure 6.17 Self Evaluation Change by Simulation Steps (the press for integration is set 
to start low [p=0.1] and then increase [p=1]) 
 
Figure 16 shows that, if the press for integration is set low (p=0.1) for the first 10 
time steps and then is raised to a higher value (p=1) afterwards, it generates a mixed 
outcome: the final self-evaluation is slightly lower than if the press were kept low for the 
whole process, but the final self-integration would be better. At first glance, this may 
indicate that the longer the press for integration is kept low, the better the final self-
evaluation. To test this, I ran an optimization simulation. The results are shown in Figure 
17, where one can see that when symbols are not very positive (mean = 3), there is indeed 
a pattern that the longer we maintain a low press, the better the self-evaluation. But after 
a short initial period (from the beginning to time step 3 or 4), the gain in self-evaluation is 
much less evident. When the symbol is very positive (mean = 6), this pattern is even 




decreasing. This indicates that, when the symbolic influence is positive enough, a 
sufficiently optimal self-evaluation can be achieved only by maintaining a low press for 
integration in the beginning period (until time step 5 or so); if we continue to maintain a 
low press, even if there is still continuous input of positive symbolic information, self-
evaluation will decrease. In a real life situation, the outcome of keeping a constant low 
value of press can be even more dangerous – it leaves the self-system subject to any 
subsequent external influence, which is generally lower in valence than symbols used in 
healing rituals. It is very likely that, after the ritual finishes and patients return to daily 
life, the external information would be much lower in valence than in the ritual situation, 
and if the patients are still kept at a low press for integration, they may be subject to the 
influence of possible negative information, which would make self return to negative 
states again.  
In summary, these simulations point to the possibility that trance-like states 
should be kept only for a limited period of time, and that trance-like states that are too 





Figure 6.18 Self-Evaluation Change in Negative Stable Self by Different Arrangements of 




Figure 6.19 Self-Integration in Negative Stable Self by Different Arrangements of Press 
and Intensity-of-Symbol 




maintaining them for a long time, but may also be better than keeping a constant high 
press for integration. Figure 18 and Figure 19 show that the limited invocation of trance-
like states can not only achieve better self-evaluation than the absence of any trance-like 
states (when the press of integration is as high as 1, the self-organizing tendency is at its 
maximum and the self is hardly influenced by any external influence, which is the 
opposite of hypnotized or trance-like states), but when the symbol is at a high intensity 
level (sd = 6), limited invocation of trance-like states also achieves higher self-integration. 
This indicates that the only advantage of keeping a high press level — higher self-
integration—is lost when the intensity of the positive symbol reaches a high level. When 
one combines this with the discoveries above, one can draw the conclusion that a 
temporally-limited use of practices that trigger and maintain a trance-like state (which 
corresponds to the self structure being disrupted by external information) achieves 
optimal results in terms of self-evaluation and self-integration, facilitating the formation 






Figure 6.20 Self-Evaluation change in Negative Stable Self by Different Arrangements of 
Symbol and Intensity-of-Symbol 
  
Figure 6.21 Self Configuration Before and After Simulation (p=0.1; symbol mean=6, 
sd=6; yellow represents a positive value, blue represents a negative value. Darker yellow 




represent lower weights) 
In the final round of simulations, I test the second question: does low press for 
integration need to co-occur with the presence of positive symbols? Is it likely that what 
matters is solely the lowering of press for integration, and there might be actually no need 
for positive symbolic influences? The simulation results illustrated in Figure 20 
demonstrate that low press for integration does indeed need to cooperate with symbolic 
influence. This simulation compares the scenario in which we only input positive noise, 
instead of positive symbols, in the first ten steps of simulation, which roughly 
corresponds to the time when the press for integration should be kept low, and then 
switch to positive symbols, in which second scenario the input is a positive symbol from 
the beginning. Figure 20 shows that the outcome is clearly better in the second scenario, 
which indicates the importance of the cooperation between lowering the press for 
integration and the inputting of positive symbols. From Figure 21, one can see that with 
low press for integration and highly intense positive symbols, the self system becomes 
more positive in evaluation, and solid negative clusters are eroded and broken into 
smaller pieces, which may indicate the reintegration of dissociated negative self-
complexes. These important findings are in agreement with the theoretical model built in 
the last chapter: to the classic question of whether it is practices or symbols that matter, 
the answer is that the co-presence of these two factors is the critical causal factor. Their 
cooperation allows the self structure to become more positive. This provides a proof in a 
computational sense for many ritual scholars’ observation that both practices and 




outcomes (Seligman, 2014; Whitehead, 1987). 
Conclusions and Discussion 
Religious ritual practices and sacred symbols both matter. Religious ritual 
practices loosen self-structuring tendencies, but this process does not itself guarantee that 
the self changes in a therapeutic direction. A self with low press for integration is subject 
to external influences, which can be positive or negative. The fact that deviant self 
transformation has occurred in religious sects studied by scholars of forcible conversion 
and brainwashing, as mentioned in the last chapter, provides abundant empirical data for 
conditions in which self-dynamics are manipulated by negative external influences. On 
the other hand, symbolic images and myths also engage in the self-transformation process, 
not by working on a passive self, but by interacting with the existing structures and self-
organizing tendencies of the self system. Similar to Nowak’s suggestion, “external 
factors such as social feedback play a role, of course, but they do so by interacting with 
the intrinsic dynamics of the self-system” (Nowak et al., 2000, p. 57). Sacred symbols 
that are frequently made salient in shamanistic healing rituals are imbued with self-
relevant information, which often arouses intense emotional responses and strongly 
affects self-understanding and self-development. As Kleinman (1980b) suggests, in 
religious healings “the switch in models and metaphors is from negatively valued, 
anxiety-laden ones to positively valued, adaptive ones” (p. 365). Change in the self in 
shamanistic healing rituals is a nonlinear process. Even if only practices and symbols are 
concerned, the interaction of these two on the configuration of the self system produces 




established by previous studies.  
This chapter has demonstrated the potential and relevance of dynamical-system 
modeling and computational simulation in exploring the mechanisms underlying 
religious healing. This may constitute a heuristic of the way computational approaches 
may be applied to the understanding of critical issues in religious healing studies, which 
normally involve psychological processes of remarkable complexity. It also provides 
directions for future empirical exploration of new phenomena that may reflect the 
dynamical principles and patterns that emerged in the simulations. For instance, the 
simulation results suggest that a temporally-limited invocation of low-press-for-
integration states achieves optimal results compared with other levels of press for 
integration. This indicates that future empirical research may explore the relationship 
between the duration of trance-states and the degree of healing effects.  
However, as in many other fields where computational modeling is widely 
adopted, the computational approach here is not meant to substitute for other methods in 
religious studies, but to form a complementary relationship in which methods actively 
inform each other. The traditional approaches of religious healing studies, such as the 
ethnographic approach, verbal reports, and any other empirical methods, are essential for 
providing empirical data, which offers constraints as well as ways of testing 
computational insights. As Nowak says, the formal framework “should not be looked on 
as a substitute for the rich insights generated by other theories and research on the self. 
To the contrary, considering such insights in light of the present model should enable us 




that characterize complex systems of all kinds” (Nowak et al., 2000, p. 57). 
 This computational model of self transformation, although based on a classic and 
well-established computational model in self studies, is still rudimentary. The control 
parameters are limited in number and in need of future iterations to provide more 
constraints. As Nowak has pointed out, “a simplified characterization cannot hope to 
capture all the richness and complexity of the features and processes specific to the self-
system” (Nowak et al., 2000, p. 57). Although it has been made clear in the above that the 
simplicity of modeling is not necessarily a weakness in itself, as Vallacher and Nowak 
(1997) have pointed out, “the goal of science is to find the simplest possible explanations 
for phenomena” (p. 85), and the isolation of a few critical variables necessary to reach 
succinct but powerful explanations. Still, whether the control parameters isolated here are 
the most appropriate ones awaits further empirical and computational exploration. Future 
empirical research can provide more data as constraints, and future modeling efforts can 
“incorporate empirically established processes as additional variables and constraints” 
(Nowak et al., 2000, p. 57) to test whether other variables can better account for 
observables.  
Despite these limitations, this research has shown the potential of the 
computational approach as a formal platform for exploring the complex mechanical 
processes underlying shamanistic healing, which may serve as the basis for understanding 
and designing more effective treatments of disorders, and inspire more researchers to take 







This project started from three observations: shamanistic healings are sometimes 
effective in achieving therapeutic effects; effective cases of shamanistic healings often 
involve changes in patients’ sense of self; and shamanistic healings generally involve 
high-arousal ritual practices and sacred symbolic narratives. Do these observations 
provide any insight on the causal mechanisms of shamanistic healing? This dissertation 
sought to explain the efficacy of shamanistic healing via exploring the self-
transformation process, as well as the respective roles played by ritual practices and 
symbols in effecting self-transformation. A specific research question was proposed and 
explored in this dissertation: how does self get transformed in shamanistic healing, and 
how are we to put into proper perspective the roles played by shamanistic ritual practices 
and the symbolic effect? 
This question is important, as it has long been noted that self-transformation is a 
common occurrence in shamanistic healing rituals, and these transformations of 
subjectivity are frequently associated with therapeutic effect and well-being (Winkelman, 
2010; Pandian, 1991). A converging consensus is that self is an important locus of these 
healings, and to understand the process and mechanism of religious healing, it is 
important to understand how self is transformed (Csordas, 1994; Seligman, 2014; Itzhak, 
2010).  
Unfortunately, the understanding of self changes in literatures of shamanistic 




from anthropological studies of self. Therefore, it is separated from the general science of 
self. However, anthropological theories of self alone cannot represent the state of art of 
the science of self, as the latter is an interdisciplinary area where important theories and 
research have come from multiple disciplines, including not only anthropology, but also 
cognitive science, social psychology, clinical psychology, philosophy, neuroscience and 
more; together these disciplines provide insights on various aspects of self from different 
angles, and combine to promote deeper and more comprehensive understandings of self. 
Separated from the science of self and overly relying on anthropological theories of self, 
the understandings of shamanistic healing thereby tend to focus on the symbolic and 
stable aspects of self—self as disembodied, culturally determined, and consciously 
represented—and thus fail to engage the implicit, embodied, and dynamic characteristics 
of self-processes. This makes it particularly hard to capture the transformative dynamics 
of self, and also renders it difficult to construe how symbols and meanings could affect 
bodily states – if both the shamanistic rituals and self are understood as systems of 
meanings, then the interactions between them can only reside in the representational and 
abstract realm but not the bodily or physical realm. This theoretical foundation has 
shaped and limited how scholars construe self-transformation in shamanistic healing, and 
the lack of understanding of the transformative dynamics of self makes it necessary to 
incorporate scientific literature on self that can particularly help understand the dynamics 
of self, in particular, scientific literature that adopts the complex systems and dynamical 
systems approaches.  




what is the critical ingredient in psychological transformation – the symbolism, or the 
instrumental practices such as chanting, fasting, sensory deprivation, etc.? Much 
anthropological literature has a predominant focus on symbols and a lack of appreciation 
of the role of practices, while the psychological literature that acknowledges the role of 
practices tends to focus on the function of practices to invoke altered states of 
consciousness (Whitehead, 1987). As Whitehead (1987) criticizes, these psychological 
literature “too often leap[s] over the symbolic significance of the experiences to arrive at 
the frailties of brain mechanics, physiology, or biochemistry…” (p. 24). 
Therefore, this dissertation developed a self-transformation model that garnered 
and integrated converging insights and consensus from the fast-developing contemporary 
research on self, especially those that are particularly useful for capturing the 
transformative dynamics of the self-system. This renewed understanding of self then 
served as a basis upon which to reconsider multiple threads of research in religious 
studies on self-transformation. Then this theoretical model is implemented using a 
computational model, and simulations are run on it to test predictions. Based on this 
multidisciplinary theoretical integration and computational simulation, this dissertation 
generated and substantiated a model of self-transformation that underlies shamanistic 
healing processes.  
To be specific, chapter 1 introduces the context of shamanistic healing studies and 
why understanding the dynamics of self-transformation is important for understanding 
shamanistic healing, as well as methodological issues. Chapter 2 consists of a multi-




examines two important mechanisms—placebo effect and dissociation—and analyzes the 
limitations of using each to account for shamanistic healing efficacy. The first three 
chapters set up the basis for the investigation of the mechanism of self-transformation 
underlying shamanistic healing. 
Chapter 4 traverses through diverse subfields in self studies to integrate 
converging consensus that are helpful for understanding transformative dynamic patterns 
of self-transformation. A new theoretical framework of self that incorporates these 
important insights, especially those adopting the dynamical systems approach and the 
complex systems approach, is proposed. Based on this integrative framework of self, 
chapter 5 constructs a self-transformation model by synthesizing self studies with 
religious healing studies. This chapter first analyzed what scholars have frequently 
abstracted from the empirical data on religious self-transformation. Three groups of 
research were considered: cultural anthropology of ritual studies, psychology of religion 
on religious experience, and the study of forcible conversions and brainwashing. After 
presenting the strengths and weaknesses of these models, a model of self-transformation 
was proposed. This model synthesized insights from previous important models and was 
designed in such a way that it can benefit from and closely interact with important 
computational threads of research – in particular, the computational social science of self 
studies (see Nowak et al., 2000). Finally, chapter 6 set forth a cellular automata modeling 
of self-transformation to implement the theoretical transformation model built in the 





Self, similar to other complex adaptive systems, has an intrinsic self-organized 
tendency towards integration. The mutual constraints among basic self-relevant pieces of 
information give rise to global properties of self. The simulation results in chapter 6 have 
exhibited the self-organizing tendency of self. Due to this internal integrative tendency, 
clusters of evaluatively integrative areas form in the self-system. The self-system exhibits 
distinct dynamical features as a response to different degrees of integrative tendency. 
With a strong press for integration, the self-system forms a more differentiated 
integrative structure; the self-evaluation also becomes more positive, and it takes longer 
for self to restore stability after disruption. These results suggest that with sufficient 
cognitive resources to allow the self to have a strong integrative tendency, self will be 
more organized and integrated.  
A self with a strong integrative tendency is also more stable and less easily 
disturbed by external manipulation. In simulations that incorporate the influence of 
external information, results show that the external information has much less effect 
under strong integrative tendency than under weak integrative tendency. This is similar to 
the results of the society of self model, which also shows that stronger press for 
integration—which corresponds to “having sufficient cognitive resources available” 
(Nowak et al., 2000, p. 48) — “enables people to actively resist incoming information 
that might otherwise undermine their existing sense of self” (ibid), while with a weak 
press for integration, self is more subject to the manipulation of external information 
which “shakes up the system” (ibid). This helps to explain that when religious rituals 




often become more susceptible to contextual influence, such as healers’ suggestions or 
the influence of symbolic narratives. This finding is especially relevant to the 
understanding of the function of high-arousal religious rituals. The “cognitive resource 
depletion” theory of ritual practices proposed by Schjoedt and colleagues (2013) suggests 
that complex religious rituals exert a great demand on attention and emotional processing, 
which leaves the executive processes with insufficient cognitive resources. The 
inadequacy of cognitive resources weakens the internal structural constraints, which 
renders the structuring of the self-processing system more open to the influence of 
outside information. 
Moreover, religious rituals can facilitate the self integration of ritual participants. 
Simulation results show that, the higher the intensity of external information, the more 
influence it has on the self-system. But there is more subtlety to this correspondence: 
when information intensity increases but still remains within a moderate level, self 
becomes evaluatively more positive and integrated even if the external information is 
lower in valence than the information stored in the self-system. Nowak et al.’s simulation 
shows similar patterns, and they interpret this as showing that, when the external 
information is not too intense, it “has a way of facilitating the person’s self-integration” 
(Nowak et al. 2000, p. 50), and this “suggests that people may turn to others, not to learn 
specific things about themselves, but to facilitate their own internal process of achieving 
coherence in their self-concept” (ibid). This finding is relevant to the understanding of the 
function of participating in shamanistic rituals – just by attending these rituals, the self-




too intense, a self without sufficient cognitive resources may become powerfully 
manipulated by the external influence, which leaves the self vulnerable to potentially 
harmful or negative external information. Similar to Nowak’s interpretation of his model 
(2000), this dissertation interprets this as indicating that a self with a weak self-
organizing tendency will find it hard to reject external influence and thus will be 
vulnerable to evaluatively intense external information. Emotionally intense external 
ideas may easily be accepted and thus dominate self-development.   
However, this vulnerability also brings benefits. For patients with an ill-formed 
self—a self that is conflicted, with low self-esteem or major dissociative elements—
religious rituals with high arousal features could facilitate recovery even if the external 
information is neutral. In simulations that start with a self-structure resembling that of 
patients instead of the healthy population, results show that, for selves already inclined 
toward negative dominance, a weak press allowed the self to become more positive even 
if the external information is neutral. Interestingly, when the press is high, even positive 
external information may make self more negative. This indicates that strong press of 
integration prevents the ill self from benefiting from positive external information, which 
may explain why healers eagerly trigger trance states in patients—to lower patients’ ego 
defense and facilitate their benefitting from positive external influence.  
The simulations also generate interesting results in terms of the degree of trance 
level. In the simulations examining the effect of positive symbols instead of positive 
noise, it is shown that trance level needs to be controlled, as the best result is obtained 




increases but still stays within a moderate level, the healing effect becomes more obvious, 
indicating stronger healing effect. However, when the press for integration continues to 
increase to very high levels, the negativity of the self-system is instead worsened. This 
indicates that, starting from a certain point in time, a qualitative change occurs – the 
increasing of the press for integration no longer strengthens the healing effect but on the 
contrary prevents self from benefiting from positive symbolic influence. This is in 
agreement with the previous finding that a strong press for integration would make the 
self-organizing tendency so strong that it prevents any external factors from influencing 
intrinsic dynamics, and the self-organization would be dominated by intrinsic tendencies. 
This also indicates that when the symbolic effect is moderately high but not extremely 
intense, to achieve optimal healing effect, healers might need to control for the level of 
trance-like or hypnotizable state, and a deep trance or no-trance states may both be less 
effective than a medium-level trance state. However, this dynamic pattern does not hold 
when external symbols are evaluatively highly intense, as simulation results show that 
here the optimal healing effect is achieved when press is weakest and sacred symbols are 
emotionally highly intense. 
The dissertation also explores how long trance-like states should last to achieve 
optimal healing efficacy. The above simulations demonstrate that weakening the press for 
integration could help the ill self to benefit from positive symbolic influences, but does 
this mean that, the longer a low level of press for integration is maintained (i.e., the 
longer the trance-like states are maintained in patients), the better the healing efficacy? 




on rituals might have relevance to the effect (Conway & Siegelman, 1978/1995), and one 
unique advantage of dynamical systems modeling is to help find important temporal 
patterns that other methods find hard to capture. Simulation results show that, if press for 
integration is kept weak only for a short initial period and is then reset to a high value, a 
mixed outcome will appear: the final self-evaluation will be slightly lower than if the 
press is kept weak for the whole process, but the final self-integration will be better. At 
first glance, this may indicate that perhaps the longer the press for integration is kept 
weak, the better the final self-evaluation. Therefore, I ran optimization simulations to test 
this. The results show that, when symbols are not very positive in their valence, there is 
indeed a pattern that the longer we keep the weak press, the better the self-evaluation. 
However, after a short initial period, the gain in self-evaluation is much less evident. 
When the symbol is strongly positive, self-evaluation will instead start decreasing. This 
indicates that, when the symbolic influence is positive enough, a sufficiently positive 
self-evaluation can be achieved only by maintaining a weak press for integration only for 
a short time at the beginning; if the press is kept weak for a longer time, even if there is 
still a continuous exposure to positive symbolic information, the self-evaluation will 
decrease. In real life situations, the outcome of keeping a constant low value of press can 
be even more dangerous – it leaves self subject to any subsequent external influence, 
which is generally lower in valence than ritual sacred symbols. In summary, these 
simulations point to the possibility that the trance-like states should be kept only for a 
limited period of time, and trance-like states that are too brief or too long will both 




The dissertation also examines whether high-arousal ritual practices need to 
cooperate with the use of sacred symbols. Is it likely that what matters is solely the 
dancing, drumming, or other physical ritual practices, and that there may be no use in 
incorporating sacred symbols or myths into healing rituals? This corresponds to an 
important question: is it possible that what matters is to only generate altered states of 
consciousness by high-arousal ritual practices, which alone account for the therapeutic 
effects, and the symbols and myths are just accidental occurrences and have no necessary 
relation to the healing effects? The simulation results demonstrate that both matter: when 
weak press of integration combines with positive symbolic influence, self achieves the 
optimal state in terms of evaluation and differentiated integration. Not only does self 
becomes more positive in evaluation, but negative clusters in self are also eroded and 
broken into smaller pieces, which indicates the reintegration of dissociated negative self-
complexes. These important findings are in agreement with the theoretical model built in 
the last chapter: for the classic question of whether it is practices or symbols that matter, 
the answer is that both are critical causal factors. Their cooperation facilitates the 
development of self towards greater positivity and differential integration. This 
constitutes an understanding in the computational sense of why the co-presence of high-
arousal ritual practices and symbolic mythic narratives is almost a cross-culturally 
universal phenomenon appearing in shamanistic ritual settings, and why when ritual 
practices and symbolic narratives work together, it normally results in optimal therapeutic 
outcomes (Seligman, 2014; Whitehead, 1987). 




conclusions relevant to the following important topics in shamanistic healing studies. 
First, self, as a complex system with an integrative tendency, is transformed following the 
thermodynamic principle of entropy control, and one reflection of this principle is the 
press for integration. This dynamical rule is reflected in the two-stage global pattern of 
self-transformation – disruption and reintegration: self can be disrupted as a function of 
the weakening of the self-integration tendency and by the inputting of external 
information; after self has been disturbed, the intrinsic press for integration propels it to 
reintegrate, and this reintegration process can also be affected by symbolic guidance. This 
dissertation also demonstrates that religious ritual practices and sacred symbols both 
matter in the self-transformation process. Religious ritual practices such as dancing, 
drumming, or fasting loosen self structuring tendencies, but this process does not itself 
guarantee the change of self in a therapeutic direction. This is because symbolic images 
and myths also engage in the self-transformation process, not by working on a passive 
self, but by interacting with the existing structures and self-organizing tendencies of the 
self-system. Sacred symbols that are frequently made salient in shamanistic healing 
rituals are imbued with self-relevant information, which often arouses intense emotional 
responses and strongly affects self-understanding and self-development; those symbols 
also guide self-transformation by providing ideal possible selves as well as scripts for role 
play.  
Contributions 
It is not a completely new observation that self-transformation is a key process 




incorporate the current multidisciplinary research on self, especially the important 
converging consensus and insights gained from the dynamical systems and complex 
systems approaches to self. As self has been increasingly recognized as a complex 
adaptive system that follows dynamical rules, it is important and even necessary to 
incorporate these new findings into religious studies, without which it is hard to construe 
in a rigorous way how self is transformed. This dissertation constitutes a step towards this 
incorporation by forming an integrated framework of self and applying it to interaction 
with multiple threads of religious studies on psychological transformations (i.e., 
psychology of religion, cultural anthropological studies of ritual healing, and forcible 
conversion and brainwashing), as the basis for a well-grounded self-transformation model. 
This helps to situate shamanistic healing within a larger evolutionary, informational, and 
physical context. 
Conceptualizing shamanistic healing using this disruption-reintegration model 
helps us to understand a classic topic in shamanistic healing, or indeed in the broader 
arena of religious healing: how are we to put into proper perspective the roles played by 
ritual practices and the symbolic effects? The author does not claim credit for being the 
first to hypothesize that ritual practice and symbols both play important roles (see 
Seligman, 2014; Whitehead, 1987), but previous studies often found it hard to explore the 
complex dynamics and relationships between these two factors in a rigorous way. This 
dissertation not only situates the understanding of this topic within a rigorous and 




and simulation techniques to test the validity of that hypothesis, and provides a formal 
understanding of this topic.  
It has long remained a difficult question to find the rationale for the diverse forms 
of shamanistic healing practices that span such a wide range, from repetitive dancing and 
drumming, to consuming psychedelics, to sensory deprivation or bombardment and 
fasting. There have been many attempts to explain the functions of these practices, but 
most propositions either lack width of coverage or specificity. This model treats those 
various forms of practice as essentially techniques of destabilizing the self-system. Self is 
a hierarchical system, the different levels of which form circular causation, so that a 
perturbation on one level could affect lower and upper levels. These techniques of self-
destabilization attack different levels of self-processing through top-down and bottom-up 
pathways, until the self-processing pattern can no longer hold the necessary degree of 
stable connections and the old attractor is broken, which creates space for the formation 
of new attractors. This model can also provide an integrated understanding of diverse 
phenomenal experiences occurring in patients and/or shamans in healing rituals. As noted 
by Whitehead (1987), instrumental practices in rituals produce similar syndromes—loss 
of control, sudden organization of perspective, increased suggestibility and dependency, 
and the sense of rejuvenation, etc. These various forms of altered states of consciousness 
may be phenomenal-level reflections of a reduced level of the press for integration in self, 
or the state of the self-system when an old attractor of brain connectivity breaks up and a 
new attractor has not yet been formed. Moreover, this model can better explain why 




destabilized, the patient enters a stage of higher malleability, and the reduced press for 
integration corresponds to weak mutual constraints between ideas and thoughts, which 
leaves the mind more susceptible to external information. This model helps understand 
why trance states seem to pave the way for the effective use of shamanistic techniques.    
This model, construing self-transformation in terms of a nonlinear process where 
old attractors are broken, creating opportunities for the formation of new ones, supports a 
novel conceptualization of the nature of shamanistic healing; that is, destabilizing biased 
self-processing attractors constitutes an important factor in shamanistic healing processes. 
Similarly, as Shapiro (2014) says about psychotherapies in general, “One function of 
therapeutic interventions becomes to shift the patient’s system away from its rigid 
equilibrium or chaotic attractors, thus allowing for new bifurcations to create a more 
functional attractor landscape and for the self-organizing process to reestablish itself” (p. 
190). The model proposed here emphasizes that shamanistic healing rituals have the 
potential to provide a short window of opportunity to reconstruct biased self-processing 
patterns, or, more exactly, to spur the self-organizing self to reconstruct itself. Although 
as Freeman (2001) laments, not much is known about the neurochemistry and the brain 
dynamics underlying this abrupt transformation process, yet with computational 
simulation techniques, we may detect further formal principles.  
  This dissertation has also demonstrated the potential and relevance of dynamical-
system modeling and computational simulation in exploring the mechanisms underlying 
shamanistic healing. As the simulation results are consistent with many previous 




potential usefulness of the self-transformation model, this dissertation may constitute a 
heuristic of how computational approaches may apply to the understanding of critical 
issues in religious healing studies, which normally involve psychological processes of 
remarkably complexity. For instance, although the theoretical self-transformation model 
takes trance-triggering ritual practices and the symbolic effect of sacred images and myth 
as two essential control parameters, the theory alone cannot answer the question 
definitively, “Are these real possibilities, or are they just fanciful speculations?” (Cohen, 
2007, p. 204). As Feynman (1998) says, “The rate of the development of science is not 
the rate at which you make observations alone but, much more important, the rate at 
which you create new things to test” (p. 27). This is why we need ways of testing. A 
computational simulation test is a powerful tool that informs us whether the hypothesis is 
promising and deserves further exploration, or whether it would be better to “look in new 
directions for more powerful explanations” (Cohen 2007, p. 204). Although 
computational simulation has some weaknesses as a testing method (for instance, the 
quantification of parameters may lack sufficient empirical basis), it does have the 
following advantages: first, the implementation of a formal model requires a high level of 
specification, which forces conceptual clarity on any theories. This is also a risk-free way 
to test any possible scenarios, and can also save money and time compared with 
experiments on human subjects. Moreover, by defining an explicit computational process 
for each theory, one can test which one among the competing theories produces the 
expected outputs and thus has stronger explanatory power. Furthermore, by specifying 




directly test causal relations and any possible temporal patterns.  
 The computational simulation results of this dissertation also provide directions 
for future empirical exploration of phenomena that may reflect the dynamical principles 
and patterns that emerged in the simulations. For instance, the simulation results suggest 
that a temporally limited invocation of trance states achieves better therapeutic results 
than a long-lasting one. This indicates that future empirical research may explore the 
relationship between the duration of trance-states and the degree of healing effects. As 
McClelland puts it, “an explicit computational perspective often leads to new ways of 
understanding observed phenomena that are apparently not always accessible to those 
who seek to identify subsystems without giving detailed consideration to the mechanisms 
involved” (O’Reilly & Munakata 2000, p. xxi). These advantages may account for why 
computational modeling efforts “are becoming more and more central to the effort to 
understand the nature of the underlying mechanisms of cognition” (p. xxii). However, it 
should be noted again that the computational approach is not meant to substitute for other 
methods, but to form a complementary relationship with them. The ethnographical 
research, verbal reports, and other empirical methods are essential for providing 
empirical data, which provides constraints as well as ways of testing the computational 
insights.  
 Moreover, by closely examining the limitations of adopting mechanisms such as 
the placebo effect or dissociation to account for religious healing efficacy, this 




anthropology and medical anthropology, greatly enriching it by drawing from the 
emerging paradigm of the dynamic systems approach and the study of complex systems.  
This self framework may also facilitate a deeper understanding of individual 
variability in terms of people’s susceptibility to the benefits of religious and ritual healing. 
People with certain self signatures, such as an aptness to loosen the press for integration, 
may be more susceptible to self-mediated psychosomatic disorders but may also benefit 
more from religious healing. As Seligman and Kirmayer (2008) suggest about the 
individual variation in dissociation, “The individual variation in dissociation may reflect 
personality or life events including exposure to trauma. There is a need to systematically 
inquire into the role of trauma and other aspects of developmental history in the life 
trajectories of individuals involved in dissociative practices” (p. 25). The same goes for 
the variation in individuals’ structural and dynamic tendencies of self.  
 This dissertation also has practical implications. Just as abnormal psychological 
phenomena have provided great insights for the understanding of normal psychology, this 
renewed understanding of unusual or exotic events in shamanistic healing might provide 
insights for current medical understanding of human psychophysiology.  It may 
contribute to bridging the gap between alternative healing studies and the modern 
biomedical framework, motivating the biomedical model to learn from the science and 
arts of religious healing. It may also provide practical information for individuals who are 
eager either to understand their responses during alternative healing sessions or to search 




nexus of mind and body, both for individuals and for the medical field, and thus may 
contribute to the understanding of mind-body effects not rarely observed in daily life.  
Limitations 
The computational model, although based on a classic computational model in 
self studies (see Nowak et al., 2000), is still at an early stage. The control parameters are 
limited in number and in need of future iterations to provide more constraints. Although 
simplicity of modeling is not necessarily a weakness in itself—as Vallacher and Nowak 
(1997) have pointed out, “the goal of science is to find the simplest possible explanations 
for phenomena” (p. 85), and the isolation of a limited number of critical variables is the 
necessary way to reach succinct but powerful explanations—yet there is always a risk 
that the control parameters isolated here may not be the most appropriate ones. Indeed, it 
is possible that this study misses critical control parameters. For example, rather than 
integration based on evaluation, it is possible that the self may integrate according to 
features of information content, which the cellular automata model could not capture. 
Using this model to understand related religious phenomena thus runs the risk of 
distorting or over-simplifying the complexity of phenomena. Therefore, when applied to 
a particular phenomenon, this model should be used to provide a useful and potentially 
important angle to tackle the complexity of that phenomenon, rather than to reduce the 
complexity of the concrete object to fit an abstract model.  
Moreover, although computational simulation has its advantages as a testing 
method, its power to confirm the validity of a theory is partial and needs to be 




empirical experiments may generate data that disprove the findings of this dissertation, 
although currently due to the complexity of the phenomena and the potential risks 
involved in the self-transformation process, it is hard to imagine how to design proper 
empirical experiments that can test the causal mechanism of self-transformation.   
 Furthermore, although this dissertation systematically examines multidisciplinary 
studies of self, the integration of those numerous findings from self studies might still be 
partial or biased, as it would require more than a lifetime to traverse through all the 
valuable formulations about the nature of self (see Gallagher & Shear, 1999; James, 
1890/2013; Klein & Gangi, 2010; Metzinger, 2004, 2010; Mischel, 1977; Popper & 
Eccles, 1981; Rosenberg, 1986; Strawson, 1999, 2009), and the scope of a dissertation is 
far less than what is needed to achieve a definite understanding of self. 
Despite these limitations, hopefully this research has shown the potential of the 
computational approach as a formal platform for exploring the complex mechanical 
processes underlying shamanistic healing, which may serve as the basis for understanding 
and designing more effective treatments of disorders, and may inspire more researchers 
to take further steps in this direction. Hopefully it is also a valuable step toward fulfilling 
the ambition “to stimulate and contribute to the advancement of the data-driven 
generation, systematic testing, and broad reinstatement of explanatory theory” (Cohen, 
2010, p. 171) in religious healing studies. The goal is not to demonstrate that the model 
proposed here is a definite conclusion, as “no approach, no researcher, no writer, and no 
book will speak the last word” (Wildman, 2011, p. xi) on these complex phenomena, but 




Recommendations for future research 
Future modeling efforts may explore other control parameters that may prove to 
be critical. For example, the healer’s radical empathy has been believed to be a crucial 
element in the shamanistic healing (Koss-Chioino, 2006), and a future formal model may 
figure out ways to incorporate this as a control parameter. By continuing testing with 
other variables we may arrive at a deeper understanding of the observables. As each 
modeling technique has its own strengths and limitations, researchers may also explore 
other techniques of modeling other than cellular automata modeling, such as neural 
network modeling, for instance, which is also frequently used in computational social 
science and cognitive science. 
The self-transformation model may also be applied to understanding other areas 
of religious phenomena, such as religious conversions. Many religious phenomena 
involve psychological changes, and this dissertation’s self-transformation model, which 
is embedded in a broader evolutionary and physical context, may provide new insights on 
these topics. The computational modeling and simulation used here might also be 
usefully applied to other topics in religious studies, as a way to add rigor and specificity 
to the understanding of other religious phenomena. 
There is a great potential for research programs using different methodologies to 
work together. For instance, empirical experiments, detailed descriptions from 
ethnographical research, psychometrics, and subjective self-reports can generate more 
data as constraints for modeling efforts, while modeling and simulation results that show 




experiments and where they could look for trends in these experiments. For instance, 
since the computational simulations of this dissertation highlighted changes in self-
integration and self-evaluation, both psychologists of religion and ethnographical 
researchers may consider using psychometrics that measure self-integration and self-
esteem to look for potentially important patterns in their studies. Moreover, these 
simulations also showed that there is a temporal pattern concerning the usage of religious 
ritual practices and therapeutic outcome, and future ethnographical studies may explore 
this pattern in their field work.  
 Cohen (2007) concludes her research on spirit possession as follows: 
The claims that I have tentatively advanced in this book are of little scientific 
interest if not appreciably uncertain and potentially testable. Testability demands 
precision and measurability. … Yet, how much more fulfilling it would be to say 
something about the transmission of spirit phenomena (and cultural transmission 
in general) with even a tiny measure of certainty than with none at all; to be able 
to hold to some provisional knowledge that something is the case (or that 
something isn't the case) than to seek refuge in some cherished hunch, fashionable 
vogue, or imaginative—but untestable—construct. (p. 204)  
 
Similarly, the claims advanced in this dissertation also have a certain degree of 
uncertainty and should not be taken as the last word on this topic. However, by offering 
“even a tiny measure of certainty” (Cohen, p. 204), hopefully this dissertation will push 




delve deeply into this profoundly interesting, complex and important issue, and generate 
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